December 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, December 2005

Joan Didion, A Book of Common Prayer
Joan Didion, Democracy
My problem with reading Didion is that she always leaves me feeling intoxicated, because her prose is so good. This does not make for intelligent book-chat on my part, so I'll just quote a choice paragraph.
"I thought about this precisely what Inez must have thought about this, but it was irrelevant. I thought there had been papers shredded all over the Pacific the night she was flying Jack Lovett's body from Jakarta to Schofield, but it was irrelevant. We were sitting in a swamp forest on the edge of Asia in a city that had barely existed a century before and existed now only as the flotsam of some territorial imperative and a woman who had once thought of living in the White House was flicking termites from her teacup and telling me about landing on a series of coral atolls in a seven-passenger plane with a man in a body bag."
Aldous Huxley, The Devils of Loudun
A fascinating story, well-told and with an unimpeachable moral (from Montaigne: "after all, it is rating one's conjectures at a very high price to roast a man alive on the strength of them"). The depiction of a 17th century Europe where almost everyone was, by my lights, either batshit insane or deeply reprehensible or both is only too convincing (but I'm biased to think that anyway). Dividing through for Huxley's peculiar personal metaphysics and theology — excuse me, the Perennial Philosophy — is easy. (Though it's amusing to see him work his way from calling us to strive for upward self-transdence, issuing in a realization of our union with the non-dual Ground of all Being, to sounding like John Dewey: "Transferred from the laboratory and the study to the church, the parliament and the council chamber, the notion of working hypotheses might liberate mankind from its collective insanities, its chronic compulsions to wholesale murder and mass suicide". For that matter, the passage in chapter 11 about the need to mortify "our fatal tendency to set up something of our own contriving in the place of nature", by accepting instead the given facts, sounds very like his own grandfather, in the famous letter to Charles Kingsley where he says to "sit down before fact as a little child", etc.) More annoying to me, it's not always so easy to tell when he's relying on actual records, and when he's falling back on the novelist's habit of making up stuff that sounds like it'd fit.
Alexis Jacquemin, The New Industrial Organization: Market Forces and Strategic Behavior
"New" in 1985, when this was published as Selection et pouvoir dans la nouvelle economie industrielle (trans. Fatemeh Mehta). Therefore a little dated, but still an interesting look at the relationship between evolutionary processes and strategic action, and how both of them undermine arguments (a la Friedman or Alchain) that evolutionary competition will make economic agents act as though they were rational utility maximizers, and deliver us to the promised land of Pareto optimality. Jacquemin's last sections, however, on sociobiology, general evolution, etc., are dismissible. (Countering E. O. Wilson with Teilhard de Chardin is countering one mass of hopeful, hopelessly-ill-informed musings with another mass of musings, even more hopeful and even more hopeless.) Suitable for anyone who knows a little game theory (basically, what Nash equilibrium is), and a little more about industrial organization (Cournot and Bertrand models, etc.) — say the level of Cabral's introductory book.
Ursula K. Le Guin, Four Ways to Forgiveness
Slavery, politics, martial and servile stoicism, clear-eyed views of the unlimited weirdness and enduring fucked-up-ness of humanity, women's liberation, and four whopping, convincing helpings of redeeming love.
George R. R. Martin, A Feast for Crows
Volume 4 in the on-going saga. A trifle unsatisfying, because, while it continues the story nicely, it doesn't resolve much. This seems to be because it's only half of the current installment, the other half of which should be out next year. I almost wish it was much worse, because then I could write off the story, but it's still good and I need to know what happens, damn him.
Andrew J. Polsky, The Rise of the Therapeutic State
An interesting history of the origin and establishment of the institutions of social casework and "public tutelage". Sadly, reading Foucault has led Polsky to over-use and reify "power", and to use "discourse", "discursive movement", "discursive framework", etc., in a most unhelpful fashion.
Christopher Moore, The Stupidest Angel: A Heartwarming Tale of Christmas Terror
How the true spirit of Christmas is exemplified by showing your beloved that you embrace the less socially-acceptable sides of their character (without going so far as to encourage them to "do some crimes"). Also by road-side graves, obscene old barmaids, and zombies who covet IKEA and brains.
Paul Park, A Princess of Roumania
I am very cross with Henry Farrell for getting me to read this very good novel, while not warning me that THE STORY IS NOT FINISHED.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at December 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

"Not actually surprising to anyone who had bothered to think"

From Joan Didion's Democracy. Applications to current events are entirely your affair.

At the time I thought that she had decided to talk to me only because Jack Lovett's name was just beginning to leak out of the various investigations into arms and currency and technology dealings on the part of certain former or perhaps even current overt and covert agents of the United States government. There had even been hints about narcotics dealings, which, although they made good copy and were played large in the early coverage (I recall the phrase "Golden Triangle" in many headlines, and a photograph of two blurred figures leaving a house on Victoria Peak, one identified as a "sometimes Lovett business associate" and the other as a "known Hong Kong Triad opium lord"), remained just that, hints, rumors, that would never be substantiated, but the other allegations were solid enough, and not actually surprising to anyone who had bothered to think about what Jack Lovett was doing in that part of the world.

There had been the affiliations with interlocking transport and air courier companies devoid of real assets. There had been the directorship of the bank in Vila that put the peculiarities of condominium government to such creative use. There had been all the special assignments and the special consultancies and the special relationships in a fluid world where the collection of information was indistinguishable from the use of information and where national and private interests (the interests of state and non-state actors, Jack Lovett would have said) did not collide but merged into a single pool of exchanged favors.

In order to understand what Jack Lovett did it was necessary only to understand how natural it was for him to do it, how at once entirely absorbing and supremely easy. There had always been that talent for putting the right people together, the right man at the Department of Defense, say, with the right man at Livermore or Los Alamos or Brookhaven, or, a more specific example with a more immediately calculable payout, the Director of Base Development for CINCPAC/MACV with Dwight Christian.

There had always been something else as well.

There had been that emotional solitude, a detachment that extended to questions of national or political loyalty.

It would be inaccurate to call Jack Lovett disloyal, although I suppose some people did at the time.

It would be accurate only to say that he regarded the country on whose passport he traveled as an abstraction, a state actor, one of several to be factored into any given play.

In other words.

What Jack Lovett did was never black or white, and in the long run may even have been (since the principal gain to him was another abstraction, the pyramiding of further information) devoid of ethical content altogether, but since shades of grey tended not to reproduce in the newspapers the story was not looking good on a breaking basis. That Jack Lovett had reportedly made some elusive deals with the failed third force (or fourth force, or fifth force, this was a story on which the bottom kept dropping out) in Phnom Penh in those days after the embassy closed there did not look good. That the London dealer who was selling American arms abandoned in South Vietnam had received delivery from one of Jack Lovett's cargo services did not look good....

This is from the end of chapter 2 in part 4 --- pp. 207--209 of the Pocket Books edition (New York, 1985).

The Commonwealth of Letters; The Running-Dogs of Reaction

Posted by crshalizi at December 31, 2005 11:41 | permanent link

December 30, 2005

Friday Cat Blogging ("Hear, Kitty!" Issue of Science Geek Edition)

It's been a while since I did one of these, hasn't it? But sometimes they just hop onto the keyboard and start meowing in my face.

D. K. Ryugo, E. A. Kretzmer and J. K. Niparko, "Restoration of Auditory Nerves Synapses in Cats by Cochlear Implants", Science 310 (2005): 1490--1492 [no freely available version?]
Abstract: Congenital deafness results in abnormal synaptic structure in endings of the auditory nerve. If these abnormalities persist after restoration of auditory nerve activity by a cochlear implant, the processing of time-varying signals such as speech would likely be impaired. We stimulated congenitally deaf cats for 3 months with a six-channel cochlear implant. The device used human speech-processing programs, and cats responded to environmental sounds. Auditory nerve fibers exhibited a recovery of normal synaptic structure in these cats. This rescue of synapses is attributed to a return of spike activity in the auditory nerve and may help explain cochlear implant benefits in childhood deafness.

In this paper, Ryugo et al. are mostly concerned with structures at the synapses in certain nerve fibers, rejoicing in the name of "the endbulbs of Held", which they describe in fairly flowery language: "Endbulbs have a calyxlike appearance that is formed from the main axon as several gnarled branches that arborize repeatedly to enclose the postsynaptic cell in a nest of en passant swellings and terminal boutons." These are abnormal in congenitally deaf animals: they don't branch so much, they're enlarged, they've got a flat rather than an undulating profile, and they've got fewer of the vesicles containing neurotransmitters that make synapses work. Not surprisingly, these endbulbs don't seem to transmit signals very well. This is a problem, especially since the nerve pathways where they tend to be found are the ones which encode precise timing information about sounds, important alike for for predators fond of twilight and leaping in ambush, and for chattering East African Plains Apes ("The critical nature of temporal resolution in facilitating speech recognition is underscored by studies that show speech recognition based on temporal cues while spectral content is systematically degraded").

What they did was to take congenitally deaf cats and, as kittens, give them cochlear implants which restored their capacity to hear. The physical capacity was verified by recording the propagation of neural signals; also by the fact that "we could routinely 'call' implanted cats for a food reward." After several months, they examined the development of the end-bulbs of Held in these cats, compared to matched normal animals, and to congenitally deaf cats which received no implant. (Don't ask how.) The results, photographically, are pretty convincing: the endbulbs look a lot more like those of normal cats than deaf, non-implanted cats, and quantitative comparisons of e.g. size are also fairly persuasive.

It would be interesting to know how old cats can be before simply providing the cochlear implant isn't enough for these synapses to develop properly. They speculate (but don't really show) that the same effect takes place in people, and that this is why congenitally deaf children benefit more from implants the earlier they get them. If that's so, it would just reinforce the importance of making sure all the children who need them get such implants swiftly. It would also make it nice to know what (if anything) could be done in conjunction with such implants, to help gnarl-up children's endbulbs.

Notice, by the way, that, as I've had occasion to remark before, that the whole nature-nurture division is not actually useful to understanding what's going on in processes like the development of hearing in these cats. (Go on, calculate a heritability here and tell me it means something, I dare you.) But this is generally the case with cognition.

Friday Cat Blogging; Minds, Brains, and Neurons

Posted by crshalizi at December 30, 2005 23:08 | permanent link

December 05, 2005

Strike-Breaking at NYU

NYU's graduate student teaching assistants are unionized, and have been for several years, but the National Labor Relations Board recently reversed itself and ruled that the university did not have to recognize the union or negotiate with it. The teaching assistants are now on strike, apparently with wide support from the faculty (so that the administration has been snooping through course websites to see who the faculty sympathizers are). To break the strike, NYU's president, John Sexton, is threatening to withhold the whole semester's stipend from any TAs who are not back to work by today, and that any TAs who strike next semester will lose their stipend for the whole year. I understand withholding wages during a strike, but this is simply vicious, and so far as I can work out would be illegal in any normal labor dispute. (Of course Sexton's position is that the TAs are not really employees, which is hogwash.) You can sign a petition against this travesty via Faculty Democracy at New York University. Leaving aside the claims of justice and elementary fairness, how many other chances will you have to agree with Andrew Ross and Alan Sokal?

(Surveying the treatment of our graduate student employees from the lofty perch of half a year on the faculty, it seems to me that CMU, at least in the statistics department, treats them pretty well, and much better than we had it at Madison when I was a TA there, and a member of AFT local #3220. But still, if they wanted to unionize, I'd be completely behind them, and I think it's idiotic and reprehensible for universities to refuse to even recognize and negotiate with graduate student unions. Unions can ask for stupid and/or selfish things, of course — which distinguishes them from any other organization how, exactly? — but the merits of particular proposals isn't the issue here; punishing people who attempt to organize to exert their rights is.)

Via John Burke (in e-mail) and Michael Bérubé; reporting and photos of the strike from Majikthise.

Update, 7 December 2005: I now see that Asad Raza, one of the strikers, has been filing dispatches (1, 2) at Three Quarks Daily.

Manual trackback: Crooked Timber

The Progressive Forces; Learned Folly

Posted by crshalizi at December 05, 2005 12:19 | permanent link

November 30, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, November 2005

Peter Burke, The Renaissance Sense of the Past
A nicely-turned little essay (150 or so pages), with copious illustrative quotations, on how the Renaissance developed a proper historical sense — with the ability to criticize sources and traditions, give explanations, and recognize change — out of the exceedingly unpromising materials left them by their medieval predecessors, and by imitating the ancients, especially the Romans. Burke assumes a reader familiar with at least the outlines of Renaissance history, but little more. The concluding few pages on the comparative sociology of historiography (i.e., China) are however unsatisfactory; see rather Brown's Hierarchy, History, and Human Nature: The Social Origins of Historical Consciousness.
Dino Buzzati, The Tartar Steppe
Nothing, actually, to do with Tartars. Instead a moving mixture of the way certain sorts of twilight, and certain harsh landscapes, can evoke feelings of mystery and intimations of some great beyond; the way youth slips through our fingers; the way life can slip through our fingers; the cost of a letting everything slip away while waiting for some great moment of glory; ways of meeting death. Having just finished the book, I discover a nice essay on it by Tim Parks.
Walter Jon Williams, Dread Empire's Fall: The Praxis, The Sundering, Conventions of War
Space opera, with ugly cover art and highly misleading blurbs; also really good novels. The politics is in some respects standard-issue space opera feudalism, but Williams has actually thought about how that could work, and what it would mean for most people. (His nobles are the descendants of the principal collaborators in the genocidal conquest of humanity by aliens, for example — and there is no inspiring plebian revolt in the offing.) The real strength, here, though, is in his ability to evoke social situations, and emotions. I don't think I've ever read a better portrayal of the special intoxication which comes when sexual love coincides with intellectual collaboration. And The Praxis, in particular, contains an embedded novella about identity, ambition, friendship and betrayal which is simply devastating, and integral to the larger plot.
Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy
Or: the vast right wing conspiracy: how it works and for whom. There are a lot of important (and depressing) ideas and findings in this. Cries out out for both detailed empirical, scientific work (via social network analysis), and political activism (though I'm less sure what the best way to go is there). For more details, see Henry Farrell's review.
Gavin Young, In Search of Conrad
Sailing around southeast Asia, re-visiting the scenes of Conrad's life and fiction. Utterly charming; makes me wish I didn't get sea-sick, and fills me with a craving to read more Conrad.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at November 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

In the Mountains of Madness, East of Las Vegas, New Mexico

What mysterious civilization carved these designs in the high desert — designs which can only be seen from the air?

Did these so-called primitives unravel the mysteries of electricity by themselves?

For how many aeons have these forbidding mountains born witness to eldritch rites?

What disturbing pre-human legends are engraved on these tablets — products of an advanced metallurgy far beyond any native to the region?

Which unspeakable cult conceals its world-shattering secrets and shambling, amorphous blasphemies behind the walls of its armed compound nearby?

Would you like red, green, or Christmas with your clams?

Psychoceramica; Cthulhiana

Posted by crshalizi at November 30, 2005 13:24 | permanent link

November 26, 2005

All of Peer Review

Larry "All of Statistics/All of Nonparametric Statistics" Wasserman has just started a weblog, The Academic Curmudgeon. By my count, this brings the number of faculty blogs in the department to three (and the proportion to about 0.09); none of our students seem to have any. Larry's second post is about peer review.

Here is a summary of common reasons for rejecting papers:
    Good Reasons For Rejecting a Paper:
  1. The results are incorrect (unfixable, critical errors).
  2. The results are not new.
    Bad Reasons For Rejecting a Paper:
  1. The referee doesn't like the paper.
  2. The referee doesn't like the author's approach.
    Tricky:
  1. The contribution of the paper is too small.

Numbers 3 and 4 are bad because they are based on the taste of the referee which is far too subjective. Number 5 is problematic. True, we don't necessarily want top journals publishing every small idea that occurs to someone. The problem is this: almost all research, including good research, is incremental. The idea that most papers in top journals are breakthough papers is fantasy. What is too incremental to publish is highly subjective.

I think the basic problem is that most referees have the wrong view of the purpose of publishing. Ideally, publishing is about disseminating knowledge. It should not be regarded as admittance to a high and mighty priesthood.

I am going to use Larry's post as an excuse to ruminate about peer review, partly because I spent yesterday whittling down the stack of manuscripts I'd agreed, in weak moments, to review, and partly because I think Larry might be unhappy with my refereeing. Maybe he gets to see a better class of manuscript than I do (I wouldn't be surprised), but it seems to me that his list of good reasons to reject a paper is seriously incomplete.

  1. The paper is so ill-written that it is not comprehensible with reasonable effort. (This is distinct from bad English, where I generally respond with a long list of corrections.)
  2. The paper is comprehensible, but so vague that one cannot tell what was actually done.
  3. One can tell what was done, but none of it amounts to a result — the experiments are inconclusive at best, the simulations wander aimlessly, the math is mere algebraic noodling.
  4. There are results alright, but they're all old ones with a new set of labels attached to the variables. (Algorithmic information theory and the logistic map are favorite targets for this treatment.)
  5. There are new results, but they belong in a different journal. (Physical Review keeps sending me papers that are, as far as I can tell, perfectly decent and straightforward ventures into population dynamics, and I keep telling the authors that there are journals like Theoretical Population Biology and the Journal of Theoretical Biology...)

I am happy to reject papers on such grounds, because they seem to follow from my understanding of the point of peer review. This is, as Larry says, about the dissemination of knowledge, not initiation into a priesthood. But the people peer-reviewers serve are not the authors but the potential readers. Passing peer review ought to endorse a manuscript, not as correct, but as possibly worthy of attention: not obviously wrong, not disconnected from the field, not out to lunch, not a waste of the reader's time. (This is more modest, and more achievable, than actively picking out the good stuff; it's a type I/type II error issue.) One important wrinkle here is that, if you're already an expert in a given field, the extra value of having somebody else filter the stream of manuscripts in that field is small — part of your expertise is being able to make such judgments reliably and cheaply yourself. But if you need to use results or ideas from another field, then you either need to become an expert there, too, or you need experts there to tell you what's worth attention. Very few scientists never need ideas from other fields, which is to say that most of us will benefit from peer review. (Similarly for hiring and tenure, but let's not dwell on such unpleasant subjects.) For complete non-experts, i.e., the lay public who ultimately support us all, peer review is about the only way they have of telling possibly-legitimate scientists from the cranks and the frauds. (More exactly, because peer review only says "not obviously wrong": anyone who can't get over the peer review barrier is so weak as to not be worth bothering with.)

I rather doubt, however, that the current journal/peer-review system is the ideal way of doing this filtering. Journals can be too conservative. Journals can not be conservative enough, when the topic is fashionable. (Not that I have anything in mind.) Journals can get locked into a vicious cycle in which they become so bad that publication there constitutes an anti-endorsement, so that only really bad scientists publish there, and they in turn become recruited as referees. (Still, an anti-endorsement is not without its own value.) There is something perverse about refereeing for commercial publishers, since publishers charge scientists larcenous rates to bring them the results of free labor on the part of authors and referees.

Ultimately, I hope that we move away from the current system towards something more like Paul Ginsparg's ideas. He envisions a system of "tiers" of publication; the lowest tiers, like the current arxiv.org, would have nearly-open submission and dissemination, and be most valuable to experts. Above them, operating more slowly, would be more selective tiers of peer review, commentary, review papers, etc., which will be more valuable to less expert readers, and won't try to filter the whole manuscript stream, which is what peer review now does. Getting there from here will probably involve lining the war-mongering parasites at Elsevier up against a wall a good deal of time and effort, but would lead to something much more efficient and intellectually valuable.

And now, back to revising our manuscript to please its referees.

Update, 29 November 2005: Dave Feldman, propelled by the burning need to procrastinate which drives so many academics to blogging, suggests that the peer review system would be much improved by free socks. He's right.

Update, 7 December 2005: For once, I wish I had comments here. (I don't feel like committing myself to the endless struggle against spam.) "Cog", of The Abstract Factory, writes in (quoted with permission):

I believe your 3 and 4 are subspecies of "the contribution is too small" (5 on Larry's list). Your 1 and 2 are both subspecies of "the paper does not communicate effectively enough for the contribution to be evaluated", which is a new reason. Number 5 is also a new reason. So you've really come up with two distinct extra reasons.

I would actually subsume Larry's reason 1, and your 1+2 under:

1'. The results are not clearly shown to be (probably) correct.

Because, of course, the burden of proof is on the authors to convince the reader that their result is not obviously wrong, not on the reviewer to show that the result is obviously wrong. To discharge this obligation requires both technical soundness and effective, precise communication.

Manual Trackback: An Ergodic Walk

The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts; Learned Folly

Posted by crshalizi at November 26, 2005 11:40 | permanent link

November 13, 2005

"Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, Objectivity, Rationality": The Names Men Give to Their Mistakes

Deborah Mayo's great book on Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge was published in 1996. In it, she lays out a way of thinking about statistics, and about learning from experience more generally, which is at once principled, powerful and useful. It helps make sense of what we already do, and suggests new ways in which we can improve our practices. I read it in 1998, and it roused me from my dogmatic slumbers about statistical inference. It's hard to imagine another path to where I am now if I hadn't read it. All of which is to say that I was very pleased to find the following in my inbox this morning:


First Symposium on
Philosophy, History, and Methodology of
E.R.R.O.R*
*Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, Objectivity & Rationality:
Induction, Statistics, Modelling
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA
June 1-5, 2006

Check out the invited speakers and the call for papers.

Enigmas of Chance; Philosophy

Posted by crshalizi at November 13, 2005 11:37 | permanent link

November 08, 2005

Statistics 754, Stochastic Processes (Advanced Probability II)

General course information (includes gratuitous eye-candy), syllabus, detailed course outline. To ward off the evil eye, I should say that I do not expect to get through all of what's in the outline. (Suggestions about the outline are still most welcome.) Lecture notes will be posted on the course website as I write them. Thanks, again, to everyone who helped me pick a text.

Update, January 2006: See downstream for links to the lecture notes.

Enigmas of Chance; Corrupting the Young

Posted by crshalizi at November 08, 2005 12:51 | permanent link

November 05, 2005

"Ceterum censeo, Carthago delenda est" (Saturday Classical Precedent Blogging)

Marcus Porcius Cato was famous for, among other things, ending all of his speeches in the Senate by saying "that is my opinion. It is further my opinion, that Carthage must be destroyed" (ceterum censeo, Carthago delenda est). Eventually, so the story goes, his fellow senators got so worn down that they launched the Third Punic War, which ended with Carthage destroyed, and the ground sowed with salt.

Senator McCain seems to be adopting a similar tactic, in a much higher cause than establishing hegemony over the western Mediterranean basin:

McCain Vows to Add Detainee-Abuse Provision to All Senate Bills: The U.S. Senate added language barring inhumane treatment of enemy combatants to legislation that sets military policy, the second major defense measure the chamber has amended with this provision.

The amendment sponsored by Arizona Republican Senator John McCain passed by a voice vote. It was attached to the Senate's fiscal 2006 defense spending bill Oct. 6 by a vote of 90-9. That bill is being negotiated with members of the U.S. House, including Republicans whose support is in question.

McCain said his intent is to prevent abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He vowed today that his measure would be "on every vehicle that goes through this body" until it's enacted into law. "It's not going away," he said on the Senate floor. "This issue is incredibly harmful to the United States of America and our image throughout the world."

Via Michael Froomkin; I agree with his comment that "I still think he'd be an awful President, but this is good stuff." Unfortunately, the link Froomkin gives to the Bloomberg news story he quotes is broken, so I can't see if anyone else is drawing the classical parallel.

The Continuing Crisis

Posted by crshalizi at November 05, 2005 11:30 | permanent link

October 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, October 2005

Stan Jones, White Sky, Black Ice and Shaman Pass
First (and only?) two novels in a series of mysteries about a native Alaskan state trooper. A sort of Tony Hillerman of the Arctic Slope. Presumably not the same Sam Jones who wrote a series of Christian instructional books under the rubric God's Design for Sex.
John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent
A post of Timothy Burke's made me realize the depths of my ignorance of sub-Saharan African history. In e-mail, he recommended this as an OK, though not ideal, starting point. I like the emphasis on human ecology. The claims that the (relatively) consensual, non-centralizing nature of authority in pre-modern African societies seemed, by contrast, very thinly supported.
Benjamin Weiss, Single Orbit Dynamics
Important for ergodic theory and information theory. Mathematicians will find the chapters on using single-orbit methods to solve problems in other areas of pure math more interesting than I did...
Jane Langton, The Escher Twist
Does not, actually, revolve all that much around the works of Escher (unlike many of Langton's earlier mystery novels, e.g. The Dante Game, or the Darwin-centered Dead as a Dodo.) Not, on that account, any less good.
G. M. Trevelyan, Garibaldi and the Thousand
Intelligent and inspiring hero-worship.
Peter Straub, In the Night Room
Elizabeth Moon, Marque and Reprisal
Robert Silverberg, The Golden Dream: Seekers of El Dorado
Much buckling of swashes; madness gleams and beckons from a thousand crazed eyes.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at October 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

A Last Night in the October Country

I used to re-read Something Wicked This Way Comes every Halloween. This year I'm without my copy of both that and A Night in the Lonesome October, so I might as well blog.

The Little Professor offers some Victorian terrors. Actual Victorian-era terrors: the resurrectionists of Ann Arbor.

Barcelona, city of jack-o-lanterns and bull-rings in the air.

Fafblog: the world's only source for haunted Fafblog. (Plus, the Medium Lobster explains the Plame affair in one sentence.)

Mad science: The Annals of Improbable Research re-runs its Halloween Research Review from 2000 (1, 2)

Zombies: Kids! Did you know you can use Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever to make zombies? By Wil McCarthy, who wrote two novels I liked and many others I've not gotten around to. (Via /dev/null, who reproduces a tribute to the Little Prince.) "And I say to any flesh-eating zombies who might be listening to the Factor this evening: Bill O'Reilly is looking out for you." (For more zombies, see Destroy All Bookmarks!.)

Vampires: Carmilla is free online, along with many other good stories by J. Sheridan LeFanu. (The Oxford collection of LeFanu's stories is nice, too.) I've always thought this was a much better-written book than Dracula. It's worth noting, though, that the traditional eastern European vampire was not a pale, skinny, strangely seductive aristocrat, but a fat, red-faced peasant whose carnal designs on the living are limited to their blood, such as drips from his (fangless) mouth, and in many ways corresponded pretty well to what peasants would find if they opened up Uncle Ivan's grave after a few weeks. The whole sexual aspect of vampirism — now, apparently, its main selling point — appears to have been invented by 19th century writers in western Europe (paging Dr. Praz, paging Dr. Mario Praz, to the locked stacks please). — It would be a shame to pass up this opportunity to plug, again, Suzy McKee Charnas's The Vampire Tapestry, unquestionably the most intelligent interpretation of the modern vampire.

Less definable horrors: Probably nobody now producing horror fiction is a better writer than Peter Straub. Here's the beginning of his latest, In the Night Room.

"I can't get that monster out of my mind": If you want to know why we're fascinated by stories of being preyed upon by monsters, Barbara Ehrenreich's observations on the effects of several million years of predation on the hominid psyche is a good place to start. (Here's chapter 1.)

All too definable horrors: Ultimately, as Bradbury's readers know, Halloween is about death; and we turn to magic because grief and loss are intolerable. For a wrenching reminder of just how intolerable, read Joan Didion's Year of Magical Thinkinghere is a long, moving excerpt, and here is a review by John Leonard, in the New York Review of Each Others' Books. (How good a writer is Didion? Well, while she was going crazy with grief, she was able to write like this.)

Manual Trackback: The Mystery of the Haunted Vampire.

Linkage

Posted by crshalizi at October 31, 2005 21:14 | permanent link

October 28, 2005

Gauss Is Not Mocked

By now, everyone and her brother has read, or at least read about, the papers by Albert-László Barabási and co., purporting to show that response times in e-mail, and in Darwin and Einstein's correspondence, follow a power law distribution, and that this is due to queuing processes.

Unfortunately, this is not true; the apparent power law is merely an artifact of a bad analysis of the data, which which is immensely better described by a log-normal distribution. (Via Aaron Clauset.)

Daniel B. Stouffer, R. Dean Malmgren and Luís A. N. Amaral, "Comment on Barabási, Nature 435, 207 (2005)", physics/0510216
Abstract: In a recent letter, Barabási claims that the dynamics of a number of human activities are scale-free [1]. He specifically reports that the probability distribution of time intervals tau between consecutive e-mails sent by a single user and time delays for e-mail replies follow a power-law with an exponent -1, and proposes a priority-queuing process as an explanation of the bursty nature of human activity. Here, we quantitatively demonstrate that the reported power-law distributions are solely an artifact of the analysis of the empirical data and that the proposed model is not representative of e-mail communication patterns.
Authors' comment: This manuscript re-analyzes data from Barabási's paper in Nature, "The origins of bursts and heavy tails in human dynamics", but it should be clear that the same problems are to be found in physics/0510117 and the upcoming Nature advertised in Barabási's web site concerning the correspondence of Einstein and Darwin

As every school-child knows (at least, these school-children do!), adding together many independent random variables, each of which makes a small contribution to the over-all result, generally gives you a Gaussian or normal distribution (unless the contributing variables are, themselves, kind of pathological). This fact is the central limit theorem.

What happens if the inputs are multiplied together, rather than added? Well, take the logarithm: log(XY) = log(X) + log(Y). The logarithm of the product will be the sum of the logarithms of the inputs. The latter will still be independent, so the logarithm of the output will be normally distributed. Undoing the log gives what's imaginative called the log-normal distribution. Log-normals are very common, for the same reasons that normals are. Unlike normals, they are very easy to mistake for power law distributions, especially if your knowledge of statistics is as limited as most theoretical physicists'. (The distribution of links to weblogs, for instance, is much better fit by a log-normal than a power law, as we've seen.) In their comment, Stoffer et al. show that a log-normal actually gives a textbook-quality fit to Barabási's data. (The only change I'd make to their procedure is that I'd report the likelihood ratio directly, and let people work out their own Bayesian posteriors if so inclined.) Looking at the data reported in the new Nature paper on Darwin's and Einstein's correspondence, if it's not log-normal too — well, I'd say I'd eat my hat, but I don't own one; I'll buy a Notre Dame hat and eat it.

Let me turn the microphone over to Francis Galton (as quoted in Ian Hacking's The Taming of Chance):

I know of scarcely anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful form of cosmic order expressed by `the law of error.' A savage, if could understand it, would worship it as a god. It reigns with severity in complete self-effacement amidst the wildest confusion. The huger the mob and the greater the anarchy the more perfect its sway. Let a large sample of chaotic elements be taken and marshalled in order of their magnitudes, and then, however wildly irregular they appeared, an unexpected and most beautiful form of regularity proves to have been present all along.
As Hacking notes, on further consideration Galton was even more impressed by the central limit theorem, and accordingly replaced the sentence about savages with "The law would have been personified by the Greeks and deified, if they had known of it." Whether deified by Hellenes or savages, however, the CLT has a message for those doing data analysis, and the message is:
Thou shalt have no other distribution before me, for I am a jealous limit theorem.

I restrain myself from making any observations on the editorial process at Nature, or on the competence of the referees of Barabási's papers. I do wish it to be noted, however, that this post is not an entry in the "Why Oh Why Can't Physicists Learn Better Probability and Statistics?" series, as Amaral and Barabási are both associated with Gene Stanley's school of statistical physics.

Update, Halloween: Suresh Venkatasubramanian, at Geomblog, turns his microphone over to Michael Mitzenmacher, who has some very good comments. (This led me to read Mitzenmacher's nice paper on generating mechanisms for power-laws.) I am more convinced by Mitzenmacher by the difference in the goodness of fits, simply because it is so overwhelmingly large. It hardly seems to make sense, in this case, to say that the data are even approximately power-law distributed...

Update, 23 November: Barabási's group has posted a reply (physics/0511186). To my eyes, the crucial observation by Stouffer et al. was that the fit of the data to a power law is in fact really, really bad, so it's pointless to talk about what mechanism might produce a power law in such situations. The reply's take on this point is that this is "merely" a statistical issue! In short, I don't find the reply at all convincing on the major points, but if you care, by all means read it. (The reply claims that Stouffer et al.'s comment was rejected by "three referees" at Nature; one wonders if they were the referees who approved Barabási's original paper.)

Update, 25 November: To hammer the point home, let's look at Figure 1b from Stouffer et al.'s comment. (Click for a larger version.)

The solid black line is the empirical distribution of the data. The red dashed line is the lognormal distribution. This is, as I said, a textbook-quality fit. Correcting for right censoring — the measured response intervals are all less than 83 days, because that's the length of time over which the data were collected &mdash would only improve the fit. (Thanks to Prof. Amaral for permission to reproduce the figure.)

Update, 29 November: Yet more commentary, from Aaron Clauset.

Update, 29 September 2006: In the event you still care about this, see G. Grinstein and R. Linsker, "Biased Diffusion and Universality in Model Queues", Physical Review Letters (2006): 130201. Grinstein and Linsker analytically solve for the asymptotic distribution of Barabási's queueing model, finding either a power law or a power-law with an exponential cut-off; they also show that the result is very sensitive to introducing a cost for switching between different kinds of tasks.

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Power Laws; Enigmas of Chance; Complexity

Posted by crshalizi at October 28, 2005 09:30 | permanent link

October 27, 2005

Will There Be a Text in My Class?

Attention conservation notice: An appeal to the reader's knowledge of textbooks on stochastic processes; also a plea not to be thrown into the briar-patch.

In the spring, I'm going to be teaching the department's advanced course on stochastic processes (36-754, for those keeping track at home). The catalogue description of the course reads, in full, as follows:

This course introduces advanced topics in Probability Theory such as Brownian motion, Markov processes, stationary processes, stochastic integration, etc.
It's intended for students from math or statistics who've had a first course in measure-theoretic probability, such as our 36-752, which goes up through the laws of large numbers for independent variables, a little martingale theory, and the central limit theorem. Most if not all of them will have already had a course on stochastic processes at the level of Grimmett and Stirzaker. My plan is to take advantage of the "etc." in the description, and teach a course on my favorite topics some interesting and highly useful material which is perhaps otherwise under-emphasized. To be more concrete, I'd like to start with the Wiener process, stochastic calculus and stochastic differential equations (which is pretty standard), but then do a lot on ergodic theory and mixing, Markov operators and their asymptotics, large deviations, information theory (as it connects to hypothesis testing and the like, not so much to coding), and spatial processes, including the Hammersley-Clifford (-Griffeath-Grimmett-Preston-...) theorem. Ideally, we'd end with some interesting spatio-temporal models, e.g. cellular automata or interacting particle systems. Markovian representations of non-Markovian processes (per Knight, rediscovered by various smart computer scientists and some confused physicists) would also be nice, but maybe too much. (Since any one of those topics could be stretched to cover a semester, the whole class is too much!)

I am looking for a textbook which covers all of this, or at least most of it; I'd be willing to change the material to match a good text. The students currently in 752 are using Ash and Doleans-Dade, which is good, and the last two chapters (which they won't get to) introduce a little ergodic theory and a little stochastic calculus, respectively, but not in enough depth. No one book I know seems to fit, and making them buy more than one expensive book doesn't seem right. If you have any suggestions, please mail them to me at cshalizi [at] oryx [dot] cmu [dot] edu (removing the name of a genus of antelope, which is there only to confuse spammers). I am going to have to spend a lot of time on my lecture notes; I really don't want that to have to grow into, in effect, writing my own book.

Update, next day: Thanks to Bill Tozier, Anand Sarwate and Wolfgang Beirl for writing with suggestions. Wolfgang, in particular, pointed me to Alexandre Stefanov's useful collection of online probability texts and notes (part of a bigger collection of mathematics resources). One of these, Robert Gray's Probability, Random Processes and Ergodic Properties, is something I was already planning to mine, along with his Entropy and Information Theory.

Update, Halloween: We will be using Olav Kallenberg's Foundations of Modern Probability as a reference, with the primary text being my lecture notes.

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Enigmas of Chance; Corrupting the Young

Posted by crshalizi at October 27, 2005 16:15 | permanent link

October 22, 2005

Destroy All Bookmarks!

Recent advances in high-energy physics. (Apropos of the second link, I bought my copy of Streater and Wightman's PCT, Spin & Statistics, and All That at university library booksale, where it was shelved under "politics/current events"; I guess they missed the "T" in "PCT".)

"Pittsburgh Unprepared For Full-Scale Zombie Attack", warns The Onion (via Johnny Logic). Here in Shadyside, we can expect to be attacked by fashionably-dressed yuppie zombies (yombies?), who will serve our freshly-sliced brains in a balsamic reduction, dusted with fennel pollen and accompanied by organic heirloom tomatoes. (I rented Night of the Living Dead shortly after moving here, but found it unwatchably bad.)

The Head Heeb looks at 18th century forensics.

The Abstract Factory turns out "the only debate on Intelligent Design that is worthy of its subject".

Bill Tozier finds tongues in trees. (I had no idea that maples actually fluoresce.) Also, an astute observation on cell-phone hazards.

Why does Leon Kass say modern women are "car-owning, pill-popping, body-piercing, career-oriented, degree-granted, sexually confident, frequent-flyer, atheistic sluts" like it's a bad thing?

Tim Burke on UNESCO, Department of Bad Ideas.

Larry Bartels on "What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?" (via Phil Klinkner at PolySigh, who somehow forgot to actually give the link).

Mark Liberman elucidates an important linguistic question: when does "fuzzy" mean "smoothed piecewise linear"?

Michael Bérubé looks forward to the Miers court (as does Brad DeLong), and dares anyone to mess with his reading of Thomas Kuhn. (I like Bérubé's writing, generally, and I hope that I'll get around to posting something about The Employment of English, and how complex systems is like cultural studies. But it does bug me that he seems to care so much more about whether he got Kuhn right than about whether Kuhn got it right, since subsequent work has revealed a lot of problems with Kuhn's scheme as an accurate description of scientific change; see e.g. the papers in Scrutinizing Science.)

I have mixed feelings about stuff like this, since things like this, this and this seem pretty well institutionalized. The fact that the career military (like career academia) is socially quite isolated from the rest of the country, and tends to look down on the people it's pledged to serve, is a long-standing problem. (It's a bit more worrisome in the case of the officer corps than the professoriat.) Under the circumstances, one should be encouraging the decent, sane, capable people who are left in the service to do what they can to redeem its honor, rather than shame them into leaving. Speaking of which: Phil Carter of Intel Dump makes his first post after being deployed to Iraq.

Matthew Yglesias on the intellectuals' war, or rather case for war, and its basic folly. (Includes self-criticism.) Also from MY: why blaming declining benefits for American workers on globalization is bullshit (ObKrugman: Pop Internationalism), and why some form of American social democracy is nearly inevitable. (Brad DeLong points out that however much sense that might make, barbarism is always an alternative.) Relatedly, Nathan Newman points out that the only reason GM's workers are getting reduced health benefits rather than none is that they have a strong union; also that Harriet Miers would benefit from restoring the estate tax.

Linkage

Posted by crshalizi at October 22, 2005 16:24 | permanent link

October 21, 2005

Some Iron Is Best Struck Cold

Back when Wolfram's monstrous tome came out, in the summer of 2002, I wrote a long review, which I "left to the gnawing criticism of the mice", thinking I'd get back to it when the cultural moment was safely past. Since I'm not getting anywhere tonight showing that the error in my filtering scheme is a non-negative supermartingale, and need to procrastinate some people who saw the manuscript liked it, and Wolfram keeps on keeping on, I felt I might as well brush off the dust, make a few adjustments, and put it online. Enjoy, if you're into that kind of thing.

Manual trackback: Bill Tozier; Quantum Pontiff; Danny Yee; Bruce Sterling ("maybe reviewers shouldn't pick on isolated, wealthy math geniuses who have intensely private, highly bonkers-sounding, self-published cosmological schemes. I mean -- what if he comes out of his ivory basement and deliberately DISTURBS THE UNIVERSE? We could be looking at the pixelated rags and tatters of reality by Friday!"); Geekable; Omniorthogonal; Three Quarks Daily; Jonathan Goodwin/The Valve; Crooked Timber; Chrononautic Log; Nonplatonic; East of the Sun, West of the Moon; Paracelsus Rambles; Blog Khoa Hoc Máy Tính; Dubbings and Diversions

Psychoceramica; Complexity

Posted by crshalizi at October 21, 2005 20:09 | permanent link

Cronyism, Corruption and Incompetence: A Network Analysis

Attention Conservation Notice: a 2100-word, semi-serious proposal for politically inflammatory social-scientific research, worked out by non-social scientists. Does not adequately explain all the technical concepts involved. Contains media criticism and blogging in-jokes.

Note: This idea was developed with a close collaborator who prefers, however, not to be named. Using the first person singular just means that I'm the only one doing the actual writing here, not that I deserve the credit for whatever merits this may have. (The blame for its faults, however, is all mine.)

I haven't written anything about Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, because nothing I could think to say seemed at all adequate in the face of the horrible human disaster and national shame. Others have said what I'd want to say better than I could have. But about the political fall-out, and the cronyism that preceded the catastrophe, and which continues to be relevant day in and day out — there I think I can suggest something.

It's by now abundantly established, at least to all sentient beings, that Michael Brown had no business running much of anything, never mind FEMA, and had the job not because people thought he was the most qualified possible person, or even a reasonably qualified person with the right political ties, but solely and exclusively because of his political ties. This naturally leads to two logically independent questions: (1) How many other people hold important government positions just because of who they know in the GOP apparatus and/or Bush family retinue? (2) Is this any worse than it was under any fairly recent previous president? It could be, after all, that the level and proportion of incompetence is no higher than it ever was, or even lower, but the Bush crew has had the bad luck of having disasters happen which exposed that incompetence; or perhaps the quality and morale of the civil service has been steadily eroded by many decades of serving under incompetent political hacks, and so can no longer adequately compensate for the folly of their masters. (Think of an unreleased episode of Yes, Minister where Sir Humphrey is merely counting the days until he can begin collecting his pension, and Bernard has split for a private-sector consulting gig.)

I've now read a couple of news stories which attempt to address these questions, and I am dissatisfied. Take, for instance, this one in the New York Times. It purports to be about this subject, but, while it reports some striking instances of cronyism and patronage, contains nothing like facts on which a reader could judge whether this problem is any worse than it's ever been, or even worse than it's been recently. It also contains the following sentence about half-way through: "People who have studied the workings of the federal government for years say this administration is no worse than President Bill Clinton's or any other recent ones in the qualifications of political appointees." This is followed by a number of quotes from such experts, none of which, carefully examined, actually say anything of the kind.

For another example, here's a story from Time, again going through the anecdotes, and quoting one of the same experts (Paul C. Light) to the opposite effect, saying that things are now much more "centralized" and politicized than before. So, from reading the reports filed by — one presumes — well-regarded journalists, not only can the concerned citizens learn absolutely nothing about whether the Bush administration is unusually incompetent and cronyist, they can't even learn what one presumptive expert (Prof. Light) thinks about the topic. Citizens might even wonder what "centralized" means here, and the news isn't going to help. The New Republic's list of the administration's fifteen worst hacks, while at once amusing, depressing and frightening, shouldn't actually convince anyone that "no administration has etched the principles of hackocracy into its governing philosophy as deeply as this one". It may be — it is! — unacceptable to treat the government of a free people this way, but it doesn't mean that this is anything new.

Let us not gnash our teeth in despair over the mainstream media, however: social network analysis can come to our rescue! What's wanted — but what the journalists don't provide — is a study where one builds the network of Presidential cronies, cronies' cronies, cronies' cronies' cronies, etc., and then asks questions such as:

  • How likely are close cronies to be named to government positions?
  • How much influence does position in the network — centrality, say, or distance from the President — have on the likelihood of getting a government job?
  • How likely are cronies to get jobs for which they are not qualified?
  • Is position more important for incompetent cronies?
  • How far are people with positions from the President anyway? (Presumably, when someone talks about thinks like political appointments being more centralized, what they mean is something like the average social distance of appointees from the President being smaller in this administration than previously.)
  • How far are they from whoever's actually at the center of the network?

Many people have asserted that networks of influence and social connection are important to how the modern GOP works — Henry Farrell reports that this is an important part of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson's Off Center, which I'm eager to read, and it's more or less explicit in Michael Lind's Up from Conservatism and John Judis's The Paradox of American Democracy — but nobody seems to have really studied this thoroughly. To do it right, you need to carefully define what you mean by "crony". Since, ultimately, the whole species forms a single human web, you want to only consider ties which are actually meaningful indicators of political alliance and, still more, of nepotism and cronyism. Also, you want to set out your criteria carefully and rigidly before collecting data, otherwise there'll be a lot of temptation to manipulate things as you go along, and the result will be closer to Lyndon LaRouche than to Randall Collins (or even Malcolm Gladwell). At the very least, I'd think you want to include the following kinds of ties:

  1. "relative of";
  2. "business partner of";
  3. "made political donation to" (for donations large enough to be matters of public record);
  4. "worked for campaign of";
  5. "worked as a lobbyist for";
  6. "hired as consultant by";
  7. "hired as attorney by";
  8. "served on same board as" (for advocacy groups or companies)
There are probably others, which an experienced political journalist (or political operator) could suggest. The kind of intelligence analysis described by Marc Sageman in his (excellent) Understanding Terror Networks has (I hope!) well-thought-out and operationalized criteria for deciding which kinds of relations to include. It would be good to know what they are, and use them.

Having fixed our criteria for which kind of relationships will count as links in the network, it'd then be necessary to build the network. A natural starting point would be the strategy sometimes called "snowball sampling": pick an initial target, say G. W. Bush, and identify everyone who counts as one of his cronies (by our criteria). Then go over each of his cronies, and see who their cronies are — Bush will be one of them, but presumably there will be others. Repeat this until either all the cronies are exhausted, or you're exhausted. Note that, if there really is just one network, then it doesn't matter whether you start with Bush, or Karl Rove, or Tom DeLay, or Jack Abramoff, or any of their other unindicted co-conspirators, except for the people who are so marginal to the network that you might reach them from one starting point but not another.

Once you have people in the network, we need to see whether they've been named to government positions (not necessarily confirmed, just named), and whether they met the legally-defined norms of competence for those positions. A simple scheme would be to code them 0 if they just met the qualifications, +1 if they were clearly more than qualified, and -1 if they had no discernible qualifications. This could be hard to do — some key positions don't seem to actually have any minimum qualifications at the moment — but something like this is necessary to answer questions like, "How much more likely are you to be named to a post if you're qualified than not, controlling for social position?" and "How much more likely are you to be named to a post as a function of social position, controlling for qualifications?" (For aficionados: I'm contemplating logistic regression coefficients here.) It's probably completely unrealistic to imagine having a matrix of qualifications scores for all people for all 3000-odd appointed posts, which would let us see whether favorably-situated cronies get named to posts they might be able to do, or just to any old thing, or what.

Now, to really do this right, we'd need to do it all over again, not just for the current administration, but for another one as a control — the Clinton administration, say, or Bush's father; Reagan or earlier is probably too far back. This seems to be the only way to answer questions like whether this administration is more centralized than its predecessors, or more likely to nominate incompetents. The crucial question, for us, is whether your odds of being nominated are more or less dependent on your distance from the center of the network under this administration than under previous ones.

Even without doubling our workload by doing a comparative study, however, simply seeing the network of cronies would let us answer some interesting questions. Who really are the most central members of the network? Are they people with formal positions of authority? Are they people you've ever even heard of? Or are they comparatively little-known fixers with huge address books, but no officially constituted authority? (Bruce Sterling, back during the Clinton troubles, compared our current mode of government to being ruled by some sort of literary movement, where often the most well-connected and subterraneanly influential people are not the most public figures.) Could we discern factions or communities, in the form of cohesive sub-networks? Is the president — the object of such veneration, verging on idolatry (no, that's not a joke) — actually at the head of his machine?

We could also compare the structure of the crony network to that of other well-studied networks of interest. Sageman looked at al-Qaeda, and while the comparison would be provocative, it's probably not really fair: al-Qaeda is very small, comparatively, and also very hard to study, so issues of missing data are much more serious. Perhaps more interesting would be a comparison with the network of people who sit on boards of directors of corporations, where two people are linked if they serve on the same board. This is a fairly sizeable network — some data sets contain over 7000 people — but one with very little formal structure. (Once you take into account the distribution of the number of boards people serve on, it looks almost perfectly random.) Economic sociologists have established that this network is a very important coordinating mechanism for big business, and, less adaptively for the corporations concerned, a mechanism for cronyism, patronage, and giving responsibility to incompetents. (Despite its coordinating role, the board network is not group which tells, e.g., the gas-station owners of America how much to charge for a gallon of regular unleaded, as apparently imagined by certain rabble-rousers who fear the market system because they don't understand it.) It would be interesting to see, then, whether the presidential crony network can be distinguished, in its broad, structural features, from the board interlock network, or whether they are both, in practice, acephalous.

It will not have escaped the reader's notice that I do not present anything like the kind of network I say we should find. In the immortal words of Stephen Pinker, "Good science is pedantic, expensive, and subversive", and this is certainly all three. We're talking, after all, about collecting and manually processing an immense amount of information on at least 3,000 people, and then doing it all over again on another administration. This would be a lot of work, of a kind to which I am totally unsuited; to get results in less than a year would need a team. Moreover, it is completely unfundable, unless the Ancient and Hermetic Order of the Shrill is now giving out grants to further the study of the "mendacity, malevolence, incompetence, corruption, uselessness, simple idiocy, or sheer disconnection from realty of the George W. Bush administration". Nonetheless, I would very much like somebody to do it, because it seems to me that it could actually answer some important questions about how our country now works.

Manual Trackback: In Search of 42; Green Gabbro; Crooked Timber

Networks; The Running Dogs of Reaction; Modest Proposals; The Beloved Republic

Posted by crshalizi at October 21, 2005 18:02 | permanent link

October 05, 2005

A New Kind of Ringtone

Wolfram Research has now released what is, without question, the most convicing demonstration yet of the power and utility of Stephen Wolfram's New Kind of Science: a cellphone ringtone generator. I will be terribly, terribly disappointed if these don't contain subliminal commands furthering a plan for world domination.

Update, 21 October: By coincidence, I've just run across this paper reviewing the history of using cellular automata to generate music, by Dave Burraston and Ernest Edmonds. (Pulbic-access copies of related papers here, under "cellular automata and music papers".)

Manual trackback: Three Quarks Daily

Psychoceramica

Posted by crshalizi at October 05, 2005 12:59 | permanent link

October 04, 2005

A Thought I Have No Time to Pursue

Start with your favorite large Erdos-Renyi random graph. Color all of the nodes, in such a manner that the number of nodes of a given color follows a strongly skewed distribution, perhaps a power law. (Exponential growth easily gives power-law size distributions.) Now form the aggregated graph, with one node for each color, and an edge between colors if any two disaggregated nodes of those colors are linked. Query: What is the degree distribution of the aggregated graph? (Inspired by thinking, while walking home, about attempts to model the structure of the Internet at the autonomous system level. Why I was doing that, I have no idea.)

Update, later that night: Aaron Clauset writes to point me to this paper:

M. Fayed, P. Krapivsky, J.W. Byers, M. Crovella, D. Finkel and S. Redner, "On the emergence of highly variable distributions in the autonomous system topology", ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 33 (2003): 41--49 [PDF reprint via Prof. Redner]
Abstract (omitting references): Recent studies observe that vertex degree in the autonomous systems (AS) graph exhibits a highly variable distribution. The most prominent explanatory model for this phenomenon is the Barabasi-Albert (B-A) model. A central feature of the B-A model is preferential connectivity --- meaning that the likelihood a new node in a growing graph will connect to an existing node is proportional to the existing node's degree. In this paper we ask whether a more general explanation than the B-A model, and absent the assumption of preferential connectivity, is consistent with empirical data. We are motivated by two observations: first, AS degree and AS size are highly correlated; and second, highly variable AS size can arise simply through exponential growth. We construct a model incorporating exponential growth in the size of the Internet and in the number of ASes, and show that it yields a size distribution exhibiting a power-law tail. In such a model, if an AS's link formation is roughly proportional to its size, then AS out-degree will also show high variability. Moreover, our approach is more flexible than previous work, since the choice of which AS to connect to does not impact high variability, thus can be freely specified. We instantiate such a model with empirically derived estimates of historical growth rates and show that the resulting degree distribution is in good agreement with that of real AS graphs.

This isn't exactly the model I had in mind; it's more realistic, for the Internet, than aggregating a static random graph. (I'm pleased to see that people who know what they're doing also thought to employ the idea that exponential growth leads to a power-law size distribution; presumably a re-invention, since they don't cite Reed and Hughes.) I remain a bit curious about the effects of aggregating a random network, but now will definitely not pursue it.

Update, 7 October: Aaron was too well-bred to point out his own papers on why many (in fact, almost all) networks seem to have power-law link distributions, when you probe them the wrong way. Fortunately, someone reminded me.

Update, 21 October: This looks relevant, if anyone's interested.

Enigmas of Chance; Networks; Power Laws

Posted by crshalizi at October 04, 2005 21:46 | permanent link

Schooled by Selection

Attention conservation notice: Promotes a technical preprint by some friends. I make no attempt to explain the science, owing to lack of time.

As you know, Bob, in the 1950s J. L. Kelly established that there were intimate connections between optimal strategies for repeated gambling and Shannon's information theory. (For instance, the best achievable growth rate for the gambler's wealth is set by the entropy rate of the random sequence of gambling outcomes.) As you know also know, Bob, the mathematical theory of natural selection is closely connected to that of repeated gambling (so that, e.g., John Holland's Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems is in some ways an extended treatise on multi-armed bandits.) This suggests that information theory could be useful in analyzing natural selection, and it would be natural to suppose that information about the environment should manifest itself as increased fitness somehow. There's been sporadic interest in the topic (e.g., J. B. S. Haldane, with his usual prescience had an early paper in this area), but really, in my humble opinion, not enough. By way of rectification, I submit the following for your favorable consideration:

Carl T. Bergstrom and Michael Lachmann, "The fitness value of information", q-bio.PE/0510007, submitted to PNAS
Abstract: Biologists measure information in different ways. Neurobiologists and researchers in bioinformatics often measure information using information-theoretic measures such as Shannon's entropy or mutual information. Behavioral biologists and evolutionary ecologists more commonly use decision-theoretic measures, such the value of information, which assess the worth of information to a decision maker. Here we show that these two kinds of measures are intimately related in the context of biological evolution. We present a simple model of evolution in an uncertain environment, and calculate the increase in Darwinian fitness that is made possible by information about the environmental state. This fitness increase -- the fitness value of information -- is a composite of both Shannon's mutual information and the decision-theoretic value of information. Furthermore, we show that in certain cases the fitness value of responding to a cue is exactly equal to the mutual information between the cue and the environment. In general the Shannon entropy of the environment, which seemingly fails to take anything about organismal fitness into account, nonetheless imposes an upper bound on the fitness value of information.
Edo Kussell and Stanislas Leibler, "Phenotypic Diversity, Population Growth, and Information in Fluctuating Environments", Science 309 (2005): 2075--2078
Abstract: Organisms in fluctuating environments must constantly adapt their behavior to survive. In clonal populations, this may be achieved through sensing followed by response or through the generation of diversity by stochastic phenotype switching. Here we show that stochastic switching can be favored over sensing when the environment changes infrequently. The optimal switching rates then mimic the statistics of environmental changes. We derive a relation between the long-term growth rate of the organism and the information available about its fluctuating environment.

Kussell and Leibler consider Markovian environments (technically, the environmental state is a semi-Markov process), and show that the fitness penalty paid for getting the statistics of environmental changes wrong is proportional to the relative entropy (Kullback divergence) rate between the organism's switch rates and the environments. Bergstrom and Lachmann consider only independent, identically-distributed environments, but go much further in relating the fitness value of signals about the environment to traditional information-theoretic quantities, essentially considering those signals as transmission channels. (They like thinking about the value of signals.) In both cases, my feeling is that, since the Kelly gambling results carry over to general ergodic environments (see the papers of Thomas Cover, especially the ones with Paul Algoet), the evolutionary results should too. I am not, however, volunteering to perform the extensions.

I happen to know that Bergstrom and Lachmann's work is part of a more general program investigating the role of information in evolution, because I've been bugging Michael to publish his results since I heard him talk about them at the first "Science et Gastronomie" workshop two years ago. I won't say any more, for fear of spoiling their surprises, except to say that further exciting revelations are close at hand.

Biology; Enigmas of Chance

Posted by crshalizi at October 04, 2005 21:34 | permanent link

September 30, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, September 2005

Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters, 1680--1750
Exhaustively documented, and full of interesting examples and interpretations. Not always adequately clear about how representative her examples were, or exactly what population she's writing about, and in places definitely under-argued. E.g., she alleges that a certain emphasis on politeness in scholarly conduct, at the expense of neglecting the content of scholarly communications, was caused by the declining standing of scholars in the eyes of potential patrons. Granting that she's correctly identified the cultural trait (emphasizing polite form over intellectual content) and the social change (declining status of scholars), I am utterly unable to tell by what means the latter caused the former (in her opinion), or how she was able to identify this causal relationship. But I've got neutral models of culture on the brain. — I was prompted to look this book up by this post.
Nadia Gordon, Death by the Glass
Apparently the second in a series of mysteries centered on the inevitable amateur detective, a fancy chef and restaurant owner in Napa Valley. Fun, especially if you're into food and/or wine.
Jeremy A. Sabloff, The Cities of Ancient Mexico: Reconstructing a Lost World
Generally good at both explaining what archaeologists think about the ancient past of Mexico (and Mesoamerica more generally), and why they think that. The chapter on why they don't believe in Old World influences, however, is very weak (and I say that as someone fully persuaded of those conclusions).

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at September 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

September 28, 2005

Almond Madelines

Or, the role of the amygdala in the remembrance of things past:

Joel S. Winston, Jay A. Gottfried, James M. Kilner, and Raymond J. Dolan, "Integrated Neural Representations of Odor Intensity and Affective Valence in Human Amygdala", The Journal of Neuroscience 25 (2005): 8903--8907
Abstract: Arousal and valence are proposed to represent fundamental dimensions of emotion. The neural substrates for processing these aspects of stimuli are studied widely, with recent studies of chemosensory processing suggesting the amygdala processes intensity (a surrogate for arousal) rather than valence. However, these investigations have assumed that a valence effect in the amygdala is linear such that testing valence extremes is sufficient to infer responses across valence space. In this study, we tested an alternative hypothesis, namely that valence responses in the amygdala are nonlinear. Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging, we measured amygdala responses to high- and low-concentration variants of pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant odors. Our results demonstrate that the amygdala exhibits an intensity-by-valence interaction in olfactory processing. In other words, the effect of intensity on amygdala activity is not the same at all levels of valence. Specifically, the amygdala responds differentially to high (vs low)-intensity odor for pleasant and unpleasant smells but not for neutral smells. This implies that the amygdala codes neither intensity nor valence per se, but a combination that we suggest reflects the overall emotional value of a stimulus.

That is all.

Minds, Brains, and Neurons

Posted by crshalizi at September 28, 2005 17:56 | permanent link

Structure and Dynamics (On the Economic Geography of Gilgamesh)

Due to circumstances which I am at a loss to explain, I find myself on the editorial board of a new, open access, peer-reviewed journal, Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences. I am really happy to report that Volume 1, Issue 1 is now live, though I believe there are still some papers which are being processed for this issue, and the next two issues of volume 1 should follow shortly. While they are all good papers (seriously!), I will, somewhat arbitrarily and unfairly, single out one of them for special mention, on the grounds of popular appeal:

Guillermo Algaze, "The Sumerian Takeoff"
Economic geographers correctly note that regional variations in economic activity and population agglomeration are always the result of self-reinforcing processes of resource production, accumulation, exchange, and innovation. This article proposes that essentially similar forces account for the emergence of the world's earliest cities in the alluvial lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Southern Mesopotamia), sometime during the second half of the fourth millennium BC.
That emergence of early cities in the southern Mesopotamian alluvium must be understood in terms of the unique ecological conditions that existed across the region during the fourth millennium, and the enduring geographical framework of the area, which allowed for the efficient movement of commodities via water transport and facilitated interaction between diverse social units alongside natural and artificial river channels. These conditions promoted evolving long-term trade patterns that, inadvertently, differentially favored the development of polities in the southern Mesopotamian alluvium over contemporary societies in neighboring regions.
More specifically, my contention is that by the final quarter of the fourth millennium the social and economic multiplier effects of trade patterns that had been in place for centuries — if not millennia — had brought about substantial increases in population agglomeration throughout the southern alluvial lowlands. Concurrent with these increases, and partly as a result of them, important socio-economic innovations started to appear in the increasingly urbanized polities of southern Mesopotamia that were unachievable in other areas of the Ancient Near East where urban grids of comparable scale and complexity did not exist at the time. Most salient among these innovations were (1) new forms of labor organization delivering economies of scale in the production of subsistence and industrial commodities to southern societies, and (2) the creation of new forms of record keeping in southern cities that were much more capable of conveying information across time and space than the simpler reckoning systems used by contemporary polities elsewhere. These innovations furnished southern Mesopotamian polities of the fourth millennium with what turned out to be their most important competitive advantage over neighboring societies. More than any other factor, they help explain why complex regionally organized city-states emerged earlier in southern Iraq than elsewhere in the Near East, or the world.

There is much more good stuff in this issue, though, and more to come soon. If you're work falls within the aims and scope of SDEAS, I strongly encourage you to submit.

Linkage; Writing for Antiquity

Posted by crshalizi at September 28, 2005 17:50 | permanent link

September 22, 2005

Thursday Sloth Blogging

Adorable pictures of orphaned baby sloths (and their teddy bears) in Costa Rica (via just about everybody).

(My class continues to eat up all my time. I continue to find certain of Bill's posts uncomfortable reading. What to do, what to do...)

Linkage

Posted by crshalizi at September 22, 2005 14:24 | permanent link

August 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, August 2005

Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks
Partial summary by Sageman. Deserves a full review.
Elizabeth Moon, Trading in Danger
Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought
More exactly, a history of the changing historical images of the classical Athenian democracy, reflecting the overwhelmingly anti-democratic nature of the great traditions of western civilization. Roberts makes no pretense to give a full survey of the anti-democratic tradition, a much broader subject. There's a favorable take in the Bryn Mawr Classical Review, which points out a few small errors of fact.
Vivian Gornick, The Romance of American Communism
A sympathetic, but definitely not indulgent, attempt at empathetic understanding of people who were members of the Communist Part (USA) from about 1920 to (pretty sharply) 1956: where they came from, how they lived as Commmunists, what happened to them afterwards. Written in 1974; the only parts which feel dated are the ones where Gornick seems to assume that the new social movements heralded a new, different and successful kind of American socialism.
Jacob Weisberg, In Defense of Government: The Fall and Rise of Public Trust
Interesting arguments, which deserve to be considered separately from Weisberg's remarks on contemporary (early 1996) politics, now of merely historical interest.
Frank Roosevelt and David Belkin (eds.), Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent
Michael D. Coe, Breaking the Maya Code
The story of the 20th century decipherment of Mayan writing, and the obstacles which held it up for so long. (As Coe makes plain in the book, this is really not much like breaking a code at all.) Coe was an early advocate of what has proved to be the correct approach, but only a marginal participant; this puts him in a good place to tell the story accessibly. The Mayan world, as revealed by their writing, seems incredibly weird and frankly repulsive; but this is of a piece with all ancient civilizations, really.
Laura Lippman, By a Spider's Thread
Or: the custody case from hell. Latest installment in Lippman's excellent mystery series. No previous acquaintance with the series is really necessary, though.
Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan
How Christians became so big on (literally) demonizing their opponents. More exactly, Pagels goes into detail on why the Gospel-writers and other early Christians would've felt this was an appropriate thing to do, but hasn't even a sketch as to why this feature of the movement persisted among later Christians, when so many others did not. (This seems to me a too-common failing among historians.)
Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary History
Entirely right-headed and sensible; obviously one of the most intellectually promising directions in which the study of literature (and, more broadly, culture) could go: mathematical, abstracting, more concerned with large patterns and populations than essentializing types or "exemplary" individuals and interpretations thereof, and extremely skeptical about treating cultural changes as reflections of or adaptations to social transformations. This deserves a full review, and hopefully will get one soon... At about twenty-five cents a page, too damn expensive. (Verso sent me a review copy without my asking, which I attribute to the fact that Prof. Moretti is both a scholar and — having read this — a gentleman.) — 6000+ more words on this theme.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at August 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

August 25, 2005

Outside of a Dog

Since it is finally sinking in that I teach my first class on Monday, posting will be light for a while. So, read a book! I've updated the book recommondations in the sidebar, and put up the archived recommendations from May, June and July.

Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at August 25, 2005 13:45 | permanent link

August 19, 2005

"The Paradox of Expertise"

When you want a smart take on how the more robust findings of cognitive psychology relate to the social organization of interdisciplinary knowledge-production, where do you turn but to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Rob Johnston, "Integrating Methodologists into Teams of Substantive Experts", Studies in Intelligence 47:1 (2003): 6 [Better-formated alternate page]
No abstract.

I'm feeling lazy, so I'll quote extensively. (All ellipses are mine.)

Intelligence analysis, like other complex tasks, demands considerable expertise. It requires individuals who can recognize patterns in large data sets, solve complex problems, and make predictions about future behavior or events. To perform these tasks successfully, analysts must dedicate a considerable number of years to researching specific topics, processes, and geographic regions. ...

The very method by which one becomes an expert explains why experts are much better at describing, explaining, performing tasks, and problem-solving within their domains than are novices, but, with a few exceptions, are worse at forecasting than actuarial tables based on historical, statistical models.
A given domain has specific heuristics for performing tasks and solving problems. These rules are a large part of what makes up expertise. In addition, experts need to acquire and store tens of thousands of cases within their domains in order to recognize patterns, generate and test hypotheses, and contribute to the collective knowledge within their fields. In other words, becoming an expert requires a significant number of years of viewing the world through the lens of one specific domain. It is the specificity that gives the expert the power to recognize patterns, perform tasks, and solve problems.
Paradoxically, it is this same specificity that is restrictive, narrowly focusing the expert's attention on one domain to the exclusion of others. It should come as little surprise, then, that an expert would have difficulty identifying and weighing variables in an interdisciplinary task such as forecasting an adversary's intentions. ...

One obvious solution to the paradox of expertise is to assemble an interdisciplinary team. Why not simply make all problem areas or country-specific data available to a team of experts from a variety of domains? ...
Ignoring potential security issues, there are practical problems with this approach. First, each expert would have to sift through large data sets to find data specific to her expertise....
Second, during the act of scanning large data sets, the expert inevitably would be looking for data that fit within her area of expertise. Imagine a chemist who comes across data that show that a country is investing in technological infrastructure, chemical supplies, and research and development.... The chemist recognizes that these are the ingredients necessary for a nation to produce a specific chemical agent, which could have a military application or could be benign. The chemist then meshes the data with an existing pattern, stores the data as a new pattern, or ignores the data as an anomaly.
The chemist, however, has no frame of reference regarding spending trends in the country of interest. The chemist does not know if this is an increase, a decrease, or a static spending pattern—answers that the economist could supply immediately. There is no reason for the chemist to know if a country's ability to produce this chemical agent is a new phenomenon. Perhaps the country in question has been producing the chemical agent for years and these data are part of some normal pattern of behavior.
One hope is that neither expert treats the data set as an anomaly, that both report it as significant. Another hope is that each expert's analysis of the data... will come together at some point. The problem is at what point? Presumably, someone will get both of these reports somewhere along the intelligence chain. Of course, the individual who gets these reports may not be able to synthesize the information. That person is subject to the same three confounding variables described earlier: processing time, pattern bias, and heuristic bias. Rather than solving the paradox of expertise, the problem has merely been shifted to someone else in the organization.
In order to avoid shifting the problem from one expert to another, an actual collaborative team could be built. Why not explicitly put the economist and the chemist together to work on analyzing data? The utilitarian problems with this strategy are obvious. Not all economic problems are chemical and not all chemical problems are economic. Each expert would waste an inordinate amount of time. Perhaps one case in one hundred would be applicable to both experts; during the rest of the day, the experts would drift back to their individual domains, in part because that is what they are best at and in part just to stay busy.
Closer to the real world, the same example may also have social, political, historical, and cultural aspects.... In order for collaboration to work, each team would have to have experts from many domains working together on the same data set.
Successful teams have very specific organizational and structural requirements.... Effective teams require cohesion, formal and informal communication, cooperation, and shared mental models, or similar knowledge structures. While cohesion, communication, and cooperation might be facilitated by specific work practices, creating shared mental models, or similar knowledge structures, is not a trivial task. Creating shared mental models may be possible with an air crew or a tank crew, where an individual's role is clearly identifiable as part of a larger team effort—like landing a plane or acquiring and firing on a target. Creating shared mental models in an intelligence team is less likely, given the vague nature of the goals, the enormity of the task, and the diversity of individual expertise. Moreover, the larger the number of team members, the more difficult it is to generate cohesion, communication, and cooperation. Heterogeneity can also be a challenge: It has a positive effect on generating diverse viewpoints within a team, but requires more organizational structure than does a homogeneous team.
Without specific processes, organizing principles, and operational structures, interdisciplinary teams will quickly revert to being just a room full of experts who ultimately drift back to their previous work patterns. That is, the experts will not be a team at all; they will be a group of experts individually working in some general problem space. ...

Intelligence analysis uses a wide variety of expertise to address a multivariate and complex world. Each expert uses his or her own heuristics to address a small portion of that world. Intelligence professionals have the perception that somehow all of that disparate analysis will come together at some point, either at the analytic team level, through the reporting hierarchy, or through some computational aggregation.
The intelligence analyst is affected by the same confounding variables that affect every other expert: processing time, pattern bias, and heuristic bias. This is the crux of the paradox of expertise. Domain experts are needed for describing, explaining, and problem solving; yet, they are not especially good at forecasting because the patterns they recognize are limited to their specific fields of study. They inevitably look at the world through the lens of their own domain's heuristics.
What is needed to overcome the paradox of expertise is a combined approach that includes formal thematic teams with structured organizational principles; technological systems designed with significant input from domain experts; and a cadre of analytic methodologists. Intelligence agencies continue to experiment with the right composition, structure, and organization of analytic teams; they budget significant resources for technological solutions; but comparatively little is being done to advance methodological science.
Advances in methodology are primarily left to the individual domains. But relying on the separate domains risks falling into the same paradoxical trap that currently exists. What is needed is an intelligence-centric approach to methodology, an approach that will include the methods and procedures of many domains and the development of heuristics and techniques unique to intelligence. In short, intelligence analysis needs its own analytic heuristics designed, developed, and tested by professional analytic methodologists. This will require using methodologists from a variety of other domains and professional associations at first, but, in time, the discipline of analytic methodology will mature into its own sub-discipline with its own measures of validity and reliability.

I have to say it's a bit obscure to me how Johnston thinks the development of intelligence-specific methods will rectify the central problem he diagnoses. (He might just mean that it can't possibly be fixed without such methodology.) That said, the whole thing's well worth reading, especially if you're interested in the earlier discussions of heuristic diversity, or interdisciplinary science. According to this, Johnston, a post-doc at the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, is by training an anthropologist, and has a forthcoming book (based on his dissertation?) titled The Culture of Analytic Tradecraft: An Ethnography of the Intelligence Community, which I'd now like to read...

The archive of declassified Studies in Intelligence articles, 1955--1976, has a lot of interesting stuff in it too, though the transcription into HTML is occasionally shaky, and it's not convenient to link directly to articles.

Update, 25 August: Henry Farrell writes to point to a forthcoming paper in Studies in Intelligence, D. Calvin Andrus's "The Wiking and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community". I haven't had a chance to read it yet, but it might be worthwhile. And, yes, this post was missing for a few days. I could tell you what happened, but then I'd have to...

(Profuse thanks to K. for pointing out Johnston's paper and discussing it with me.)

The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts

Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 20:15 | permanent link

Friday Cat Blogging (Roof the the World Issue of Science Geek Edition)

Snow leopards (Uncia uncia) are big cats native to the mountains of Central Asia. They are not in fact particularly closely related to leopards, but they are solitary, beautiful animals (the young are intensely cute), and, unsurprisingly, endangered. Hearteningly, their numbers are actually increasing. Somewhat dishearteningly, part of this is due to an "involuntary park" effect: a lot of their habitat lies along the borders of unfriendly states, where armies exclude people who might otherwise want to use that land for grazing. (Obviously this excludes actual areas of continuing hostilities, like Siachen Glacier, site the "war above the clouds", of one of the most extraordinary, and pointless, conflicts of modern times.) You have to be very poor to find land like this desirable, but there's no shortage of really poor people in Central Asia. However, good work is being done by the Snow Leopard Trust in community-based conservation, trying to devise ways of actually making the presence of the animals beneficial to their human neighbors. (Iowa could use some of this.) The latest effort, in conjunction with the International Finance Corporation (a part of the World Bank group) is to bring this approach to the Sary-Chat Ertash nature reserve in Kyrgyzstan, next door to a substantial gold-mining area. Since the park rangers appear to have exactly one jeep, this seems like a good thing. In the meanwhile, if you find yourself yearning for some Central Asian handicrafts (and who doesn't, from time to time?), the Snow Leopard Trust's online store seems like a beneficent way to get them. (Via the Private Sector Development Blog at the World Bank.)

Friday Cat Blogging; Afghanistan and Central Asia

Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 17:16 | permanent link

Slack from the Past

Behold: The High Weirdness Project, a wiki descendant of the Rev. Mr. Ivan Stang's classic High Weirdness by Mail. As one of the people responsible, along with Mitch Porter, for producing High Weirdness by World Wide Web (back when the Late Chalcolithic of Internet time was just giving way to the present Iron Age), what can I say except "Praise 'Bob'!"? (Thanks to Modemac for the pointer.)

Linkage

Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 16:04 | permanent link

Our New Filtering Techniques Are Unstoppable!

Attention conservation notice: 2800 words and many large figures advertising our latest scientific paper. More than most people will ever want to know about nonlinear filtering, cellular automata and coherent structures.

A year and a day after we began working on the manuscript, here it is:

Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, Robert Haslinger, Jean-Baptiste Rouquier, Kristina Lisa Klinkner and Cristopher Moore, "Automatic Filters for the Detection of Coherent Structure in Spatiotemporal Systems", Physical Review E 73 (2006): 036104 = nlin.CG/0508001 [Smaller, higher-quality PDF]
Abstract: Most current methods for identifying coherent structures in spatially-extended systems rely on prior information about the form which those structures take. Here we present two new approaches to automatically filter the changing configurations of spatial dynamical systems and extract coherent structures. One, local sensitivity filtering, is a modification of the local Lyapunov exponent approach suitable to cellular automata and other discrete spatial systems. The other, local statistical complexity filtering, calculates the amount of information needed for optimal prediction of the system's behavior in the vicinity of a given point. By examining the changing spatiotemporal distributions of these quantities, we can find the coherent structures in a variety of pattern-forming cellular automata, without needing to guess or postulate the form of that structure. We apply both filters to elementary and cyclical cellular automata (ECA and CCA) and find that they readily identify particles, domains and other more complicated structures. We compare the results from ECA with earlier ones based upon the theory of formal languages, and the results from CCA with a more traditional approach based on an order parameter and free energy. While sensitivity and statistical complexity are equally adept at uncovering structure, they are based on different system properties (dynamical and probabilistic, respectively), and provide complementary information.

Rob and Kristina worked out the fundamental theory and algorithms for this paper and its predecessor; Rob also figured out the order parameter for cyclic cellular automata, and Kristina did the actual statistical analysis. Jean-Baptiste implemented all our ideas (in Objective CAML), and ran all the simulations. Cris came up with the idea of local sensitivity, and pushed for harder examples. I pushed for local statistical complexity, and a lot of misconceptions.

OK, assuming anyone's still reading, let me give you an illustration of the kind of thing we're talking about in the abstract.

That is a picture of the time-evolution of a one-dimensional cellular automaton ("ECA rule 54", in the jargon), starting from a random initial condition. Space goes up and down, and time advances from left to right. What you can see is that, most of the system is soon dominated by patches of a single repeating regular pattern, called a "domain". Technically, each domain is defined by a "regular language" (a certain kind of rule describing the pattern), which can extend indefinitely across the lattice, and persist indefinitely in time under the action of the cellular automata rule. ("The regular language is invariant under the time evolution".) There are also things moving through the domains ("particles"), which are another kind of structure. All this is, in this case, reasonably easy to make out by eye. You'll also notice, if you look long enough, that every once in a while the domains are disrupted seemingly out of nowhere. Since the rule is deterministic, there has to be a reason, and it turns out, if you look quite carefully, that there are multiple phases the domain could be in, that the boundaries between regions of different phase act like particles, and you're seeing the collision of those phase defects.

As I've discussed before, understanding the particles and domains of such systems is important in understanding their dynamics, and still more important in grasping their computational properties — particles and their collisions are the components people use to build computational circuits in cellular automata, and appear spontaneously in CA evolved to do non-trivial computations. Accordingly, there's a fair amount of theory now for the regular-language patterns of one-dimensional deterministic cellular automata with known rules. (Important early contributions were made by, inter alia, Wolfram, Grassberger, and Boccara; the most general theory I know of was developed by Hanson and Crutchfield. Ilachinski's textbook on CA has a pretty good review, but it's still a live subject, witness Pivato's recent work on particle kinematics.) But "general theory" here means a general framework, where all the details still have to be filled in by hand, case-by-case, after intensive communion with the pictures like that figure, and with mathematical objects like the regular-language evolution operator induced by the CA. In the end, you can build a little filter which will scan over configurations produced by the system and identify the domains and particles. (Here is a figure showing the domain and the filter, from an old paper I wrote with Wim Hordijk and Jim Crutchfield.)

And then you turn to another system, like this one (ECA rule 110), and you have to do everything over again, because all the work you've done is completely dependent on that particular system. Use your old filter on the new data, and you get nonsense.

Now, unlike my co-authors, I am lazy, which means I don't like putting that much work into figuring out the coherent structures in one system, let alone many. This is the kind of thing I want a computer to do for me, with as little input or insight on my part as possible. (As Larry Wall has said about Perl programming, this sort of laziness implies a negative discount rate: you do work now so your future self won't have to.) More seriously, the primate visual cortex is a remarkable thing, and does a marvelous job of analyzing the kinds of patterns needed to get East African Plains Apes through their natural life-cycles, but it was never supposed to cope with massive collections of high-dimensional multi-variate data, which is what science increasingly is faced with. (Talk to, say, these people if you don't believe me.) Something more automatic and principled is deeply to be desired. We tried to find a generic way of locating the places where interesting, important things were happening, on the grounds that the most interesting and important things in the system are the coherent structures. In fact, we found two ways of doing this, which turn out to be quite distinct. (I was sure, before we actually had any results, that they'd turn out to be two ways of getting at the same aspects of the system, which shows it's a good thing wiser heads were involved.)

The first quantity, which we ended up calling "local sensitivity", tries to quantify interest and importance in the sense of "having a lot of influence on the rest of the system" and "small changes here make a big difference". In classical dynamics, you quantify things like this with the Lyapunov exponents, but for a number of reasons, explored in the paper, we ended up needing something different. Basically, we perturb a small-ish region in the vicinity of a given point, and then see how large an area is affected by the perturbation over a certain interval of time; the bigger that area is, compared to how large it possibly could be, the larger the sensitivity at the point in question. Areas of high sensitivity are ones where small perturbations influence the future evolution of large parts of the system; they tend to drive their neighbors, rather than be driven by them.

The other quantity is the "local statistical complexity", in essence the number of bits of information about the past of a given point needed to optimally predict its future behavior. You might worry that this is not an objectively well-defined quantity, but we'd earlier shown how to put those fears to rest: we showed how to reconstruct the effect state space at each point ("causal state reconstruction"), and then use some information theory and the idea of a minimal sufficient statistic to show this gives an objective forecasting complexity. The details are too technical to go into here (though the connection between physical complexity and statistical inference is pleasing), so if you're really interested I'll refer you to the paper. Complex regions, in this sense, are ones where a great deal of information about the past is required for optimal prediction — where a lot of the past is relevant to the future, and fine distinctions have to be drawn between similar histories.

In practical terms, what we did was take the original CA configurations, and then compute the values of these two fields — local sensitivity and local statistical complexity — at each point in space, at each moment in time, over and over again, and then compare those results to the original field. Here, for example, is what we get looking at the first example (ECA 54) — in order, the original system (repeated here for comparison), the system as filtered for sensitivity, and as filtered for complexity. (The darker points are more sensitive or more complex, respectively.)

Looking at this, all the little defects just pop right out, even though the filters don't know anything about the phase structure of the background domain, or even that there is a background domain. Now, when we apply exactly the same filters to the second example (ECA 110), this is what we get:

In other words, we see the particles cleanly separated from their regular domain backgrounds, and the particle collisions/interactions as well; they're as complex or even more complex than the particles. Since the interactions are what you use to build a universal computer in this CA rule, that's pleasing, but secondary.

Which is all very well, but there are remarkably few one-dimensional pattern-forming systems in nature, and the regular-language story gets weird and unsatisfying in two or more dimensions. Do our filters work in more than one dimension? Well, it depends what you mean by work. The defining math has no problem in higher dimensions, but how do we know that the structures they find are the right, important ones? We needed a two-dimensional dynamical system where people had already figured out what the important structures were. For a number of reasons, we chose cyclic cellular automata (CCA) — partly because they self-organize into cute spiral waves, partly because some clever mathematicians had already thoroughly studied the system, and partly because some of us had already written papers about them and felt comfortable with them.

You really need a movie to appreciate what CCA do, but my skills don't extend to creating one, so I'll just recommend that you download Mcell and see for yourself. Here, in lieu of that, are a few snap-shots. You can see the random-noise initial conditions,


the first growth of spirals,

and their eventual domination of the whole lattice.

If you're a statistical physicist, you're indoctrinated into a particular way of thinking about coherent structures. You think of them as topological defects in the order parameter field, places where the free energy associated with the order parameter gets very high; and the order parameter is the variable which measures the symmetry broken by the background pattern. This is part of an elaborate, immensely-successful circle of ideas connecting broken symmetry, order parameters, phase transitions, universality, thermodynamic potentials, generalized elasticity and hydrodynamics — what have been called the "basic notions of condensed matter physics". But the application of these ideas involves an immense amount of trial and error, too, and tradition. When you're confronted with a new system, your first question is "which system does it remind me of?", hoping that someone else has already identified the right order parameter and effective free energy for that system. You then try to make them work for yours, find that they don't, and start tinkering with them until, if you are very good, things start to click. Making everything work out of equilibrium is a bear, and even if the next system you encounter looks similar, there's no guarantee that the same order parameters will in fact work there. (While we were writing this, we ran across this paper on a system with a similar phenomenology to our CCA. We tried their order parameter on our case, and the results were horrible.)

Nobody had worked out the order parameter for CCA before, but we wanted to compare the results of our filters to more physical ideas, so we needed to come up with one. This was basically the work of Rob Haslinger, who (unlike me) is actually very good at real physics. After remarkably few tries, he came up with something which fits the end-state spiral configurations very well (a kind of discretized XY model, if you're into this kind of thing). Here is a typical image of one of those long-run configurations, on the left, and the free energy field corresponding to the order parameter on the right.

Now here is what we get from the sensitivity and complexity filters. Let me stress, again, that these are the same filters we applied to the 1D case — we really, honest, cross our hearts didn't cheat, tweak or adapt at all.

Clearly, both our filters pick out the right structures — though in somewhat different orders. It turns out that you need a lot of information to predict what's happening at the boundaries between spirals — essentially because you've got out-of-phase regions right next to each other, and so you need to think hard to see what things at the boundaries will do — but they're not very sensitive. Make a small perturbation on a boundary, and it's going to get erased quickly by the waves radiating out from the spiral cores. The story with the cores is just the other way around: you need less information to predict them (though more than background), but disrupting one screws with the whole spiral, making them highly sensitive and autonomous.

I mentioned that the two filters give complementary information; they look at different kinds of system properties, as we say in the abstract, and their values are basically uncorrelated. (You can find correlation coefficients in the paper.) Like I said, I'd expected there would be a strong correlation at least — that places where optimal prediction needs a lot of information would be places where small perturbations have a large effect, and vice versa. My co-authors were not convinced, and, as it happens, right. Remarkably enough, however, if you look at the pictures, they're manifestly identifying the right structures, but in different ways, like I just explained in the spiral case. (We go into the contrast between the two filters in some depth in the paper.)

The fact that the order parameter field looks almost the same as the complexity field is, in my humble opinion, especially noteworthy. Let's see them again.

The first is the product of Rob's insight, and the accumulated wisdom of the statistical-physical community; it is also a function of the current lattice configuration alone. The second is an entirely automatic product of our code, and the definition of local statistical complexity, and depends on the past time-evolution of each point's local neighborhood. It is not at all obvious that there should be any relationship between them at all. I admit that they're not exactly the same — they're only strongly correlated, not identical — but the estimates of statistical complexity are subject to finite sample noise, and I'd be willing to bet the difference is due to that. It would be grossly irresponsible at this point to claim that reconstructing the causal states gives us a way of automatically finding good order parameters, but the identity between those figures suggests something like that might be worth looking at.

Also worth looking into, even more, is actual data. Because the sensitivity filter depends on making perturbations, and lots of them, it's probably not suitable for many experimental situations. But the local complexity filter just needs observations, so in principle any experiments producing sufficiently fast movies could work. (Time resolution is important because we need to ensure that a change at one point in one frame can only affect a finite region in the next frame, or else our techniques break down. We'd also need to somehow discretize space and color, but digital cameras do that to you anyway.) For it to be really meaningful, you'd need either an effectively two-dimensional system, or three-dimensional imaging data; we've got some ideas on both fronts, but are open to suggestions. We also have some ideas about weakening the requirement of having a movie, so we could work with just a representative ensemble of snapshots, but they're not ready yet for public consumption.

8 March 2006: The paper is now printed, with very minor corrections; I've updated the citation above, but here it is again: Physical Review E 73 (2006): 036104.

Manual trackback: The Quantum Pontiff; Brad DeLong; The Statistical Mechanic

Complexity; Enigmas of Chance; Physics; Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 14:26 | permanent link

"The Case for Building an Afghan Auxiliary Military Force"

It was almost two years ago that I (modestly) proposed to solve our geo-political difficulties by turning the Afghan militias into US auxiliaries, and legalizing drugs. Now I see (via Intel Dump) that the first part of this idea has also occurred to Roberto Bran, who recently gave a presentation sketching out the details on the model of the Gurkhas. When I said this, it was just a sarcastic expression of despair, but Bran is trying to make a constructive policy proposal, has thought carefully about issues like language training, and, again unlike me, has some idea of what he's talking about:

I spent six months as an embedded advisor under Task Force Phoenix with a Quick Reaction force kandak (battalion) and tolei asleyah (weapons company) of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Following that assignment, the 10th Mountain Division returned to Fort Drum and I was sold to Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) in Kabul, where I served as the Interagency Strategic Plans Officer and worked under some of the smartest men I have ever met. I don't pretend this qualifies me for "expertise," but at least I do have some practical experience.

I'm led to believe that this could be a good thing, if well-implemented. But I really doubt it will happen, because there is simply no domestic political constituency for it. (Thanks to Captain Bran for graciously answering some questions in e-mail.)

Afghanistan and Central Asia; Modest Proposals; The Continuing Crisis

Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 12:00 | permanent link

August 02, 2005

George W. Bush Darkens Counsel by Words without Knowledge

Does Bush's endorsement of teaching the "controversy" over intelligent design actually surprise anyone? Hopefully not, and let's take some comfort from the fact that, according to a reporter who was there, he didn't seem too eager to discuss the topic. (Full transcript here.) As usual, only Fafblog is capable responding to the news in an adequate manner.

Still, for the record: there is no scientific controversy over intelligent design. The best attempts of the intelligent design movement to produce scientific work are, as we've seen, rubbish (e.g., 1, 2). I read them from time to time, but then, I also read people who claim to have found the lost city of Atlantis in Wisconsin, or unearthed the suppressed secrets of anti-gravity, and many other varieties of crackpot. There are two reasons why the best efforts of the intelligent design movement are rubbish. The first, and most important, is that the theory, to the extent there is a theory, is false. Still, I could make out better arguments for ID than they're managing to do; they are either not trying very hard, or just not very good. Which brings us to the other reason why those best efforts are rubbish: the goal is not to produce scientific work. It is instead to give lay-people the appearance of a controversy — to generate uncertainty and doubt — so as to give excuses to politicians like Bush. Organizations like the Discovery Institute do not exist to make discoveries, or advance knowledge; they are, rather, front organizations. In their less guarded moments, people like William Dembski realize this perfectly well, and say things like "intelligent design is just the Logos theology of John's Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory". (See Larry Arnhart's exchange with Behe and Dembski in First Things. Arnhart, incidentally, is proof that intelligent, conservative evolutionists are possible; he even has an interesting book on Darwinian Natural Right, about which more another time, perhaps.)

(Some other time, I'll talk about the history which links places like the Discovery Institute back to the first wave of right-wing think-tanks like Heritage and the American Enterprise Institute, and what those in turn owe to the intellectual Cold War and ultimately to the Communist Party (USA); but in the meanwhile I'll just recommend that you read Creationism's Trojan Horse, and the chapter on "the triangular trade" in Michael Lind's Up from Conservatism.Paul Krugman has now written about this, without, however, going all the way back to the CP.)

The thing is, this leads to bad science, and, if an unbeliever can say so, bad religion. The stakes are more serious here than with silly "devotionals with mathematical content", but the issues are not that different. Doing what you must know is shoddy science, in the hope that it will provide cover for propagating the gospel, shows a poor opinion of your fellow creatures, of the gospel, and of God. Of your fellow creatures, because you are resorting to trickery, rather than honest persuasion or the example of your own life, to win converts. Of the gospel, because you do not trust its ability to change lives and win souls. Last and worst, of God, because you are perverting what you believe to be the divine gift of intelligence, and refusing to learn about the Creator from the creation. And for what? To protect your opinion about what measure you think it fitting for God to employ.

One of the greatest passages in the Bible is when "the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind":

Where was thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof; when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?
Creationism is a way of responding to this profound challenge by saying "I know! I know! You did it just like I woulda!"

Manual trackback: Crooked Timber; Nanopolitan; Signal + Noise; MoJo; Idiolect

Creationism; The Running-Dogs of Reaction

Posted by crshalizi at August 02, 2005 19:29 | permanent link

Days of Miracles and Wonders

In an altogether-too-precedented moment, I have just gotten spam flogging monoclonal antibodies.

The Great Transformation

Posted by crshalizi at August 02, 2005 14:07 | permanent link

Quickly, Igor, bring me the manuscript!

Alife X, the 10th international conference on the simulation and synthesis of living systems, has just sent out its call for papers. As a member of the program committee, I urge you to contribute only your best work, whether it addresses what's been achieved in the last two decades, or how much further we still have to go.

You have until November 7th to perfect throwing up your hands and yelling "It's alive!" your submission.

Complexity; Biology

Posted by crshalizi at August 02, 2005 12:03 | permanent link

July 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, July 2005

Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life
My mother has enthused about this book for as long as I can remember. (The title was a family catch-phrase I often heard as boy.) She was, of course, right...
Brian Stableford, The Last Days of the Edge of the World
A very charming little novel of the end of magic. (I can only imagine how many volumes would be taken to tell this story nowadays.) " 'Vanity,' said the mirror in tones of mild reproof, 'is not nice.' "
Sebastiano Timpanaro, On Materialism (London: New Left Books, 1976)
(Not an actual quotation:) "Comrades? We need to talk. I'm a European scholar of the humanities and a revolutionary Marxist like the rest of you, but I'm very concerned that you're all succumbing to bourgeois idealism — yes I know you're calling it 'structuralism' now, and 'critical theory' and so forth, but it's still the same old nonsense underneath. And no, pretending that external reality is just a product of human praxis, rather than of human thought, isn't an improvement. And you can't go on dismissing every scientific attempt to understand how human beings work as 'vulgar materialism' or 'reductionism' forever, comrades, or else you'll just end up looking ridiculous. After all, since Darwin we know that nature is historical, and as materialists we should be committed to the continuity of human and natural history, should we not? Comrades? Are any of you listening to me at all?" (Evidently not.) — But I must object: Anyone who takes seriously the prospect that the Earth will in the distant future become incapable of supporting life (true enough!) has no business dismissing interplanetary travel as "science fiction". More importantly: it's hard for me to respect the political views of a Leninist, especially when he talks, in the 1970s, about how capitalist democracies are inevitably abandoning the "democracy" part and descending into barbarism, and how the People's Republic of China represents a great hope. (If this be social-democratic reformism, make the most of it.)
Elizabeth Moon, The Deed of Paksenarrion
Or: Learning about courage from Dungeons & Dragons. I feel a bit ashamed of enjoying a 1000-page novel which leans so heavily on the game that (once upon a time) I could've told you which pages of the rule books to look things up on, but it did pass the time, and once the story turned darker, about two-thirds of the way through, gives a sense of the higher quality of story-telling evident in Moon's latter science fiction novels. (So far as I know, those owe nothing to any role-playing game.)
Bernt Oksendal, Stochastic Differential Equations: An Introduction with Applications
One of ten Springer books I picked up in Beijing, in apparently-authorized local reprint editions, for about $70 total. (I didn't have the gall to ask my hosts if they also called Springer math books "the yellow peril".) It probably says something about me that I'm excited to have finally found an SDE text which is compact, readable, and connected to non-mathematical reality. Judging by the number of editions it's gone through, many people have gotten here before me.
Alan Furst, Dark Star
I have nothing to add to Brad DeLong's remarks. Well, except that Furst reminds me of pre-war Ambler, only with some sex (which is not really an improvement), and a certain difference in tone which I can't help but feel comes from knowing how the war is going to go — at once a bit more ironic and a bit more complacent.
Isabel Glass, Daughter of Exile and The Divided Crown
Half a recommendation. These read like Glass is trying to do something new with heroic fantasy — it's definitely not, thank God, another generic trek through fantasyland — and there's some good characterization and invention. But parts of the plots were serious strechers, especially in the second book (royal courts without factions? a king has magicians to serve him, but when he starts a war he not only doesn't tell them, none of them know?). Most of all, the language stayed too flat and prosaic for the magic to be convincing — too much Poughkeepsie and not enough Elfland, as Le Guin might say, and this didn't seem to be to make a point, say that not even Elfland is Elfland. Still, parts were quite good (say the first half of the first, and the portions of the second told from the viewpoints of the secondary characters), and I'd read more. (Thanks to Holtzbrinck Publishers for the unsolicited publicity copy of Divided Crown, which prompted me to finally read them both.)
A. Lee Martinez, Gil's All Fright Diner
B-movie monsters in middle-of-nowhere Texas foil a break-out from what Terry Pratchett would call the dungeon dimensions. Very funny.
Charlie Stross, The Family Trade
Trust a Scotsman to see the ability to move between time-lines as a business opportunity. Actually, this was quite good, and I'm very impatient to lay my hands on the sequel.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at July 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

July 28, 2005

"Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'"

Attention conservation notice: Log-rolling promotion of a paper written by two friends.

Some weeks ago, I directed noises of harrumphing approval towards Mark Liberman's contention that it is not enough to explain why humans evolved language, one must also explain why every other species failed to do so. Carl Bergstrom kindly brought to my attention a paper where he and Michael Lachmann do so at least partially: language allows us to lie.

Michael Lachmann and Carl T. Bergstrom, "The disadvantage of combinatorial communication", Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B 271 (2004): 2337--2343
Abstract: Combinatorial communication allows rapid and efficient transfer of detailed information, yet combinatorial communication is used by few, if any, non-human species. To complement recent studies illustrating the advantages of combinatorial communication, we highlight a critical disadvantage. We use the concept of information value to show that deception poses a greater and qualitatively different threat to combinatorial signalling than to non-combinatorial systems. This additional potential for deception may represent a strategic barrier that has prevented widespread evolution of combinatorial communication. Our approach has the additional benefit of drawing clear distinctions among several types of deception that can occur in communication systems.

Michael and Carl --- excuse me, Dr. Lachmann and Prof. Bergstrom --- consider a two-player signalling game, where one player, the sender, gets to observe the actual state of the world and send a signal about it to the receiver, whose payoff depends both on the actual state of the world and the action they chose to take. In equilibrium, the expected value of the information in the signal, averaging over all signals, is non-negative. However, for combinatorial signalling systems, but not monolithic ones, "the value of information conditional on a particular signal can be negative at equilibrium". Now, for any particular signal, you could patch this by applying a "monolithic" meaning to it, one not derived from the general combinatorial rules (as, e.g., learning "Of course I'll respect you in the morning" means "I don't respect you now"). But this doesn't really make the difficulty go away:

The problem is not that one can never assign monolithic meanings to phrases. It is simply that one does not encounter most phrases often enough to assign them monolithic meanings and as a result those phrases can be used in ways that confer negative value of information.... Combinatorial communication can efficiently facilitate large numbers of messages because novel messages can be interpreted simply from a familiarity with the message components. Unfortunately, this also means that receivers will assign meanings to messages without first-hand experience of the circumstances of their use — and thus certain messages can be consistently used to the detriment of signal receivers.
Let me repeat that all of this holds at equilibrium, when neither the sender nor the receiver can do better by unilaterally switching to a different strategy. (Out of equilibrium, the value of information can be negative over-all, whether the signalling system is combinatorial or monolithic.) Of course this doesn't amount to a full model of the non-evolution of language, but I think it's a real insight. Now, if somebody would just come up with a good explanation for why the benefits of combinatorial communication outweighed this cost in our case, but not for cephalopods or lions or chimpanzees, I'd be happy...

The Natural Science of the Human Species

Posted by crshalizi at July 28, 2005 11:55 | permanent link

July 22, 2005

Friday Cat Blogging (Son et Lumière Issue of Science Geek Edition)

A lot of work on neural computation just looks at understanding how animals process information coming from a single sense, but of course our ears don't shut off when we look at something, and it's well-established on a behavioral level that you can get more of a response with a noise and a flash than with either alone. Here is a careful paper looking at the neural basis of such multisensory integration in cats.

Terrence R. Stanford, Stephan Quessy, and Barry E. Stein, "Evaluating the Operations Underlying Multisensory Integration in the Cat Superior Colliculus", The Journal of Neuroscience 25 (2005): 6499--6508
Abstract: It is well established that superior colliculus (SC) multisensory neurons integrate cues from different senses; however, the mechanisms responsible for producing multisensory responses are poorly understood. Previous studies have shown that spatially congruent cues from different modalities (e.g., auditory and visual) yield enhanced responses and that the greatest relative enhancements occur for combinations of the least effective modality-specific stimuli. Although these phenomena are well documented, little is known about the mechanisms that underlie them, because no study has systematically examined the operation that multisensory neurons perform on their modality-specific inputs. The goal of this study was to evaluate the computations that multisensory neurons perform in combining the influences of stimuli from two modalities. The extracellular activities of single neurons in the SC of the cat were recorded in response to visual, auditory, and bimodal visual-auditory stimulation. Each neuron was tested across a range of stimulus intensities and multisensory responses evaluated against the null hypothesis of simple summation of unisensory influences. We found that the multisensory response could be superadditive, additive, or subadditive but that the computation was strongly dictated by the efficacies of the modality-specific stimulus components. Superadditivity was most common within a restricted range of near-threshold stimulus efficacies, whereas for the majority of stimuli, response magnitudes were consistent with the linear summation of modality-specific influences. In addition to providing a constraint for developing models of multisensory integration, the relationship between response mode and stimulus efficacy emphasizes the importance of considering stimulus parameters when inducing or interpreting multisensory phenomena.

They start with individual spike-trains, and use those to build post-stimulus time histograms for the spiking rate, but mostly they on the number of spikes evoked in the first 50 ms after the stimulus, which assumes a kind of rate coding. (No attempt at working out a temporal code is made here.) They do, however, do a pretty thorough job of analyzing the rates, including a nice null model of additivity (using the rastergrams), and corrections for spontaneous activity. The abstract does a pretty good job of summarizing the results of this analysis. They use them to suggest a simple and attract model, but dash those hopes a few paragraphs later.

That most multisensory interactions were consistent with simple summation of modality-specific influences suggests that a very basic linear model of the SC might account for many of the current observations. For example, the fact that superadditive interactions were common only in response to combinations of very weak modality-specific stimuli suggests that such superadditivity reflects temporal summation of the [post-synaptic potentials] consequent to near-threshold activity on the auditory and visual input channels. Subadditive interactions were relatively uncommon; however, their correspondence with combinations of the most effective stimuli could likewise be the simple consequence of approaching an intrinsic firing frequency limit of the SC neuron. In principle, a qualitatively similar relationship between computational mode and stimulus efficacy could be produced by an integrate-and-fire model that includes threshold and saturating nonlinearities. [p. 6506]

Alas, as they say, such a nice near-linear model has two fatal flaws. First, it doesn't account for the variability among neurons, and the fact that "few displayed the transition in its entirety from superadditivity to subadditivity". Second, the SC gets input from the cortex as well as from the sense organs, and while blocking cortical input leaves modality-specific responses alone, it eliminates multi-modal enhancement, which is not compatible with the near-linear model.

As you may have guessed, there is no feline cuteness to the paper at all, though I am happy to report that "[a]t the end of an experiment, injection of anesthetics and paralytics was terminated, and animal [sic] was allowed to recover normal respiration and locomotion before being returned to its home cage" (p. 6500).

Friday Cat Blogging; Minds, Brains, and Neurons

Posted by crshalizi at July 22, 2005 13:32 | permanent link

July 19, 2005

Common Notions: Towards a Lattice-Theoretic Turn in Social Epistemology

Another ancient draft post dusted off while sleepless in China.

One of the best books I've read on how science actually works is Stephen Toulmin's Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts. (It is, of course, long out of print.) The core of it is a set of ideas about how the social mechanisms of working scientific disciplines actually implement the intellectual goals of learning about the world, and rationally changing our minds, through a evolutionary process. (And Toulmin actually understands evolution in a sensible, blind variation plus selection, way, rather than some useless idea about progress or trends.) A lot of the argument is summed up in two of his aphorisms, which he admitted he exaggerated a bit for effect: "Every concept is an intellectual micro-institution" (p. 166), consisting of the people who accept the concept, and the practices by which they use and transmit it; and conversely, "Institutions are macro-concepts" (p. 353).

The natural question is whether one can say which institutions correspond to which concepts, and vice versa. This is a very tricky question, but an excellent beginning has been made by two papers on Camille Roth and Paul Bourgine, which I've been meaning to post about for quite a while.

Camille Roth and Paul Bourgine, "Binding Social and Cultural Networks: A Model", nlin.AO/0309035
Abstract: Until now, most studies carried onto social or semantic networks have considered each of these networks independently. Our goal here is to bring a formal frame for studying both networks empirically as well as to point out stylized facts that would explain their reciprocal influence and the emergence of clusters of agents, which may also be regarded as "cultural cliques". We show how to apply the Galois lattice theory to the modeling of the coevolution of social and conceptual networks, and the characterization of cultural communities. Basing our approach on Barabasi-Albert's models, we however extend the usual preferential attachment probability in order to take into account the reciprocal influence of both networks, therefore introducing the notion of dual distance. In addition to providing a theoretic frame we draw here a program of empirical tests which should give root to a more analytical model and the consequent simulation and validation. In a broader view, adopting and actually implementing the paradigm of cultural epidemiology, we could proceed further with the study of knowledge diffusion and explain how the social network structure affects concept propagation and in return how concept propagation affects the social network.
Camille Roth and Paul Bourgine, "Epistemic Communities: Description and Hierarchic Categorization", nlin.AO/0409013
Abstract: Social scientists have shown an increasing interest in understanding the structure of knowledge communities, and particularly the organization of "epistemic communities", that is groups of agents sharing common knowledge concerns. However, most existing approaches are based only on either social relationships or semantic similarity, while there has been roughly no attempt to link social and semantic aspects. In this paper, we introduce a formal framework addressing this issue and propose a method based on Galois lattices (or concept lattices) for categorizing epistemic communities in an automated and hierarchically structured fashion. Suggesting that our process allows us to rebuild a whole community structure and taxonomy, and notably fields and subfields gathering a certain proportion of agents, we eventually apply it to empirical data to exhibit these alleged structural properties, and successfully compare our results with categories spontaneously given by domain experts.

While I don't want to suggest for a moment that the stuff about Galois lattices is window-dressing, the intuitive idea behind what Roth and Bourgine are doing is simple and compelling, and I think can be accurately presented without an excursion through higher mathematics. (The math is necessary when it comes to actually making the stuff work, though. And really it's pretty cool math in itself. To read more about it, it may be helpful to know that the structure Roth and Bourgine call a Galois lattice is also known as a Galois connection, because it's a relationship between two lattices. The Wikipedia entry on Galois connections is good, and explains where the name comes from, namely Galois theory in abstract algebra, which was, in fact, initiated by Evariste Galois.)

Start with an arbitrary collection of scientists; we don't care whether or not they have anything to do with one another in reality, at least not yet. These will have certain concepts they employ in their research. Probably no two scientists employ exactly the same concepts, but it's a good bet that scientists who are part of the same research community will have a lot of concepts in common. So, let's write down the set of concepts which are shared by all the scientists in our initial collection. This corresponds to starting with the initial set of all concepts, and then tossing out any ideas which aren't shared by all of our scientists. This is, so to speak, the conceptual intension of the group. Now that we have this group of concepts, we can ask "are there any other scientists who employ all these concepts?" That is, we take our initial group, and augment it with all the other scientists who share all the concepts shared by its initial members; this is the social extension of the concepts. Now, notice, we've come to a fixed point. If we took the augmented group and repeated this procedure, we'd get no increase in the group. (You might care to try checking this by hand.) Roth and Bourgine call such an augmented group an "epistemic community".

The same trick can be worked the other way, too. Start with a set of concepts; identify all the scientists who share them; and then add any additional concepts all those scientists have in common. This will get you to a fixed point as well, and so it will also be an epistemic community.

It's easy to convince yourself that if community A includes all the scientists in B and more, it must contain fewer concepts, and vice versa. This lets us define a kind of structure on communities, of the sort technically known as a lattice: socially larger but conceptually more impoverished groups sit higher in the lattice than smaller, more conceptually-distinct groups, until at the very top one finds the collection of all the scientists in the world, and whatever incredibly generic conceptual apparatus they all have in common (if anything). At the bottom are individual scientists, and their complete, presumably unique conceptual repertoires.

Just by itself, this is a neat idea for characterizing epistemic communities, but Roth and Bourgine, in their second paper, go further, and show that it can be used to actually discover such communities, more or less blind. What they did was take all the papers in Medline from 1990 to 1995 that included "zebrafish" among their keywords. They then identified, for operational purposes, the remaining keywords with the concepts employed in the papers. (Naturally, they are aware of all of the pitfalls involved in this.) They then built the Galois lattice of authors and concepts, on the assumption that every author on a paper employed all of the concepts in its keywords. This gives them a lattice of communities, and the striking thing is that their communities make sense. The top is a single community centered on the concept "zebrafish" --- no surprise. Below that are communities centered around words like "gene", "expression", "pattern", "embryo", "develop", "vertebrate", with high over-lap, and another bunch of overlapping communities based on "cloning", "stage", "transcription", "sequence", "protein", "region", "encode". These in turn sub-divide into, say, neuro-developmental communities (P. Z. Myers is probably in there someplace), or even just the spinal cord. Because this is a lattice structure, and not just a tree, there are sub-communities (say, changing patterns of gene expression in the spinal cord during different stages of development) which belong to multiple higher-level communities.

Roth and Bourgine check their results by comparing them to the ideas zebrafish biologists have about themselves, as revealed by tables of contents, review papers, etc., and by a native informant. There's much to be said for this, but it would be nice to have a more objective check. On the one hand, there will be many populations where there aren't handy native informants; on the other, people might mis-understand themselves, or simply have missed some important feature of their own organization, which could in fact be revealed by the lattice. Still, it's impressive how sensible the organization they get is, especially since the way they pick out concepts is, as they emphasize, quite simplistic, both logically and as a matter of language-processing. --- You could of course repeat this analysis on any population with partially-shared concepts and terms: scientists, philosophers, writers for science fiction fanzines, other literary intellectuals, modernist poets, (other) rappers, UFO-fanciers, political pundits, or even bloggers. The results would be interesting, and probably often pretty amusing.

As Roth and Bourgine emphasize in their first paper, simply picking out what the communities are is merely a preliminary to figuring out how they work, and how they got that way --- to understanding dynamics and function. Presumably there are relationships between, say, epistemic community structure and the structure of the scientific collaboration network. (I've already written at length about the "cultural epidemiology" they mention, so I won't repeat myself other than to say "Right on!") But you have to know what the epistemic communities are before you can ask how they're related to other things, and this is the nicest way I've seen to do that.

Update, 22 July: M. Roth writes to point out that he has a new preprint, nlin.AO/0507021, looking at, inter alia, the evolution of the zebrafish epistemic community structure from 1997 to 2004. I've not had a chance to read it yet, but I'm looking forward to doing so.

Manual trackback: Three Quarks Daily; 3rd Desk

The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts; Networks

Posted by crshalizi at July 19, 2005 13:45 | permanent link

Under Erasure

This was mostly written in December, back before I went on hiatus, and polished up last week, when jet-lag had me getting up at four a.m. every day.

One of the commonly-accepted bits of lore in the physics of computation and information is Landauer's principle, named after the late, great Rolf Landauer, who first articulated it in 1961. This states that erasing one bit of information is always an entropy-producing operation, and that the entropy it creates is kln(2), where k is Boltzmann's constant. At a constant (absolute) temperature T, then, erasing n bits produces kTnln(2) joules of heat. Landauer's principle says that erasure is not thermodynamically reversible; a further, associated claim is that erasure is the only irreversible computational operation, and that, in particular, measurement can be done reversibly. This would establish a connection between thermodynamic reversibility, and logical invertibility — the ability to recover the inputs to a computation from its outputs, if you want to do so.

As I said, Landauer's principle is a commonly accepted bit of physical lore. Unfortunately, I have recently read two papers by philosophers — Orly Shenker's "Logic and Entropy", and John Norton's "Eaters of the Lotus" — which have managed to convince me that all of the usual arguments for Landauer's principle, starting with those of Landauer himself, are invalid. Both Shenker and Norton sketch out physical mechanisms which can store and erase bits in thermodynamically-reversible ways, or at least ones which are thermodynamically reversible in suitable limits (you may have to erase very slowly). There may be flaws in their proposals — detecting such slips is not my strong suit — but if so they're subtle ones, and I'm pretty sure they're right about the invalidity of the normal arguments. At best what has been established is that certain physical realizations of bit-erasure are thermodynamically irreversible, and their entropy production is at least kln(2). If Shenker and Norton are right (and I'm afraid they are), we have no good reason to believe Landauer's principle is a general truth. Where this leaves us, I have no idea.

(One thing which strikes me about this is that, while Norton and Shenker document what seems to be a widespread error, their implicit explanations for it rest on mistakes of reasoning, particularly confusions about when different sorts of ensembles are appropriate. They find no need to invoke the social or political interests of the physicists. Indeed, it would be absurd to do so; what extra-scientific interest is served by thinking that the minimum dissipation compatible with erasure of a bit is kln(2) rather than zero? While I have no doubt that one could talk coherently and interestingly about the social mechanisms which made Landauer's principle endemic among physicists — which carried the idea from his mind to, among others, mine — those mechanisms would seem to have little ability to explain the content of the principle.)

Update, 20 July: Dave Bacon has a good follow-up post; unlike me, he actually explains the arguments involved.

Update, 22 July: Cris Moore, writing in the comments to Dave Bacon's post, presents what may be a problem for Shenker's reversible eraser. I'd need to think about that very carefully. I'm still persuaded, however, by Shenker and Norton's criticisms of the arguments for of Landauer's principle.

Update, 23 July: A new preprint by Tony Short et al. at the Pittsburgh philosophy of science archive (just down the street!) claims to rescue a "qualitative" form of Landauer's principle. (Presumably they mean that any logically irreversible operation must be dissipative to some degree, if not necessarily the kln(2) formula.) I haven't had a chance to read it yet, and probably won't for a while.

Physics

Posted by crshalizi at July 19, 2005 11:59 | permanent link

Frontiers of Xenobiology

An astute observation from David Chess:

By observing the length of time that the Bush administration stonewalled about the Plame affair before any at all credible actions were even hinted at, we should be able to estimate the time that it takes to extract an alien overlord from a human brainstem and implant it into a new host body.

(Suggestions that the current Karl Rove is actually a clone of the original, grown specifically to take the blame, seriously overestimate the Greys' ability to clone humans; Cheney's heart problems are clear evidence that they haven't made this a high priority, or that the biology of the two species is just too different to allow quick adaptation of the technology.)

The Running-Dogs of Reaction

Posted by crshalizi at July 19, 2005 11:32 | permanent link

July 13, 2005

A View from Incense-Burner Mountain

The atmosphere just outside Beijing is hot, humid, and almost unbelievably hazy. The atmosphere of the complex systems summer school where I'm teaching this week is, thankfully, rather different...

Corrupting the Young; Postcards; Complexity

Posted by crshalizi at July 13, 2005 13:47 | permanent link

June 30, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, June 2005

Norman Douglas, Old Calabria [Project Gutenberg e-text]
Travels in darkest southern Italy by the author of South Wind. Some lovely travel writing, amusing historical and theological reflections, observations of the country and its inhabitants, etc., interspersed with what are now very jarring reminders that the English-speaking world in 1915 was indeed another country, and in some ways a very unpleasant one. (E.g., the completely unself-conscious way Douglas talks about "we white men", in contrast to the Calabrians.) — The first chapter would be completely confusing without at least some acquaintance with the history of medieval southern Italy, especially that of Frederick II and his heirs.
Stephen King, Song of Susannah
Volume 6 of the Dark Tower series. (See earlier remarks on vol. 5.) One more to go...
James Tucker, Abra Cadaver, Hocus Corpus and Tragic Wand
Series of mystery novels about a Pittsburgh surgeon and amateur magician. I read them to try to get some feel for the city — we'll see how well that works — but they're amusing enough, in a brain-candy way. (I can barely follow the explanations of the magic tricks, though.)
Joseph Conrad, Nostromo
Conrad is, as always, a minor god of prose and story. However, the later author's foreword at the beginning of the edition I read (Doubleday, 1924) is one damn plot-spoiler after another...
Andrea Camilleri, Excursion to Tindari
Excellent Sicilian police procedural. The middle of a series; I will be reading the rest.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at June 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

June 16, 2005

An Operational Test of "Mathematical Maturity"

Do you find these hilariously funny, or just lame? (Via Bill Tozier, via Ernie's 3D Pancakes)

Mathematics; Learned Folly

Posted by crshalizi at June 16, 2005 09:45 | permanent link

June 15, 2005

Continuing the Flow of Brainy Material

Two more publications are now available (but were done some time ago).

One is a fairly straightforward paper, which you can get from arxiv.org.

Matthew J. Berryman, Scott W. Coussens, Cosma Shalizi, Yvonne Pamula, David Parsons, Kurt Lushington, David Saint, Andrew Allison, A. James Martin, Declan Kennedy and Derek Abbott, "Nonlinear Aspects of EEG Signals from Sleep Patients", pp. 40--48 in Fluctuations and Noise in Biological, Biophysical, and Biomedical Systems III (Bellingham, Washington: SPIE, 2005); q-bio.NC/0506015
Abstract: Electroencephalograph (EEG) analysis enables the neuronal behavior of a section of the brain to be examined. If the behavior is nonlinear then nonlinear tools can be used to glean information on brain behavior, and aid in the diagnosis of sleep abnormalities such as obstructive sleep apnea syndrome (OSAS). In this paper the sleep EEGs of a set of normal and mild OSAS children are evaluated for nonlinear behaviour. We consider how the behaviour of the brain changes with sleep stage and between normal and OSAS children.

This paper grows out of work Matthew did in Ann Arbor, when he visited last summer. (Our summer, not his.)

The other is a little more convoluted.

Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, "Functionalism, emergence, and collective coordinates: A statistical physics perspective on 'What to say to a skeptical metaphysician'", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2004): 635--636
This is part of the peer commentary on Don Ross and David Spurrett's target paper, "What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician: A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists" (pp. 603--627, same issue). The commentary (pp. 627--637) is followed by Ross and Spurrett's intelligent reply to comments (pp. 637--647). My contribution isn't particularly readable outside of that context, which of course the journal doesn't make publicly available.

Now, back to work.

Minds, Brains, and Neurons; Complexity; Physics; Philosophy; Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at June 15, 2005 10:00 | permanent link

June 13, 2005

Further to Heuristic Diversity

Posting will be light for the next few days, while I get various forms of work done. In the event you simply must have more of my prose to read, here is my latest (and probably last) article for the SFI Bulletin, which is the 2500 additional words on Scott Page's work on diversity I promised some time ago.

The tone is somewhat affected by the fact that the Bulletin is the functional equivalent of an alumni magazine for SFI --- it's supposed to make people feel good about the place and its work, and (hopefully) give money. Still, I think I did a pretty honest job of it. (On my own, I might have left out the bits about Scalia, and left in the bits about exactly what's wrong with The Wisdom of Crowds, but my editors were right on both counts.) Even at that length, I had to leave out a lot of things. The ones which I most regret, today, were the connections to boosting and other ensemble methods in machine learning and statistics, on the one hand, and to Charles Lindblom's work on decision-making by mutual adjustment and "disjointed incrementalism", a.k.a. "the intelligence of democracy". But I had the disturbing realization, when writing it, of just how easy it would be to turn it into a sixty- or hundred- page venture into social theory. Really, the subject demands a book; fortunately, Scott is writing one.

Now, back to the bowels of LaTeX.

The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts; Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at June 13, 2005 12:13 | permanent link

June 12, 2005

Exponential Families and Hybridity (Why Oh Why Can't Physicists Learn Better Probability and Statistics, Part N)

Attention conservation notice: Incredibly geeky exposition of statistical arcana, along with unbecoming negative emotions. Contains equations. Without some knowledge of calculus and probability, only the whinging will be clear.

An exponential family is a collection of probability distributions over some space of configurations, where the probability density at a particular configuration x has the form

\[ p_{\theta}(x) = \frac{e^{-\theta \cdot T(x)}}{Z(\theta)} \]

(Note to statisticians: I'm glossing over some details about things like the choice of reference measure here.) The vector $ T(x) $ is a (finite) collection of statistics, $ T_i(x) $ , which we calculate on individual configurations x. $ \theta $ is a corresponding vector of parameters, which essentially say how much weight we give to each of the statistics. If one of those parameter is large and positive, then configurations with large values of the matching statistic are, all else being equal, exponentially unlikely. These parameters — generally called the natural parameters — index the different distributions. Clearly, any vector $ \eta = f(\theta) $ , where f is invertible, could also be used, but the nice algebraic form of the density would generally be messed up. (In information geometry, we'd say that the family is a manifold of distributions, and the natural parameters are one coordinate system on that manifold. Changing to a different coordinate system would be the same as reparametrization.) Finally, Z is just a normalizing factor:
\[ Z(\theta) = \int{dx ~ e^{-\theta \cdot T(x)}} \]

OK, that's an exponential family — so what? Because the probability density has this nice exponential form, many things are very easy to do. The statistics $ T_i $ turn out to be sufficient statistics, so to do essentially any kind of inference, we only need to know their values, not the complete configuration x. Further, the values of the natural parameters that maximize the likelihood of the data, $ \hat{\theta} $ turn out to be the ones where the expected values of the statistics equal their observed values. I think that calculation is very cute, so I'll impose on your patience to actually go through it.

\begin{eqnarray*} 
{\left.\frac{\partial p_{\theta}(x)}{\partial \theta_i}\right|}_{\theta=\hat{\theta}} & = & 0\\ 
& = & {\left. \frac{Z(\hat{\theta})\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_i}e^{-\theta\cdot T(x)} - e^{-\theta\cdot T(x)}\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_i}Z(\theta)}{Z^2(\theta)} \right|}_{\theta=\hat{\theta}}\\ 
& = & {\left. -Z(\theta)T_i(x) e^{-\theta\cdot T(x)} - e^{-\theta\cdot T(x)} \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_i}Z(\theta)\right|}_{\theta=\hat{\theta}} 
\end{eqnarray*}

Now the derivative of Z has a nice form:

\begin{eqnarray*} 
\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_i}Z(\theta) & = & \int{dx ~ \frac{\partial}{\partial \theta_i} e^{-\theta \cdot T(x)}}\\ 
& = & \int{dx ~ (-T_i(x)) e^{-\theta \cdot T(x)}}\\ 
& = & \int{dx ~ (-T_i(x)) p_{\theta}(x) Z(\theta)}\\ 
& = &-Z(\theta) \int{dx ~ T_i(x) p_{\theta}(x)}\\ 
& = & -Z(\theta) \mathbf{E}_{\theta}[T_i] 
\end{eqnarray*}
(If you worry about differentiating under the integral sign, I applaud your caution. Imagine for right now that the space of configurations is discrete, so that integral is really just a sum.)

So

\[ {\left. -Z(\theta)T_i(x) e^{-\theta\cdot T(x)} + e^{-\theta\cdot T(x)}Z(\theta) \mathbf{E}_{\theta}[T_i]\right|}_{\theta=\hat{\theta}} = 0 
 \]

Canceling common factors, we're left with
\[ 
T_i(x) = \mathbf{E}_{\hat{\theta}}[T_i] 
 \]
Q.E.D.

I could go on about the wonderful properties of exponential families at some length — say, a chapter in a first course on theoretical statistics, or even whole monographs — but I'll forbear. The art in getting exponential families to work consists of picking the right set of statistics — the right functions of the data to calculate.

Some months ago — you'll see why I disguise the details in a moment — I heard a talk a statistician gave on a subject of mutual concern to her tribe, and to physicists interested in complex systems. As I've mentioned a number of times before, these two tribes essentially never talk to each other, so this was pleasing to me. Unfortunately, the talk itself was less than successful, and it nearly resulted in a highly regrettable action on my part.

This was because the statistician was doing something very clever, which should have been quite transparent to the physicists, but was in fact utterly opaque. She was trying to fit the properties of these systems using exponential families, which is why I bring them up. Most of the talk the statistician had intended to give was about how the set of statistics most people had thought were important in these systems actually turned out not to work, but a different, much larger set did, and that these new variables could be broken down into two sorts, which corresponded to two different mechanisms in the system in question, both of which had been postulated by physicists, but whose relative contributions hadn't been clearly distinguished in data before.

If there is any one idea in theoretical statistics which should be natural for physicists, I'd think it's that of an exponential family. This is because classical statistical mechanics is all about one particular exponential family, namely the Boltzmann distribution. The sufficient statistics $ T_i $ correspond to the extensive thermodynamic variables, like molecular numbers, volume and energy, while the natural parameters correspond to the intensive variables, like chemical potentials, pressure and (inverse) temperature. Saying that you need to find the right statistics to get good results is the same as our bit of lore that the crucial first step is to find the right collective degrees of freedom — that you can't hope to make progress until you've identified the order parameters, etc. The normalizing factor is just the partition function (which is why I wrote it Z). And the equality of observed and expected values at the maximum likelihood parameter turns out to be entropy maximization (as Jaynes pointed out sometime in the '60s).

In fact, none of this was clear to the other physicists in the audience, who were not (for the most part) dumb. They didn't get what the normalizing factor was, they didn't really get the difference between a statistic and a parameter, and they even had trouble understanding that finding the parameter value for which the observed configuration is more likely than it is with any other parameter value is not the same as finding the parameters where the observed configuration is more likely than any other configuration — that maximizing the likelihood is not the same as making the data the mode. Hell, some of them had trouble understanding that the mean of a distribution and its mode are not necessarily the same. At one point I wanted to yell at one of them, who was being particularly obtuse, "J., can't you even recognize a #$!@% partition function?"; but that wouldn't have been proper even if I'd been the one giving the talk, which I wasn't.

All this comes to mind, of course, because I've been writing a page explaining what I do, and why I'm doing it in a statistics department. I don't think I've ever been so glad of my new affiliation as I was when that talk ended. This was some time ago, now, and so I'm able to think more calmly, and can envision another seminar — the dual, as it were — where a physicist talked about "state" and "coarse-grained collective degrees of freedom", and statisticians were equally baffled, because they didn't realize he was talking about causal screening, low-dimensional statistics, etc.

In fact, I can only too easily envision giving that talk. But that's a somewhat limited ambition: my true goal is to produce work both statisticians and physicists will find incomprehensible.

Enigmas of Chance; Physics; Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at June 12, 2005 21:10 | permanent link

Friday Cat Blogging (Sunday Supplement Issue of Science Geek Edition)

Unscrewing the Inscrutable has a wonderful post on the evolution and biology of cats. The illustrations, in particular, are great (especially the Felis ocreata kittens). This shows up my own puny efforts as the jokes they are... (Via Majikthise, Pharyngula and Three Quarks Daily, all at once.)

Friday Cat Blogging; Biology

Posted by crshalizi at June 12, 2005 10:58 | permanent link

Sunday Story Time

How many people who complain about the Just So stories of evolutionary psychology actually go to the trouble of writing them? Thus Sharon Begley in the Wall Street Journal:

In the High and Far-Off Times, oh Best Beloved, the Man lived harmoniously with others. Although his heart ached when his Mate fell in love with another, and he raged and cursed love's cruelty, the thought of vengeance never crossed his mind. Seeing his Doormat tendencies, Women scorned his advances, and he never had children. His line ended, Best Beloved.
But the Man lived to see the birth of a New Man. When the New Man grew up and his Mate was unfaithful, he killed her. When his next Mate merely glanced at another Man, he killed her, too. His third Mate, he beat up to keep her too submissive to even dream of looking at another. Women became smitten with his power and status, and his line grew plenteous. His sons inherited his mate-killing instincts, and soon only they — not the Doormats — mated and begot children. And ever since then, oh Best Beloved, all Men have a mind designed to kill unfaithful Wives.
Kipling never got around to explaining how men's minds got wired for uxoricide, but fear not: David Buss, professor of psychology at the University of Texas, Austin, has. In "The Murderer Next Door: Why the Mind Is Designed to Kill," he explains that the male mind "has developed adaptations for killing." (An "adaptation" is a trait that conferred an evolutionary edge; those with it left more descendants than those without it.)

(If you think that's not really suitable for telling your Best Beloved, you should check out what some of the Grimms' fairy tales were like, before they edited out the bits that shocked their sensibilities.) Begley then goes on to give Buss's theory the serious consideration it deserves. (A hint as to her conclusion is contained in her story's headline: "Theory Men Are Wired To Kill Straying Mates Is Offensive and Wrong".)

Of course, the shoddiness of (much of) the sex-and-violence part of evolutionary psychology is quite compatible with (many of) the criticisms of the field as a whole being themselves shoddy as well. Chris at Mixing Memory ("The Best Blog in the World That Is Written By Me"), himself no friend of evolutionary psychology, here neatly vivisects one recent attempt at critique (which was hailed by Brian Leiter as definitive).

(Begley's piece via Darrel Plant, via The Tenth Skeptics' Circle, via Deltoid. Aside: The Murderer Next Door is also the title of a out-of-print mystery novel by Rafael "Abu Matthew" Yglesias, which is a much better book than Buss's sounds like; admittedly I say this without having read the latter.)

The Natural Science of the Human Species

Posted by crshalizi at June 12, 2005 10:39 | permanent link

June 11, 2005

Word

Over at LanguageLog, Mark Liberman contemplates the latest theory for the evolution of language ("it's all about cutting up dead elephants"), and raises a worry I've often had about the evolution of human intelligence in general.

In my opinion, the biggest mystery is not why we humans developed language, but why nobody else did. If language is so great, why doesn't everybody have one -- or at least the best approximation they can manage? Judging by their contemporary descendents, the cephalopods of 400 million years ago probably had as many qualitatively different communicative displays as chimpanzees do. Since then, surely, many other species have gotten into situations that motivated symbolic communication for fission-fusion scavenging, or for social group maintenance, or for sexual display, or whatever.

This is exactly right. One needs to explain not just why human beings have language, but also why other species do not — why can't lions talk? They are, after all, a highly social, sexually-reproducing species engaging in group food-procurement on the African savannah. Similarly, remarkably few accounts I've read of human evolution try to explain why other primate, or at least other great ape, lineages didn't themselves develop human-level cognitive abilities. Maybe all the possible selective forces Liberman talks about, and more, actually work, but they are all very weak, and for some reason only hominids were subject to enough of them to make intelligence or language cost-effective...

Update: In e-mail, Bill Tozier reminds me I have neglected the decisive factor in the evolution of the human mind.

The Natural Science of the Human Species

Posted by crshalizi at June 11, 2005 10:20 | permanent link

June 10, 2005

And You May Say to Yourself, "This Is Not My Beautiful Blog!"

David Byrne has an online journal, where he discusses life, music, spam, photographic iconography, what it's like being introduced as "the guy from Talking Heads", etc. Apparently he doesn't like it being called a blog; fair enough, since there seems to be no way to link to individual entries. (Via John Burke, who also provided the title.)

Linkage

Posted by crshalizi at June 10, 2005 14:32 | permanent link

The Little Grey Cells Get Their Act Together

Posting has been light partly because of house-hunting (graciously hosted by John and Dani), but also because of finishing and submitting this:

Kristina Lisa Klinkner, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi and Marcelo F. Camperi, "Measuring Shared Information and Coordinated Activity in Neuronal Networks", q-bio.NC/0506009
Abstract: Most nervous systems encode information about stimuli in the responding activity of large neuronal networks. This activity often manifests itself as dynamically coordinated sequences of action potentials. Since multiple electrode recordings are now a standard tool in neuroscience research, it is important to have a measure of such network-wide behavioral coordination and information sharing, applicable to multiple neural spike train data. We propose a new statistic, informational coherence, which measures how much better one unit can be predicted by knowing the dynamical state of another. We argue informational coherence is a measure of association and shared information which is superior to traditional pairwise measures of synchronization and correlation. To find the dynamical states, we use a recently-introduced algorithm which reconstructs effective state spaces from stochastic time series. We then extend the pairwise measure to a multivariate analysis of the network by estimating the network multi-information. We illustrate our method by testing it on a detailed model of the transition from gamma to beta rhythms.

This was really Kris and Marcelo's problem, and their solution; but they let me kibbitz. Still, since it's mostly their work (by a large margin), I feel like I can say that it's very nice, without tooting my own horn too much. Existing methods, like cross-correlation or joint peristimulus time histograms, can handle certain kinds of coordination between neurons, but basically they do it by making really restrictive assumptions about what patterns of activity the neurons might be using, and how they're related. If you look at cross-correlation, for instance, you're sticking to linear relationships between what happens at one time to one neuron and to another neuron after some time-lag, and ignoring non-linear relationships or relationships between extended patterns (rather than just momentary activity). What Kris and Marcelo realized is that you don't have to make this kind of assumption. If we had a way to discover each neuron's characteristic patterns of behavior, we could just look at the moment-to-moment coordination of those patterns. But reconstructing the effective state space, which is something we know how to do, is the same thing as discovering those patterns; and there we are.

Another nice feature of this approach is that, as we say in the abstract, it lets us get at global coordination in a way which goes beyond just averaging pairwise measurements. Since we use mutual information between states, it would be nice to look at the global mutual information — essentially how far the joint distribution of all the neurons' states departs from statistical indepdence. Estimating that global distribution directly is really hard, but it turns out one can use Chow-Liu trees to put a very reasonable lower bound on the global information, while only having to estimate the joint distribution of each pair of neurons. This is like ignoring higher-order interactions in statistical mechanics, except when they can be decomposed into pairwise interactions, and it's actually (see Amari) a kind of maximum-entropy approximation. Nothing like this would work for, say, correlation coefficients. — We learned about Chow-Liu trees from a cool paper by Kirshner, Smyth and Robertson at UAI last year; I'm surprised they're not better known.

There is no reason why informational coherence should measure coordination only between neurons. But that will be another story.

Manual trackback: Idiolect

Minds, Brains, and Neurons; Enigmas of Chance; Networks; Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at June 10, 2005 13:54 | permanent link

Life in All Its Rich Variety — Do Not Falter!

There are days I am glad I'm a mathematical scientist.

Paul B. Eckburg, Elisabeth M. Bik, Charles N. Bernstein, Elizabeth Purdom, Les Dethlefsen, Michael Sargent, Steven R. Gill, Karen E. Nelson, and David A. Relman, "Diversity of the Human Intestinal Microbial Flora", Science 308 (2005): 1635--1638
Abstract: The human endogenous intestinal microflora is an essential "organ" in providing nourishment, regulating epithelial development, and instructing innate immunity; yet, surprisingly, basic features remain poorly described. We examined 13,355 prokaryotic ribosomal RNA gene sequences from multiple colonic mucosal sites and feces of healthy subjects to improve our understanding of gut microbial diversity. A majority of the bacterial sequences corresponded to uncultivated species and novel microorganisms. We discovered significant intersubject variability and differences between stool and mucosa community composition. Characterization of this immensely diverse ecosystem is the first step in elucidating its role in health and disease.

One reason papers like this gladden my heart is my basic intellectual cowardice: the sheer endless proliferating detail of biology overwhelms me, especially when something drives home the fact that we keep finding utterly new stuff everywhere we look. Here we are, looking at our own guts, and coming up with stuff like this: "Three sequences from two subjects ... appear to represent a novel lineage, deeply branching from the Cyanobacteria phylum and chloroplast sequences." See? There are organisms whose closest relatives are the stuff that turns ponds and leaves green living inside us, and until now we had no idea. And when we eventually look inside them, they're going to turn out to be weirdly complicated and uniquely strange, exactly like everything else. And of course the damn things will have histories, again exactly like everything else. Biology just doesn't stop, and at some point the details and special cases make me wish my head would explode.

Fundamentally, however, stuff like this cheers me up because my work does not involve collecting colonic mucosa.

Update, that afternoon: Oh, dear, I knew that last joke was going to turn out to be a mistake. Really, I was aiming for a tone of sour grapes adaptive preferences: I think this kind of science is utterly fascinating, and I wish I could do it, but I just don't have the ability to keep masses of detail straight in my mind which I'd need to do so. This rather amuses the half of my immediate family consisting of experimental biologists. So, pace my good friend Bill Tozier, I really would like you to know what's up your butt; or at least like someone to know. Bill's post raises many fine issues, and deserves a full response, but for now he'll just have to be content with my muttering something about quasiparticles.

Manual trackback: Crumb Trail; Pharyngula; A Thinking Reed

The Natural Science of the Human Species; Biology

Posted by crshalizi at June 10, 2005 08:47 | permanent link

May 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, May 2005

Lois McMaster Bujold, The Hallowed Hunt
What can I say? Bujold is a vice really a very good and enjoyable novelist.
Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250--1350
A tour of the "archipelago of towns" that constituted the first integrated economy, from Flanders to to Hangzhou, and centered on the Indian Ocean. Creates the impression that in some sense modernity ought to have begun then, and been centered in India and China, rather than the fairly peripheral lands of western Europe. To simplify Abu-Lughod's argument somewhat, the reason it didn't is that those same trade routes were the ones which spread the Black Death, especially in the great pandemic of the 1340s, and so tended to be especially severe in precisely the most advanced, integrated parts of the world. The knock-on effects of the disease, like the weakening of Mongol power, further damaged the system, so that by the fifteenth century all that was left were a few fragments and a lot of power vacua, which could be picked-up and repurposed by the new European imperial powers, especially since they had the resources of the Americas to draw on. Ming China could have done something similar, but chose not to, for what seemed like good reasons at the time. Remarkably well-written (especially for medieval political-economic history!), and accurate. (Though I admit I boggled when she implied that the capitol of the Tang dynasty was Peking, when every schoolchild knows it was Chang-an.) Highly, highly recommended.
Doug Henwood, Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom [full text free online]
For the most part, sound and intelligent. Henwood's insistence on looking at financial markets as social institutions, ones where power is vitally important, is entirely correct and refreshing. If you don't know much about how those markets and institutions work, this book will tell you, in a refreshingly disillusioned way. Even if you are more expert, you'll probably learn something — e.g., I was quite suprised by his numbers on how little investment is financed through selling new stock, as opposed to firms' internal cash-flows. Downsides: his reflexively negative attitude towards economic modeling and econometrics; the residual impulse to genuflect before Marx, and (this "coincidence" is no accident, comrades!) the tendency to describe social developments as deliberate actions taken by personified Capital; the excursion into the psychoanalysis of money; equivocation about whether the problem is money and finance, or whether it's capitalism (not a confusion Marx would've made); and the vagueness of his constructive proposals, mostly confined to the last two pages, which seemed like Alec Nove, only with all the intellectual clarity removed. As a good Left Popperian, I share his view that the institutions of a better society will only be found through struggle and experimentation; but by the same token, I dislike his spending many more pages on why all more concrete improvements are impossible and/or pointless until we expropriate the expropriators.
Kristine Smith, Code of Conduct
The over-exciting life of a government document examiner. No, really.
Kage Baker, The Anvil of the World
Initially, this seems like a fairly typical picaresque fantasy book, a series of agreeably-told but inconsequential humorous stories, like lesser works by Terry Pratchett, only without the social perspective, or by Jack Vance, only without the gorgeous prose style. By the end you realize she's constructed a fiendishly tight plot, where all the throw-away amusing details actually matter — that everything is a gun placed on the mantle-piece in Act I. (Cf. Greg Egan's Distress.) Clearly, I need to read more Baker...
Ken MacLeod, Cosmonaut Keep, The Dark Light and Engine City
Leftist human cosmonauts vs. nanobacterial cometary gods, with grey-skinned aliens piloting flying saucers caught in the middle. Great fun: revolutions, anarcho-syndicalists vs. communists, hacking, love, highly respectable materialism, arguments about the philosophies of history and of practice, special-relativistic tragedies, etc. Getting the in-jokes, both socialistic ("the delegates brandish their weapons") and science-fictional (the very last line) should not be necessary to enjoy these. (I'm sure I missed many!)
Eric Ambler, Background to Danger
Ambler is probably the best thriller writer I've ever encountered. This is one of pre-war anti-fascist novels, like his masterpiece, A Coffin for Dimitrios. While admittedly this isn't as good as that, it's still first-rate.
Helen Collins, Mutagenesis
Feminist bio-anthropological SF. I'm not sure how much more to say without spoiling the plot, other than that it's really good, and I'm more than a little disappointed that Collins doesn't seem to have published any more novels since this one.
Ramsey Campbell, The Face That Must Die
A queasily-absorbing venture into the mind of a paranoid killer; the interior lunacy is effectively echoed by late-seventies British urban squalor. This edition has an autobiographical introduction by Campbell which is, itself, fairly unsettling.
Elizabeth Ironside, A Very Private Enterprise
Enjoyable mystery novel, set among diplomats in Delhi, with a vividly-described excursion to Ladakh. Good on surprising-yet-persuasive plot twists, including a really big turn at the ending. (No buying link, since it's not in the Powell's catalog. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984; I read a 1995 paperback reprint, ISBN 0450640332.)
Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism
This is very mixed: some parts are quite good, like Berman's reading of Qutb, and the description of the curious psychological mechanisms which lead well-meaning people to discount the possibility of large-scale political madness. But other parts are not convincing at all. To proceed from the less to the more consequential. (i) It's important to realize that large, influential, successful, genuinely popular political movements can be completely, viciously mad, but there are always some would-be leaders of the people, offering insane political programs. It's also crucial to understand why the appeal of insanity varies over space, time and class. Berman offers nothing here beyond the suggestion that Europe lost its marbles after the Great War, and this then spread by contagion; at the very least, pragmatically unhelpful. (ii) That there was any important historical connection between European totalitarianism and modern Islamism remains just as dubious to me after reading it as it was before. (Berman doesn't even consider the possibility of similar responses to similar situations.) (iii) I completely fail to see how he convinced himself that attacking secular Arab fascism, as institutionalized by Baathist Iraq, was going to help deal with the threat of Islamism. Even if one grants, reasonably enough, that these are both two totalitarian movements, or clusters of movements, which have taken root among largely-Islamic populations, this does not follow at all. (iv) However desirable a determined US policy of support for democratization and liberalism in the Muslim world might be, the Bush administration could not be counted on to (1) actually agree, (2) implement such a policy, especially when it runs against short-term expediency, and (3) implement it competently. Here, as in his later writings, the possibility of an "anti-this-war-now" left is simply ignored. (Yes, yes, I know we were all supposed to read this book years ago. Sue me.)
Nancy Kress, Stinger
I like the idea of biomedical thrillers, but find the implementations generally unreadable. Stinger is a rare exception. The biology is good, the writing is significantly more than decent (especially the characterization), and the sense of how a major scare about bio-terrorism would play out is altogether too plausible — I thought some bits must've been lifted bodily from reporting on the 2001 anthrax cases, but this was published three years earlier. Features the return of FBI agent Robert Cavanaugh from Kress's (also good) Oaths and Miracles, with more amusing sketches ("meanwhile, back at the skin") and tragicomic cluelessness about women. Both books are out of print, naturally.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at May 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

May 27, 2005

Let Me Be Among the First to Welcome Our New Orbital Cybernetic Zombie Overlords!

I present for your edification three pieces of evidence that the modern world is, in fact, a really bad* science fiction movie.

  1. (Return of the Zombie Monger): Lo, these many months ago, I puzzled over how Christof Koch --- one of the brighter lights in the field of biological computation --- could be saying such obviously-wrong things about consciousness. Koch appears to be saying that consciousness evolved to allow us to engage in behavior which requires memory and planning, rather than the automatic responses of what philosophers call "zombies". The problem is that zombies, in that sense, are defined as creatures behaviorally identical to people, only without inner consciousness. Matthew Yglesias is now similarly puzzled, though he expresses his bafflement with less automata theory. I suppose I should really read Koch's book and see if he's really making the mistake he appears to be, or just ought to be cursing all publicists and science-writers for gross misunderstanding.
  2. (Death from Space): The Air Force wants to militarize space --- as in, spend a ton of money on filling it with weapons, as well as our existing spy satellites. Now, I like the idea of an orbital death-ray platform as much as the next guy (though really I'd prefer mind-control lasers), but actually doing something like this is just stupid. There's no way Star Wars will ever actually be a workable defensive technology. But an offensive capacity is far more feasible. It also only makes sense to encourage such things if you assume that you and yours are going to be ruling humanity with an iron fist and no allies for the next thousand years.
  3. (The Little Grey Cubes that Ate Ithaca): Victor Zykov and others working in Hod Lipson's lab at Cornell report successful self-reproduction by modular mechanical robots in Nature. There are cool movies available, too (either from the supplementary files at Nature, or directly from the lab at Cornell). This actually implements an old idea of John von Neumann's, for what he called "kinematic" self-reproduction. He imagined an automaton swimming in a large pool filled with machine parts (all presumably rust-proofed, or perhaps the pool was to be filled with oil?), snagging the ones it needed to assemble a new copy of itself, according to a plan it could carry in memory. You might object that the parts had to come from somewhere, but it seems clear that a robot which could do that could also assemble program-controlled machine tools, etc. (The mathematical field of cellular automata, which I hold dear, owes its existence to von Neumann's feeling that these arguments weren't completely rigorous, and that he needed something else to prove there was nothing self-contradictory in the idea of a self-reproducing machine. Things might have been very different if Johnny had been more of an experimentalist.) Zykov et al. have provided a neat implementation of this idea, minus the pool, using partially-articulated, mechanically-actuated metal cubes, which can swivel and attach to each other using electromagnets. Physically all the blocks were identical --- it's not clear to me from the paper whether their internal programming was differentiated. In any case, I thought this bit was very clever: "The four-module robot ... was able to construct a replica in 2.5 min by lifting and assembling cubes from the feeding locations. Because the replica is as large as the original, the replica reconfigures itself to assist in its own construction." They also suggest a very reasonable quantification of self-reproduction, by "by comparing the log probability of a machine spontaneously appearing in an environment to the log probability of it appearing, given that one instance already exists". They do not cite A. Merritt's 1920 pulp lost-world novel, The Metal Monster, the title character of which is made out of re-arrangeable cubes a few inches on a side.

Needless (?) to say, only the last of these is a basically-hopeful development.

(Thanks to Rob Haslinger and Dave Rainwater.)

Update, further to the theme: Via Gary Farber, startling photos of the Baikonur rocket junkyard.

Update 2, 8 June 2005: Cell announces the coming of Mutant Laser Zombie Flies from New Haven!; trailer; one critic's view ("I am so not going to sleep tonight"). (Thanks to Edward Burns for the pointer.)

*: Actually, to cite precedents from good science fiction, all three themes appear in Lem's great Peace on Earth. And, of course, it is well-established that we have been "living in a Ken MacLeod future since sometime not long after 9/11, and I wish he'd CUT IT OUT" --- to judge by this batch of news, we're someplace in the back-story of The Cassini Division (or perhaps The Sky Road, it's too early to tell).

Scientifiction; Minds, Brains, and Neurons; The Eternal Silence of These Infinite Spaces; The Continuing Crisis; Afghanistan and Central Asia

Posted by crshalizi at May 27, 2005 23:45 | permanent link

Je ne regrette rien

Regret, in decision theory, is the difference between the value of choice you actually made, and that of the best choice you could have made. Usually, decision theory considers agents which try to either maximized the expected value, or maximize the minimum possible value, but there are now some clever methods for learning strategies that minimize the maximum regret an agent will experience, which have some important advantages over those alternatives. (This is something Kris knows much more about than I do, naturally.) Interestingly, there is now also some evidence that this is a better description of what people do than is maximizing expected value --- at least, people with intact orbitofrontal cortices.

Nathalie Camille, Giorgio Coricelli, Jerome Sallet, Pascale Pradat-Diehl, Jean-René Duhamel and Angela Sirigu, "The Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex in the Experience of Regret", Science 305 (2004): 1167--1170 [full text freely available]
Abstract: Facing the consequence of a decision we made can trigger emotions like satisfaction, relief, or regret, which reflect our assessment of what was gained as compared to what would have been gained by making a different decision. These emotions are mediated by a cognitive process known as counterfactual thinking. By manipulating a simple gambling task, we characterized a subject's choices in terms of their anticipated and actual emotional impact. Normal subjects reported emotional responses consistent with counterfactual thinking; they chose to minimize future regret and learned from their emotional experience. Patients with orbitofrontal cortical lesions, however, did not report regret or anticipate negative consequences of their choices. The orbitofrontal cortex has a fundamental role in mediating the experience of regret.

Properly constructing the kind of gambling task used in this study can be tricky, and this week's Science contains a comment claiming these experimenters made a mistake; they reply, and seem to me to have the better of the argument.

Minds, Brains, and Neurons

Posted by crshalizi at May 27, 2005 22:33 | permanent link

Friday Cat Blogging (Towards the Stainless Steel Cat Issue of Science Geek Edition)

Responding to my parenthetical plea for artificial felines, Henry Farrell wrote to point me me (via BoingBoing) to NeCoRo, which (so far as I can make out) is a Japanese company manufacturing a line of toy robot cats. They have a page of QuickTime movies of the toys in action, with a presumably non-robotic little girl. Henry calls them "unnerving", and BoingBoing calls them "creepy", but I think they're charming. The manufacturers don't seem to have given any thought to making them interact with animals or with each other, as opposed to being scratched behind the ears, batting at sticks, etc. --- just as well, or I'd be tempted to get one as a playmate for Kara. (She likes to play with other cats, but needs to establish that she's in charge first, and they tend to find that a bit intimidating.)

Update that afternoon: via a correspondent who prefers to remain nameless, I give you Robokoneko, the robot kitten with cellular automaton brain, from the studio of the inimitable Prof. Dr. Hugo de Garis.

Manual trackback: Crumb Trail

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at May 27, 2005 09:04 | permanent link

May 25, 2005

Towards the Stainless Steel Rat

The latest issue of Adaptive Behavior (vol. 13, no., 2, June 2005) is all about artificial rodents. Beside the humor value, there's really some very good stuff in there, particularly if you're interested in the neural control of action. Abstracts are freely available, but you need a subscription for the full text. (Sadly, none of the papers seem to recognize the need for artificial felines.)

Minds, Brains, and Neurons

Posted by crshalizi at May 25, 2005 12:40 | permanent link

May 23, 2005

A Sociological Exercise

Correspondence with a number of people who, for obvious reasons, I won't name, suggests that part of the reason physicists so much bad biology, sociology, etc. shows up in physics journals, is that it is "too easy" for physicists to slap together some shoddy simulations and think they're answering important questions, especially if they know very little about the field they're invading. My correspondents further suggest that the people who do this are likely to be the ones who couldn't succeed as ordinary physicists. This case is to be distinguished, they suggest, from physicists who become interested in other fields, take the trouble to learn about them, and, most likely, end up publishing in their fora as well as, or even instead of, physics journals.

Let me suggest, then, the following exercise, which should be fairly straightforward, if quite tedious, for anyone with access to the right databases and a copy of R. Take, say, Physica A over the last few years, and identify all the authors of papers on non-physics subjects. (I suggest counting quantum computation as physics, at least for the purposes of this study, for reasons I hope to explain later.) Divide these authors into the conquistadors, who only publish in physics journals, and the assimilated, who also publish in relevant non-physics journals. For each group, compare their publication record in conventional physics, as measured by say citations per year per paper, with that of straight physicists, who only publish on conventionally-physical topics. The hypothesis is that the conquistadors will have been less successful, within physics, than either the straight physicists or the assimilated. One should probably control for time since receiving the doctorate, and possibly for for the school they got their doctorate from as well.

If you do this study, let me know the results, OK? I'm curious.

Physics; Learned Folly; Modest Proposals

Posted by crshalizi at May 23, 2005 18:00 | permanent link

May 22, 2005

The Structure and Strangeness of Interdisciplinary Research

Aaron Clauseta physicist working on complex networks in a computer science department — has responded to my ramblings on the dispute between physicists and sociologists over networks with a very good post of his own, which goes beyond the immediate subject to considerations of interdisciplinary research generally. Like Aaron's writings in general, it's strongly recommended.

Aaron's post, especially towards the end, touches on the question of why we have disciplines in the first place. Various deflating answers are possible — for instance, some combination of medieval university tradition and primate territoriality. But I think they do, in fact, have a useful function in the advancement of knowledge. Researchers face what are, in principle, insanely difficult decision-problems: what topics do I investigate? what methods do I use? what background knowledge do I need to have? to whom do I communicate my results, and how? which other investigations are most relevant to my work? The existence of a discipline — in the sense of both a body of knowledge and a community of inquirers — reduces the scope of these problems; so does that of more specialized sub-disciplinary fields, and so on all the way down to research communities of, perhaps, a few hundred people world-wide. It is at this point that things are sufficiently manageable that ordinary mortals can hope to make some progress, together, on learning about the world. Disciplines and smaller fields are never completely isolated from one another, but the interfaces are restricted — anything else would be self-defeating. As science expands, both intellectually and socially, the decision problems get harder, and so the pressure to specialize rises.

(The existence of disciplinary specialization is not a logical requirement of scientific investigation. The blessed and immortal gods who, as the poets both ancient and modern affirm, dwell in the untroubled spaces between the worlds, free of suffering and occupied in contemplation, intellects vast, cool, and unsympathetic (this follows, etymologically anyway, from their lack of suffering) — the gods have no need of disciplines. Had we but worlds enough and time, our minds, like theirs, might "grow vaster than empires, and more slow". Instead, we are all-too mortal and all-too dumb. Disciplinary specialization is a response to this, which makes use of our capacities for communication and coordinated attention.)

It is for these reasons that successful interdisciplinary movements turn into disciplines in their own right — if people involved really are doing important and productive work together, they don't have the time or attention to keep up with their home disciplines, but they are keeping up with each other. The outstanding examples from the last century are molecular biology and cognitive science, but at finer levels of resolution you'll find many other examples. Also many failures, interdisciplinary movements which never matured into disciplines (e.g., cybernetics, general systems theory), though one can argue about how many of them deserved to fail, and how many were victims of time and chance.

It is not obvious to me that the field of complex systems is going to follow a trajectory more like that of cognitive science than of general systems theory, nor that it deserves to.

Manual trackback: Crooked Timber

Complexity; Learned Folly

Posted by crshalizi at May 22, 2005 13:58 | permanent link

May 20, 2005

Korean Dutch Book

Who'll give me odds that the US threatens to use military force to get South Korea to halt biomedical research before it threatens to use military force to get North Korea to stop building nuclear weapons?

(Thanks, if that is the word, to Rob Haslinger)

The Continuing Crisis

Posted by crshalizi at May 20, 2005 17:45 | permanent link

Networks and Netwars

Attention Conservation Notice: A post of positively Holbonic length (over 2700 words), occasioned by physicists and sociologists squabbling over the turf of studying social networks. Includes a lengthy self-quotation and defenses of the author's friends. Plus, the title is really bad. You must have something better to do than read this.

Eszter Hargittai over at at Crooked Timber is a bit miffed about physicists working on social networks, the specific occasion for the indignation being a preprint on arxiv.org on social networks in the Eurovision song contest; as she points out, Kieran Healy tossed that idea out as a joke more than a year ago. She goes on from there to complain about physicists' habit of invading the field, ignoring all previous work and re-inventing sundry wheels. She posts an informative graph of the citation pattern of the small worlds literature, where physicists show up as one cohesive community (colored black) and sociologists as another (colored white), with only a handful of links between them, and closes by offering some choice recent quotes from John Scott, who I know of as the author of a useful textbook on social network analysis, which includes a nice historical survey.

I was going to let this one pass by, but Henry Farrell, in the comments, asked me to weigh in — which isn't such a compelling reason, when there's real work to be done on deadline (no offense to Henry), but I've been meaning to vent about some of this stuff for a while, and it gives me an excuse to do so. With any luck, I'll manage to offend absolutely everyone!

First off, I agree with a lot of what Hargittai says, and with the quotes she gives from Scott. My fellow physicists, for a number of reasons, have a very bad habit of trying to take up new subject-matter and not learning what's already known about it. Some years ago, in fact, Bill Tozier and I wrote a paper about physicists' tendency to do this in the area of biological evolution, and our guess as to the mechanism. I still think that's right, so I'll indulge in the dreadful vice of public self-quotation.

  1. A physicist runs across or concocts from whole cloth a mathematical model which is simple, neat, and contains a great many variables of the same sort.
  2. The physicists has heard of Darwin (1859), and may even have read Dawkins (1985) or some essays by Gould, but wouldn't know Fisher (1958), Haldane (1932) and Wright (1986) from the Three Magi, and doesn't dream that such a subject as mathematical evolutionary biology exists.
  3. The physicist is aware that lots of other physicists are interested in annexing biology as a province of statistical physics.
  4. The physicist interprets his multitude of variables as species or (if slightly more sophisticated) as genotypes, and proclaims that he has found "Darwin's Equations" (cf. Bak et al. (1994)), or, more modestly, has made an important step towards eventually finding those equations.
  5. His paper is submitted for review to other physicists, who are just as ignorant of biology as he, but see that it's about equivalent to the other papers on evolution by physicists. They publish it.
  6. The paper is read by other physicists, because at least it's not another derivation of specific heats on some convoluted lattice under a Hamiltonian named for some Central European worthy now otherwise totally forgotten. Said physicists think this is cutting-edge evolutionary theory.
  7. Some of those physicists will know or discover simple, neat models with lots of variables of the same type.
Mutatis mutandis, I think the same mechanism is at work in our incursions into economics ("econophysics"), network analysis, social psychology, etc.

The thing is, the quality of that work is highly, highly variable. Most of what physicists do in all these areas is at best uninteresting and derivative, but most of what all academics do in all areas of research is at best uninteresting and derivative. My impressions, as a reader of the literature, and as a referee for a lot of physics journals, are as follows. We do some good and interesting stuff in theoretical biology, especially in some specialized corners of evolutionary theory (viral quasi-species, hypercycles) and ecology, and on allometric scaling; a lot of what we do on networks is also good, and not just a re-invention of the wheel — I'll get back to that. (Though a part of me wants to ask whether there wouldn't be a certain comfort in a genuine re-invention, in seeing that even from a completely different starting point, you wind up with the same concepts?) In the (very distinct) areas of artificial neural networks and neural coding in real animals, we're actually quite good. On the other hand, our tendency to hallucinate power laws is a disgrace (as I've written here before), and there are times when I think that the best thing which could happen to econophysics would be for someone to come along and rescue its fallen practitioners by making honest quants of them. What explains this variation, I don't know — it's obviously correlated with how well physicists know the non-physics literature, but that might not be the cause; nonetheless I'm pretty sure it's real. In many cases, its effects are annoying-to-dreadful. I don't bother to read Physica A any more, because the overwhelming majority of its papers seem either sound-but-boring vanilla statistical mechanics, or wrong-headed at best. There is a reason why I find myself writing posts titled "I don't know you people", and why my first faculty job is going to be in statistics, not physics (and it's not that I can't get stuff into physics journals, thanks).

(I will not repeat my speculations on the causes which are leading us to do more of this in recent years. I do now have an outline for On the Genealogy of Complexity, and if you're really interested and willing to keep its contents confidential, I'd be happy to send it to you for comments. Nor will I renew my grumbling about theoretical physicists not learning statistics, since that's tiresome and anyway I have another post about that in prep. I will point out an aspect of the division of labor, however: in physics proper, the task of comparing theoretical predictions to real-world data traditionally falls to experimentalists, or interface specialists known as "phenomenologists".)

As for networks, I should declare that while I've never published anything in the area myself (popularization doesn't count), two of my good friends and collaborators are reasonably prominent in that area, and I know quite a few others personally. (I don't speak for my friends, of course, so the blame for what follows is just mine.) So there's probably an element of "don't say my friends are dumb!" in my remarks — as in many academic discussions, of course. But I've already agreed that a huge chunk of what shows up at arxiv.org — and even what gets through peer review — is not especially good, so this isn't intended as a blanket defense of work done by physicists, or near-physicists, on networks. (I say "or near-physicists" because I imagine someone like Duncan Watts is probably counted as a physicist in the graph Hargittai posted, since his doctorate is from Cornell's department of theoretical and applied mechanics, i.e., applied math, though he's now a professor of sociology at Columbia. Actually, come to think of it, what color do Duncan's papers have in that graph?)

Having now thoroughly cleared my throat, let me say what those genuine contributions are.

  1. They expanded the domain, by linking up social networks with networks of many other kinds — networks from molecular biology and from engineering especially. Physicists often talk about complex networks, rather than just social networks, as their area of interest, because they're interested in the properties of large networks with highly patterned yet hard-to-predict-in-detail connection structure. (This is roughly what they mean by "complex"; a good complexity measure for networks would be nice.) This leads them to ask different questions, which revolve around things like the large-scale topological structure, and statistical regularities common across many different sorts of network. This does not mean that they have to ignore the peculiarities of different sorts of network — in fact, comparative study here shows how social networks are different from other kinds of networks, in ways which I can't believe are sociologically irrelevant, but which seem very hard to discover from only looking at social networks.
    One reason there is so little cross-citation between the physicists and the sociologists is that a lot of the physics literature is an exploration of various network models qua models in statistical mechanics. This is one of the things we do; somebody proposes a new model, and then lots of us explore its properties as a mathematical object, and explore small variations on it.
  2. Related to this, the physicists have tended to be more interested in global properties and in generalizations holding across broad classes of networks, rather than in the micro-structure of social exchange and social interaction (important though that is). Even when the sociologists have looked at what they think of as more "macro" issues, they tend to be very particular, at least to a physicists' eyes. Kieran Healy points to the Cambridge Structural Analysis series, and so I'll pick one of those books I happen to know, Roberto Franzosi's From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science. (This also makes me fret less about the fact that I'm really never going to finish my post on his work.) Franzosi is interested in understanding how changing relations among different kinds of social actors, and changing kinds of social action, contributed to the process by which Italy went from the brink of a Communist revolution in 1919 to the ascension of Fascism in 1922 — from the moment of Gramsci and the Turin soviets to the moment of Mussolini and the march on Rome. He isn't interested in the structure of the network connecting the actors for its own sake, or (except incidentally) in how it compares to other types of complex network. And that's fine, because he's asking interesting and important questions — but the others are interesting, too. (Attempts to answer interesting questions need not be interesting, of course, but Franzosi's are; so are Mark Newman's and Luis Amaral's — and Amaral isn't even a friend.) Franzosi is also, as one might guess from his title, making methodological points, about how similar questions might be usefully approached (and I like those answers, too — anyone who's in to network analysis and grammatical inference is clearly after my own heart), but methodology isn't what I'm talking about either. Nan Lin's Social Capital, also in that series, may come closer to a physicist's idea of macro theory; I haven't read it yet. Again, this is not to say that other issues are unimportant, or even less important.
    (I hereby include by reference the whole nomothetic vs. idiographic argument, with all the obligatory Dilthey citations, etc., etc. Let's not get back in to that, shall we?)
  3. Another distinctive contribution is the emphasis on studying dynamical processes which take place on the networks. (Recall that the paper which launched physicists on this path, by Duncan Watts and Steve Strogatz, actually came out of a long tradition of studying synchronization of coupled oscillators, and asking what happened if the oscillators were coupled through a non-trivial network.) I'd also put under this heading the work connecting epidemiological models, of the traditional SIR or SIS kind, with percolation processes. There are some good arguments for doubting the more extreme claims made in this area, but not all, and some of it passes muster among biologists and epidemiologists (e.g., 1, 2).
  4. Finally, it seems to me that work on automatic identification of community structure has really been pushed forward by the physicists (e.g., 1, 2, 3). Of course it's strongly related to earlier work by sociologists, e.g., Doug White's work on social cohesion, and to work in computer science on graph clustering. (For that matter, it's reminiscent of the hierarchical graph decomposition algorithms in Christopher Alexander's Notes on the Synthesis of Form.) Fundamentally, this is a data-mining problem, and as such I'm sure the people from machine learning are ultimately going to take over; but they use statistical-mechanical techniques all the time too.

One thing I don't think the physicists can really claim as a contribution is computational data analysis on really large networks; while things like studying the collaboration networks of physics or biomedicine are impressive through sheer scale (as well as through results), something like Woody Powell et al.'s study of the American biotechnology industry is certainly in the same league. Another place where novelty can't be claimed is the idea of networks with power-law degree distributions forming through preferential attachment; Barabasi and Albert re-invented this in one of their 1999 paper on network growth, but the fundamental mechanism — multiplicative growth producing highly skewed distributions — was apparently first discovered by Herbert Simon in the 1950s ("On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions", Biometrika 42 (1955): 425--440), and applied to citation networks by Derek de Solla Price in the 1970s ("A General Theory of Bibliometric and Other Cumulative Advantage Processes", Journal of the American Society for Information Science 27 (1976): 292--306). The first people to point this out were themselves physicists. (To compare a small thing to a great one, if all western thought is a series of footnotes to Plato, then complex systems is a series of footnotes to Models of Man and The Sciences of the Artificial.)

(As another parenthetical remark: Price, by all accounts one of the great sociologists of science, was, as I've said before, originally a physicist. Like many of us, he seems to have always remained one at heart; he described his classic book Little Science, Big Science as an exercise in statistical mechanics: "[M]y first lecture is concerned with the volume of science, the second with the velocity distribution of its molecules, the third with the way in which the molecules interact with one another, and the fourth in deriving the political and social properties of this gas" (p. vii). Perhaps part of the difference between sociologists' reception of Price and that of later physicists, is that there were next to no sociologists studying these issues before Price!)

So where does all this leave us? Obviously, I wish physicists would bother to master the existing literature in new areas, before we start building models there. It's highly unlikely that all of the previous scholars who worked on the subject were idiotic or totally misguided — and even if they were, it's important to be able to say so with a clean conscience. As a physicist working in non-traditional areas myself, I find it both acutely embarrassing and professionally harmful when others of my tribe make dreadful howlers, or re-enact elementary discoveries. (There is a reputational externality here.) At the same time, I think it would be a shame if the offenses many physicists commit against properly scholarly procedure and etiquette lead others — in this case, sociologists — to dismiss our efforts completely, partly because that would be unfair to individuals, and partly because very interesting results, which seem to me to be relevant to sociology, have come from individuals who I've heard express the most withering (and completely unjustified) contempt for that field and its practitioners. (I can't, obviously, name names.)

After some thought, I am unable to come up with a flaw in the following simple plan (which means there are probably many): if you are a physicist and found you have written a paper on topic X, send it to a journal of X-ology. If X is, by tradition, a part of physics, by all means send it to Physical Review E. If, on the other hand, X is a topic in social science, then send it to a social science journal. Only if X isn't physics, but also isn't really, or isn't just (say) an analysis of social structure, because it's also an analysis of metabolic pathways, and says something new about nonequilibrium phase transitions, and says how to get a free pony, only then does it make sense again to send it to PRE — or Nature, especially if you have a good picture of the pony. (Even then, if we had successful complex systems journals, I'd say send it there.) As precedent, I would point to the way we helped invent molecular biology, publishing not in our own journals but in things like the Journal of Biological Chemistry. If you are worried about finding a social science journal which will not reject your contributions just because of your background and approach, let me take this opportunity to plug the new Structure and Dynamics: e-Journal of Anthropological and Related Sciences. As a recently co-opted member of the editorial board, I can promise that your manuscript will receive extensive criticism from referees from both mathematical-physical and social-scientific backgrounds — though whether the net effect is to make the review process unusually well-informed or completely blockheaded is obviously not for me to say.

Update: See The Structure and Strangeness of Interdisciplinary Research for a follow-up; there will probably be more.

Manual trackback: Dubbings and Diversions; MoneyScience; Structure + Strangeness; Idiolect; hakank.blogg; Easily Distracted; Crooked Timber; Knowledge Problem; Preposterous Universe; Something Similar; Michael Nielsen; Nanopolitan

Physics; Complexity; Networks; Learned Folly

Posted by crshalizi at May 20, 2005 00:03 | permanent link

May 06, 2005

Friday Cat Blogging (Ridiculous Self-Satisfaction Issue of Non-Science-Geek-Edition Edition)

Here is Kara, her air of feline self-satisfaction in rare form, while looking ridiculous from her nest on the couch.

Kara is a cat, so she gets to assume this expression whenever she feels like it. I, for my part, have returned the proofs for my book chapter, and handed off two manuscripts to my co-authors this week, so I'm sure I look as smug, and probably as silly. Rather than nesting in the living room, however, I think I'm going to go outside and enjoy the spring... because next week I'm traveling back to autumn.

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at May 06, 2005 16:26 | permanent link

May 01, 2005

Two Paths

For May Day, how about a distressingly well-documented book on how the Great American Risk Shift shows up in the labor market?

Annette Bernhardt, Martina Morris, Mark S. Handcock and Marc A. Scott, Divergent Paths: Economic Mobility in the New American Labor Market (Russell Sage Foundation, 2001)
Book description: The promise of upward mobility — the notion that everyone has the chance to get ahead — is one of this country's most cherished ideals, a hallmark of the American Dream. But in today's volatile labor market, the tradition of upward mobility for all may be a thing of the past. In a competitive world of deregulated markets and demanding shareholders, many firms that once offered the opportunity for advancement to workers have remade themselves as leaner enterprises with more flexible work forces. Divergent Paths examines the prospects for upward mobility of workers in this changed economic landscape. Based on an innovative comparison of the fortunes of two generations of young, white men over the course of their careers, Divergent Paths documents the divide between the upwardly mobile and the growing numbers of workers caught in the low-wage trap.
The first generation entered the labor market in the late 1960s, a time of prosperity and stability in the U.S. labor market, while the second generation started work in the early 1980s, just as the new labor market was being born amid recession, deregulation, and the weakening of organized labor. Tracking both sets of workers over time, the authors show that the new labor market is more volatile and less forgiving than the labor market of the 1960s and 1970s. Jobs are less stable, and the penalties for failing to find a steady employer are more severe for most workers. At the top of the job pyramid, the new nomads — highly credentialed, well-connected workers — regard each short-term project as a springboard to a better-paying position, while at the bottom, a growing number of retail workers, data entry clerks, and telemarketers, are consigned to a succession of low-paying, dead-end jobs.
While many commentators dismiss public anxieties about job insecurity as overblown, Divergent Paths carefully documents hidden trends in today's job market which confirm many of the public's fears. Despite the celebrated job market of recent years, the authors show that the old labor market of the 1960s and 1970s propelled more workers up the earnings ladder than does today's labor market. Divergent Paths concludes with a discussion of policy strategies, such as regional partnerships linking corporate, union, government, and community resources, which may help repair the career paths that once made upward mobility a realistic ambition for all American workers.

Their documentation for the descriptive claims about what has happened to the labor market and to career paths is compelling, and statistically impeccable; also completely in accordance with, y'know, actually looking around you. The writing is OK, too. (You can get a sense of it from the free PDF of the first chapter.) Firm-internal career ladders are gone or severely truncated. Many jobs have been intentionally de-skilled and simplified so that workers need less training, can be more easily fired, and their services more readily contracted out to specialized firms, which themselves have no internal career ladders. Surprisingly, increasing demand for technical skills seems to explain only a negiglbe portion of wage stagnation; engineers' wages have actually fallen, and even those for workers with computer science degrees have risen very little in real terms. Personally, I find this result especially distressing:

Workers with college degrees did not see significant growth in their wages during the 1980s and 1990s but were generally able to hold their own ground. Workers with less education, however, saw large declines in real wages. The increase in the high school wage penalty between 1979 and 1995 varies from one labor force group to another [typically in the range of 30 to 60 perecent].

Accompanying these changes, shafting the people at the bottom, things have actually gotten better for people at the top, such as their "new nomads". For these people, the management-guru fairy-tales about flattening hierarchies, self-direction, personal flexibility and creative work are, if not true, then at least recognizable. I have friends who qualify for membership in this class, and I suppose I do myself. (It would be interesting to know how many people in this category are the children of salarymen --- most, I imagine.) It's an appealing niche in many ways; it's a shame that the same organizations which make it possible for a small number of us to enjoy it currently rely on many others being stuck in the low road.

And for the really rich, of course, the last thirty-odd years have been great. There are so few of these people that they are essentially invisible in the statistics here.

Inevitably, perhaps, Bernhardt & co. are a bit less convincing when it comes to explaining why these changes have come about; it's simply much harder to rule out alternative explanations, and much of the data one would really like simply isn't there. (It's not enough to say that capitalists and managers will give workers the rawest deal they can get away with, because that's always true. The question is why firms and managers have become more effective at screwing over workers recently, and you can't explain a variable with a constant.) Given the kinds of causes the authors (plausibly) argue are at work, however, it's hard to see what they suggest really making much of a difference; my suspicion is that regional action would be ineffective, but that national-level risk pooling (say, universal health insurance) might actually do a lot to mitigate the effects of the new labor market. To be fair, however, I haven't gotten to the last chapter of the book yet, where they advance constructive proposals.

My feeling is that the transformation of the labor market is one of the most important things to have happened in the US during my lifetime (and it does pretty much coincide with my lifetime); its consequences are manifold, and often profoundly morally ugly. It is a great luxury to be able to think about this transformation, as opposed to struggling to preserve one's life and a modicum of dignity in its midst. Shamefully, my thoughts keep running in circles: we need political change to reduce inequality and the shift of risk to those in no position to bear it, but our politics is driven by those who've profited most from the risk shift (and their hired minions). The only way out I can see is some new form of organized labor, adapted to the new job market. What that might look like, I have no idea, but I am sure it will be resisted mightily.

Happy May Day.

The Progressive Forces; The Dismal Science; The Beloved Republic

Posted by crshalizi at May 01, 2005 21:45 | permanent link

April 30, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, April 2005

Robert J. Sawyer, Calculating God
Nicely-done novel about first contact, the Argument from Design, and cancer. Sawyer's characters are however far too credulous about anthropic arguments; if they'd taken a drive from the Royal Ontario Museum to the Perimeter Institute, Lee Smolin could've straightened them out on that score. Still, it's hard not to enjoy a novel where the newly-arrived alien's first request is for a paleontologist (and is met with "Vertebrate or invertebrate?").
W. G. Runciman, A Treatise on Social Theory, vol. I: The Methodology of Social Theory
First part of a massive trilogy on social science and how it should be conducted, by a sociologist who is also (as he puts it) a practicing capitalist. I was inspired to start this by reading his one-volume popularization (and revision), The Social Animal, which is excellent. Here is mostly concerned with clearing the ground and laying foundations --- answering doubts about whether social science is possible (it is), whether it must be fundamentally different from natural science (no, with one exception), etc. This is largely done through an exploration of four concepts: three different sorts of understanding, and evaluation. He introduces primary, secondary and tertiary understanding thus: "The first of these is the understanding necessary for the reportage of what has been observed to occur or to be the case; the second is the understanding of what caused it, or how it came about; and the third is the understanding necessary for its description in the special sense here given to that term," that of "convey what it is like" to do X or to be Y or to suffer Z. The difference between the social and the natural sciences doesn't lie in problems of reportage or explanation, but in description (in this sense), and in evaluation. ("[N]othing prevents those engaged in research into human institutions and practices from incorporating into their research the ideas which they cannot help having about what makes one form of social organization either better or worse.... If they wish to expound to their readers their theories of justice or freedom, or their vision of the good society, neither their readers nor any passing methodologist can stop them. All the methodologist can do is to make clear to them ... that in seeking to vindicate their evaluations against those of [rival] theoretical schools they are appealing to fundamentally different criteria from those to which they appeal in seeking to vindicate their reports as accurate, their explanations as valid and their descriptions as authentic.") As a writer, Runciman is careful, level-headed, thorough and agreeable, but not (here) exciting. (The Social Animal displays more verve.) He is good at raising, and fairly airing, serious objections, and generally convincing in his counter-arguments. I will definitely be pressing on to vol. II, where he finally introduces his substantive social theory, which a selectionist one, concerned with the differential reproduction and propagation of beliefs, and, more centrally, of practices.
Jane Lindskold, The Buried Pyramid
Enjoyable fantasy novel about 19th century Egyptology (in a rather more literal sense than Elizabeth Peters's books).
Damien Broderick, The Black Grail
An unusually well-written and well-conceived member of the dying earth genre, melding well-controlled mythic allusions with a thoroughly naturalistic world, though the protagonist is ignorant enough to often think he's dealing with magic. (Paul McAuley does something similar in his Confluence trilogy.) The ending is particularly fine, and surprising. (I won't spoil it.) A hideous cover makes it look like a Star Wars rip-off, which could hardly be further from the truth. Update, some weeks later: The Black Grail is a drastically revised version of a novel published over ten years earlier as Sorceror's World. Having now browsed through a copy of the later, I urge you not to read it, unless you want to see just how much better Broderick got in that time.
J. H. Plumb, In the Light of History
Well-written historical essays, mostly on British politics and society in the 18th century, with excursions to other parts of the English-speaking world before and since. I particularly liked the one attacking the cult of Burke, and the one on the oppression of women.
Jane Haddam, The Headmaster's Wife
Hadaam's latest mystery novel (oddly not mentioned on her website). As always with Haddam, an excellent combination of well-realized characters, in various stages of desperation, delusion and distress, with a portrait of an institution --- here, a marvelously unappealing New England boarding school that combines snobbery with hypertrophied political correctness.
Mark Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind
The scandal being that there essentially is no distinctively evangelical life of the mind, no respectable intellectual activity which is informed by the concerns and ideas of evangelical Protestantism. (This is not to say there is no respectable intellectual activity on the part of evangelical Protestants.) Noll is a historian and an evangelical, which leads to some interesting perspectives. It also leads him to end the book with a rather desperate search for signs of a "revival" of the evangelical mind (so desperate he instances both Philip Johnson and Christian Reconstructionism), and a whistling-in-the-dark hope that these dry bones shall yet live, when the — I use the word advisedly — natural conclusion is that he's made a strong case that there is no hope for the evangelical mind. For the most part, he's quite good, but there are places, especially when he discusses evolution and science (which I hasten to say he accepts) where I was definitely irritated: apparently Stephen Jay Gould was uppity for daring, as a mere paleontologist, to discuss what science is and what it can and cannot do, a task better left to those more qualified, like ecclesiastical historians. Still, it's an extremely informative and interesting book, and I strongly recommend it to anyone who wants to understand what a large fraction of Americans are thinking, or, rather, not thinking.
[It's tangential, but I was struck, while reading this, that Noll explains the origins of distinctive evangelical cultural traits in one way --- essentially, as adaptations to contemporary social conditions and more widely-distributed cultural traits --- but their maintenance in a quite different way: in fact he never does explain why they're maintained, seeming to take that as automatic. This seems not uncommon among historians, but it is curious. As a good Darwinian, I'm more than happy to accept that the two phenomena have different sorts of causes, but I would like to know why what seem like two completely different mechanisms were operative at different eras, and what the mechanisms which preserved, e.g., Baconian ideas about science among North American evangelical Protestants actually were.]
Read on the recommendation of Fred "slacktivist" Clark.
Stephen King, Wolves of the Calla
Volume five of King's Dark Tower series, good if you've read its predecessors and pointless otherwise. (I think the predecessors are worth reading: here's 1, 2, 3 and 4, the last link to my review. Bits of this one also draw on Black House, below, and still more on 'Salem's Lot, as well as Gaiman & co.'s World's End --- for which King wrote the afterword, come to think of it.) It's not much of a spoiler to say that this time Roland, the Last Gunslinger, stars in a remake of The Seven Samurai. The illustrations, however, are not very good.
Stephen King and Peter Straub, Black House
Sequel to their earlier collaboration, The Talisman, but independent, and highly enjoyable. They should collaborate more.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at April 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

Mysteries of Academic Publishing

Why oh why do publishers require you to submit your manuscript in LaTeX, using their particular, and particularly ugly, style file, only to pour everything into Microsoft Word? Why oh why, if they are going to do this, do they not have a reliable way of translating the math into Word, where by "reliable" I mean "does not introduce an error about one time in four"? (Yes, yes, I know, we should all have nothing worse to complain of, or more onerous to do than sit in a cafe, surrounded by pretty flowers in bloom, and revise proof sheets.)

Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at April 30, 2005 18:37 | permanent link

Saturday Sibling Blogging

The lab my little brother studies in now has a homepage, and what kind of big brother would I be if I didn't call attention to this fact? And what kind of geek would I be if I didn't also call attention to his very nice paper on signal transduction in neural development?

Linkage; Biology

Posted by crshalizi at April 30, 2005 11:59 | permanent link

April 29, 2005

Friday Cat Blogging (A Most Distressing Issue of Science Geek Edition)

This is not good, in several ways:

Roongroje Thanawongnuwech, Alongkorn Amonsin, Rachod Tantilertcharoen, Sudarat Damrongwatanapokin, Apiradee Theamboonlers, Sunchai Payungporn, Kamonchart Nanthapornphiphat, Somchuan Ratanamungklanon, Eakchai Tunak, Thaweesak Songserm, Veravit Vivatthanavanich, Thawat Lekdumrongsak, Sawang Kesdangsakonwut, Schwann Tunhikorn, and Yong Poovorawan, "Probable Tiger-to-Tiger Transmission of Avian Influenza H5N1". Emerging Infectious Diseases, May 2005.
During the second outbreak of avian influenza H5N1 in Thailand, probable horizontal transmission among tigers was demonstrated in the tiger zoo. Sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of those viruses showed no differences from the first isolate obtained in January 2004. This finding has implications for influenza virus epidemiology and pathogenicity in mammals.

In addition to the deaths of well over a hundred tigers (unpleasant ones; I will spare you the details), this is bad because they Thanawongnuwech et al. can more or less show that many of the tigers which got the disease must have gotten it from other tigers: "Epidemiologic data obtained from this study demonstrated that all tigers that became ill after October 23, 2004, were probably infected by horizontal transmission since the animals had not been fed raw chicken carcasses since October 16." Infection from other birds can also be pretty much ruled out. It's worth reading in detail if you want to scare yourself about mammal-to-mammal transmission of avian flu, or you're curious about how, exactly, one determines what ails a tiger. (Via Majikthise.)

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at April 29, 2005 16:40 | permanent link

April 23, 2005

A Home Where the Meth Heads Roam

Speaking of light posting, let me recommend Hal Herring's six-part saga (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) of sex, econonomic collapse, meth addiction and Christian financial counseling in rural Montana. It's an extraordinary story, but I think anyone who's lived in the west or southwest recently should find the elements only too familiar. If it had happened here in northern New Mexico, the drug would've been heroin rather than meth, but then this region has always taken pride in its distinctive culture. (Via The Uneasy Chair.)

Update, 27 April 2005: My posting this a few days before Herring began covering the trial was pure coincidence. (Again via The Uneasy Chair.)

Manual trackback: Mark A. R. Kleiman; Unions-Firms-Markets.

The Beloved Republic

Posted by crshalizi at April 23, 2005 09:20 | permanent link

Mañana

I'm in Santa Fe for a small meeting on networks, and trying to do some work as well. (Finishing a paper is always an uphill slog, but I think we'll be able to see a very long way from the top this time.) Posting will be light for the next little while. If you want more serious stuff, you can try the notebooks.

Posted by crshalizi at April 23, 2005 08:46 | permanent link

April 22, 2005

Friday Cat Blogging (Natural Healthy Curiosity Issue of Non-Science-Geek-Edition Edition)

Our new neighbors are rebuilding the house next door, pretty much from the ground up. Kara is intrigued by their construction supplies, and especially by the concept of prefabricated columns.

Kara stands up to explore pre-fab columns

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at April 22, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

April 16, 2005

Spring and All

Attention conservation notice: This is an unusually self-absorbed post, even for me.

Spring arrived very suddenly in Ann Arbor last week, in the form of actual warm weather. As Julie's mysterious co-blogger Mock Turtle said over dinner, within hours the mode of dress around campus went from Michelin-man down padding to Sin City. Other signs have followed: magnolia and forsythia and cherry in bloom, crocuses unfurling, the cat shedding all over the place and stalking birds in the early morning hours, the trees coming into bud, green creeping back in everywhere, boaters back on the river. It's all very wonderful and life-affirming, and like the previous two springs I've had here, makes you feel glad to live someplace nice. (I happen to think that where I live is an especially nice part of Ann Arbor, too.)

This is going to be my last spring in Ann Arbor. My post-doc here, as I've mentioned, finishes at the end of May, at which point I join the statistics department at Carnegie Mellon as a visiting assistant professor. (If you want to draw conclusions about the power of blogs, achieving success through social capital, etc., well, it's a free country.) It's a three-year, non-tenure-track position, with teaching duties of one course a semester. I realize it's conventional to say you're excited about new jobs, especially when your new employers can overhear, but I am excited: the people in the department are great and do very cool stuff, I'm looking forward to teaching again, it'll be good to live in a city rather than a small town again, and Pittsburgh actually seems like a decent one. I'm even kind of looking forward to house-hunting, which should be helped a lot by things like this amazing hack of Craig's List and Google Maps. (That last was kindly supplied by John Taylor.) As a former devoted reader of Invisible Adjunct, I realize just how lucky I am.

So: I'm looking forward to the new job, and at some point I will no doubt post some feeble confabulation about how this isn't really a deflection in my career path, but rather part of a Cunning Plan to put the stat. back in stat. phys. But today I'm going to enjoy spring here.

Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at April 16, 2005 14:50 | permanent link

April 15, 2005

"Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute"

This was mostly written just before I went on hiatus.

Wolfgang has got me thinking about Newcomb's Paradox (here, under "2004-12-23"). It goes something like this. A Superior Being (perhaps the Medium Lobster?) appears before you, and gives convincing signs and tokens of its effective prescience. Then, being capricious, it offers you the following dilemma. It places before you two boxes. Box A is transparent, so you can see it contains $1,000. Box B is opaque, and may or may not contain <voice="dr. evil">$1,000,000</voice>. You can take either box B, or both boxes. If it predicts that you will take only box B, then it's got the money; if it predicts that you will take both boxes, then box B is empty. Which do you chose? I emphasize that the Superior Being has convinced you it is able to predict your behavior, and that attempts to fool it are unavailing. We can also stipulate that you're not allowed to randomize: it will detect you doing so, and smite you appropriately.

There does not seem to be a stable resolution, within the stated terms. If you chose both boxes, then (since the Superior Being can follow your train of reasoning), you'd do better to pick only box B, but if you do chose just box B, you should really chose both boxes: if there's any chance the Superior Being predicts wrong, you'll be better off, on average, by doing so. Better people than I have gone over this a zillion different ways, exploring all the decision-theoretic wrinkles, and still wound up like the demons in Paradise Lost:

Others apart sat on a Hill retir'd,
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will, and Fate,
Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost.

Wolfgang suggests, in e-mail, that the best way out may simply be to reject one of the premises of the paradox --- that the kind of prediction the Superior Being is purporting to make is simply not possible. But this is also very strange. Human beings are, after all, finite material bodies, and it strains belief --- at least a physicist's belief --- to think that a limitation on the in-principle ability to predict the motion of a finite material body can be discovered by an exercise of pure reason, without any experimental data. Worse, there doesn't seem any reason, in principle, why a Laplacean Vast and Considerable Intellect couldn't integrate the equations of motion for your body to predict what it would do. (Pace Penrose, and even Mitch Porter, quantum processes are unimportant in the brain, so this just demands utterly implausible computational resources and measurement resolution: a piece of cake for a Vast and Considerable Intellect.) For that matter, your friends (and still more your spouse) could probably make a pretty shrewd guess about what you'd do, even if you can't.

My thought, at this point, is that the paradox shows us a limitation, alright, but not on the predictability of material bodies. Rather, I suspect, the limitation is in our ideas about rational decision-making.

The laws of physics are what they are, and I see no reason to suppose that human beings are necessarily harder to predict than, say, the atmospheres of gas giant planets; perhaps less. Psychological terms and concepts, in both their folk and scientific versions, provide a coarse-grained description of human (and animal) behavior with considerable predictive power, at least on its own level, and great concision. (Rather than belabor the point, I will refer you to my post about David Wallace's version of this story.) Psychology is a kind of approximation to the reality of human organisms, just as hydrodynamics and climatology are approximations to the reality of the Jovian atmosphere. (That we use those approximations to help mark off the objects under discussion is beside the point.) At the psychological level, we can say things like "Cosma is over-cautious and greedy, but his timidity always beats his avarice; he'll take both boxes".

Psychology is, in turn, approximated by our ideas --- or better, ideals --- of rational choice. These constitute an abstract system, which can be formalized in various ways, e.g., as in von Neumann and Morgenstern. I think what Newcomb's paradox tells us is that the situation imagined is one where the abstract system of decision theory breaks down and gives indeterminate results, perhaps because your being a rational agent, in the necessary sense, is inconsistent with your being predictable. Since we're dealing with an abstract system, it's not surprising that a mere thought experiment can show us a place where it breaks down.

Or maybe you should just take both boxes; what do I know?

Update, 18 April 2005: Thanks to Wolfgang for pointing out that I initially mislabeled the boxes!

Posted by crshalizi at April 15, 2005 20:11 | permanent link

Friday Cat Blogging (Advantages of Theft over Honest Toil Issue of Non-Science-Geek Edition Edition)

Kara has a slight flaw in her character: she is a thief. She has, over the years, brought home several socks (including one matching pair, on successive days), other cats' toys, dogs' toys, and, most ambitiously, a small music box which she will stare at, mesmerized, when it's wound up and playing. It's been several months since her last acquisition, which I attribute to our unusually prolonged and depressing winter. Last week, as if to herald the arrival of spring, she got a glove.


I think she was disappointed when it wouldn't do anything.

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at April 15, 2005 17:15 | permanent link

April 14, 2005

Agathidium cheneyi

When considering slime molds, about which I hope to have more to say soon, we should not forget their natural predators [cache]. (Via Matthew Berryman, in e-mail.)

Posted by crshalizi at April 14, 2005 07:58 | permanent link

April 08, 2005

The Figured Wheel

In honor of National Poetry Month, Robert Pinsky has a piece in Slate nicely titled "I, Too, Dislike It". Here is my favorite poem by Pinsky.

The Figured Wheel

The figured wheel rolls through shopping malls and prisons
Over farms, small and immense, and the rotten little downtowns.
Covered with symbols, it mills everything alive and grinds
The remains of the dead in the cemeteries, in unmarked graves and oceans.

Sluiced by salt water and fresh, by pure and contaminated rivers,
By snow and sand, it separates and recombines all droplets and grains,
Even the infinite sub-atomic particles crushed under the illustrated,
Varying treads of its wide circumferential track.

Spraying flecks of tar and molten rock it rumbles
Through the Antarctic station of American sailors and technicians,
And shakes the floors and windows of whorehouses for diggers and smelters
From Bethany, Pennsylvania to a practically nameless, semi-penal New Town

In the mineral-rich tundra of the Soviet northernmost settlements.
Artists illuminate it with pictures and incised mottoes
Taken from the Ten Thousand Stories and the Register of True Dramas.
They hang it with colored ribbons and with bells of many pitches.

With paints and chisels and moving lights they record
On its rotating surface the elegant and terrifying doings
Of the inhabitants of the Hundred Pantheons of major Gods
Disposed in iconographic stations at hub, spoke and concentric bands,

And also the grotesque demi-Gods, Hopi gargoyles and Ibo dryads.
They cover it with wind-chimes and electronic instruments
That vibrate as it rolls to make an all-but-unthinkable music,
So that the wheel hums and rings as it turns through the births of stars

And through the dead-world of bomb, fireblast and fallout
Where only a few doomed races of insects fumble in the smoking grasses.
It is Jesus oblivious to hurt turning to give words to the unrighteous,
And is also Gogol's feeding pig that without knowing it eats a baby chick

And goes on feeding. It is the empty armor of My Cid, clattering
Into the arrows of the credulous unbelievers, a metal suit
Like the lost astronaut revolving with his useless umbilicus
Through the cold streams, neither energy nor matter, that agitate

The cold, cyclical dark, turning and returning.
Even in the scorched and frozen world of the dead after the holocaust
The wheel as it turns goes on accreting ornaments.
Scientists and artists festoon it from the grave with brilliant

Toys and messages, jokes and zodiacs, tragedies conceived
From among the dreams of the unemployed and the pampered,
The listless and the tortured. It is hung with devices
By dead masters who have survived by reducing themselves magically

To tiny organisms, to wisps of matter, crumbs of soil,
Bits of dry skin, microscopic flakes, which is why they are called "great",
In their humility that goes on celebrating the turning
Of the wheel as it rolls unrelentingly over

A cow plodding through car-traffic on a street in Iasi,
And over the haunts of Robert Pinsky's mother and father
And wife and children and his sweet self
Which he hereby unwillingly and inexpertly gives up, because it is

There, figured and pre-figured in the nothing-transfiguring wheel.

(From The Figured Wheel: New and Collected Poems, 1966--1996, pp. 105--106. First published in Plougshares, 1983)

The Commonwealth of Letters

Posted by crshalizi at April 08, 2005 13:48 | permanent link

April 04, 2005

Sheep or Gulls? (This Week at the Complex Systems Colloquium)

Attention Conservation Notice: This is an attempt to increase the attendance at the complex systems colloquia by blogging about them in advance. Of minimal relevance if you're not in Ann Arbor or don't care about complex systems, modeling the spread of ideas and practices through social networks, herding and information cascades, fads and fashions, relating micro-actions to macro-behavior, or how to successfully launch one of those silly blog memes.

For this week's colloquium, we are very happy to have as our speaker Michelle Girvan from SFI. Michelle has done extremely impressive and well-known work on complex networks, perhaps most notably her algorithms for discovering community structure in networks. This week, however, she is going to answer for us a question asked by generations of parents, "If everybody else jumped off a bridge, would you jump too?", as well as its less time-honored companion, "What if they all told you it was 'gravitational therapy' and really good for your calves?"

"Persuasion, Imitation, and the Spread of Ideas in Social Networks"
Abstract: The spread of ideas and behaviors through populations depends crucially on the structure of the social network and the local mechanism of transmission between individuals. In this talk, I will explore how information cascades differ when transmission is based on persuasion versus imitation. In addressing the implications of the different modes of transmission, I take a network-based approached that focuses on the following types of questions: if a fad spreads from individual to individual through imitation, which nodes in the network are the best initial targets to maximize the size of the cascade? If the transmission mechanism is instead persuasive, how do we need to modify our target set? I will discuss two types of imitation — infectious imitation in which each link is given equal probability for transmission, and herd imitation in which the probability that an individual becomes an adopter depends on the fraction of his or her neighborhood that has already adopted the idea or behavior. I will also discuss a simple model of persuasion that is built around the assumption that all individuals have equal time to devote toward persuading their neighborhood and they attempt to divide the time equally among their associates. We see that the best initial target set changes substantially when the mode of transmission is altered. In addition, structural features of the social network heavily influence the advantage of an optimized versus random approach to choosing the initial target set.

Thursday, 7 April, at 4 pm in 335 West Hall, Central Campus.

UPDATE: Sadly, Dr. Girvan has had to cancel her visit to Ann Arbor. The talk is off, at least for this semester.

Complexity; Networks

Posted by crshalizi at April 04, 2005 08:45 | permanent link

April 01, 2005

Friday Cat Blogging (Metaphysical Melancholy Issue of Non-Science-Geek Edition Edition)

An unusually compact and pensive Kara contemplates her next project.

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at April 01, 2005 07:00 | permanent link

March 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, March 2005

Peter Straub, Lost Boy Lost Girl
Yes, I'm on a Straub kick. More serial killers, more messed-up families, a haunted house, at least four kinds of interlaced guilt, and two kinds of teenage love, one very familiar and one really, really strange; plus the return of some characters from Straub's Blue Rose novels (Koko, Mystery, The Throat). It seems to be hard to write a supernatural horror novel which actual fits in the world of daily life, as experienced by most of early twenty-first century America; here Straub pulls it off effortlessly.
Don't look at the movie on the book's website until after finishing the novel, though.
Nancy Kress, Crossfire
Readable first-contacts novel, complicated by relativistic physics and Quakerism. The plot is has echoes of the great William Tenn's magnificent "The Liberation of Earth", though Kress is earnest where Tenn was satirical.
Peter Straub, The Hellfire Club
Peter Straub likes to mess with his reader's minds. This book is partly a literary-detection mystery, unraveling the authorship of a cult fantasy novel that, itself, comes across as somewhere between The Lord of the Rings and The Catcher in the Rye; a portrait of a marriage foundering under the pressures of personal weakness and an impressively dysfunctional family; and a disturbing, sometimes very graphic serial-killer yarn, in the course of which some truly awful things happen to the heroine. (This is, I think, necessary to the story Straub wants to tell.) Running through it all as a consistent theme is the power and near-ubiquity of self-deception and even self-delusion in the service of our desires. It's very good, but probably not the most restorative thing to read when ill and jet-lagged.
Steven Saylor, Roman Blood
Historical mystery, set in late Republican Rome, and based on Cicero's oration for the defense in the trial of Sextus Roscius for patricide; Cicero is one of the main characters. The private investigator hero is, however, fictional, and (as Brad DeLong remarks about the series in general) implausibly modern-minded. (Though nowhere near as bad in that respect, i.e., nowhere near as sympathetic, as Marcus Didius Falco.)
Philip A. Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America
A historical argument that the only times America has made progress towards treating black people fairly is when external threats have forced it to do so, because blacks were needed as part of the war effort or because hypocrisy was just too damning to the American cause. I wish it weren't so convincing, for obvious reasons.
John M. Ellis, The Theory of Literary Criticism: A Logical Analysis
Remarkably enough, this really is a logical analysis. Ellis tries to legitimately derive all his positions from his definition of what makes something "literature", and (allowing for the inevitable vagueness of merely verbal argument) does a remarkably creditable --- that is, honest and rigorous --- job. The definition, itself, is that literary texts of a given community are the ones it uses in a certain way. This part I like very much, because it makes sense in itself, and also makes sense of the huge variation in the characteristics of texts which count as literature: certain characteristics may facilitate that use in certain communities, but they're not constitutive of the category. I'm much less happy with his defining that mode of use as one which disregards the context in which the text was composed, but for reasons I find harder to pin down. If you accept that, though, his strictures about, e.g., biographical criticism make tremendous sense.
Needless to say, this is so much better than the vast majority of work on literary theory it hardly seems fair to put them in the same category.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at March 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

Heuristic Diversity, Your Key to Knowledge, Wealth and Power (Dept. of "Yay Team!")

Attention conservation notice: Brazen promotion of research done at the center where I work; worse yet, one of the authors is my boss.

I meant to write about this quite some time ago, but held off because I had too much to say, and still do. But seeing Muck and Mystery blog a third-hand account of this really cool work --- someone's notes on a presentation by James "Wisdom of Crowds" Surowiecki --- prompts me to plug the actual research here.

Lu Hong and Scott E. Page, "Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA) 101 (2004): 16385--16389 [PDF reprint]
Abstract: We introduce a general framework for modeling functionally diverse problem-solving agents. In this framework, problem-solving agents possess representations of problems and algorithms that they use to locate solutions. We use this framework to establish a result relevant to group composition. We find that when selecting a problem-solving team from a diverse population of intelligent agents, a team of randomly selected agents outperforms a team comprised of the best-performing agents. This result relies on the intuition that, as the initial pool of problem solvers becomes large, the best-performing agents necessarily become similar in the space of problem solvers. Their relatively greater ability is more than offset by their lack of problem-solving diversity.

There will be 2,500 words more on this later.

Manual trackbacks: Muck and Mystery; Three Quarks Daily

The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts

Posted by crshalizi at March 31, 2005 09:45 | permanent link

March 30, 2005

April Fool's Sloth

For April Fool's Day, Mark Liberman (a.k.a. Mr. LanguageLog) has arranged for me to give a colloquium talk to his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Research in Cognitive Science. I'll be speaking this Friday at noon.

"Coarse-graining, symbolic dynamics and collective coordinates: How physicists deal with large, complex systems, and why cognitive scientists might care"
Abstract: Many systems in statistical physics admit multiple levels of description, from microscopic molecular detail up through very broad macroscopic features. The higher-level descriptions are "coarse-grainings" of the lower levels, and the higher-level variables are generally collective properties of many lower-level objects. Not every coarse-graining leads to a "good" set of macroscopic variables; those that do have certain statistical properties. These properties, in turn, have important information-theoretic implications, and, when the coarse-graining is discrete ("symbolic dynamics"), the system can be modeled by stochastic automata. After sketching these ideas, I suggest some ways they might help cognitive scientists relate symbolic or computational descriptions to neural, dynamical ones.

This is largely based on my paper with Cris Moore on the nature of macroscopic states in statistical mechanics, plus some irresponsible speculations about coarse-graining neural dynamics to yield symbolic cognitive states, which should on no account be held against him. Hopefully these speculations are not so irresponsible that I will have to deny knowing myself, but we'll see what people with actual knowledge of the relevant subjects think on Friday.

(I didn't post about my last three talks, but what would this blog be without my shameless, yet ineffectual, attempts at self-promotion? )

Self-Centered; Physics; Minds, Brains, and Neurons

Posted by crshalizi at March 30, 2005 22:10 | permanent link

March 29, 2005

"saint & or"

Enough of eternal salvation and similarly unpleasant subjects! I present, by way of cleansing the mind's palate, Michael Farrrell's "saints & or: notes in the form of sonnets (millay effects)", from the last issue of the Boston Review. This poem is perhaps best described as imagining the result of a collaboration between twentieth-century America's greatest masters of the sonnet form, e. e. cummings and Edna St. Vincent Millay. It works better than it ought to. A stanza from the middle:

the season knows you as its own &,
the bay as it produces weed for you to;
put in a, pocket &, bring out a
hat never photographed & never; was your water drunk
the moons no, good except as hook,
to pull you back over the sands of dance,
you are not too tall to be a bird.
a sign i hope the wind ignores the
drops foreground what this is really about rain;
loss of focus &, ignorance of steps directions magpie
swoops they know something too from a different view &, ---
maybe on another day you or another a summers
day tanned, --- & feeling light youll answer who.

The Commonwealth of Letters

Posted by crshalizi at March 29, 2005 11:55 | permanent link

Dept. of "What Part of 'Do Justice and Love Mercy' Do You Not Understand?"

From Suburban Guerilla (by way of Brad DeLong), a remarkable little story from the Charlotte, N.C. Observer, proving that, as ever, the secret of great comic delivery is timing:

A church has withdrawn its support for a food pantry serving the needy because the pantry works with Roman Catholics.
Central Church of God explained its decision in a letter March 1 from minister of evangelism Shannon Burton to Loaves & Fishes in Charlotte.
"As a Christian church, we feel it is our responsibility to follow closely the (principles) and commands of Scripture," the letter said.
"To do this best, we feel we should abstain from any ministry that partners with or promotes Catholicism, or for that matter, any other denomination promoting a works-based salvation."
Loaves & Fishes isn't the only ministry with which the large church has cut ties, and Catholics have not been the only reason they've given.
The Rev. Tony Marciano, executive director of Charlotte Rescue Mission, said Burton told him the church could no longer support the agency after it allowed three Muslim students from UNC Charlotte to help serve a meal.

DeLong's response is perfect, so I'll quote that, too.

When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory. And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats. And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left. Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in: Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me."
Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, "Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee?"
And the King shall answer and say unto them, "Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."

The Running-Dogs of Reaction

Posted by crshalizi at March 29, 2005 11:46 | permanent link

The Eigenvectors Declare the Glory of God

Who among us has not, from time to time, felt the need for "Christian devotionals with mathematical content"? Yet who has ever found them? Look no further: Prof. Sharon K. Robbert, chair of the mathematics department of Trinity Christian College has prepared a whole series such devotionals, to accompany courses in single-variable calculus, multivariable calculus, discrete structures, linear algebra, differential equations and statistics. Linear algebra is my favorite, but I also admire the wit which links the idea of sampling a population to the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Sadly, none of Prof. Robbert's devotionals reference either the natural Wisdom 11:20 ("Thou has ordered all things in measure and number and weight"), or the apt 1 Timothy 6:20-21:

O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called: which some professing have erred concerning the faith. Grace be with thee. Amen.

Joking aside, there is something rather sad about these devotionals, simply in their own terms, because they are so shockingly bad as readings of the Bible, being based on little more than puns. (I guess it could be worse.) At first I thought this must be a joke, like the creationist science fair web page that made the rounds a while ago; but this doesn't seem to be the case. Because I try to maintain a high opinion of my fellow creatures, I still hope that Prof. Robbert is not being entirely honest on that last-linked page, and these things were the result of, say, trying to comply with an ill-conceived order from the college administration that all classes must have a Scriptural component. But I'm afraid it doesn't seem likely. It seems to me that if you were serious about the Bible being the inspired word of the God to whom you will answer at the Last Judgment, you would not treat it in this profoundly shoddy, slapdash way. Yet people like Robbert are evidently both sincere in their faith, and devoid of intellectual conscience in matters pertaining to it. I am left with a psychological puzzle, and a strong desire to read The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind.

Update, 30 March 2005: Two correspondents write to point to related, and well-traveled, Internet jokes. Danny Yee says he prefers Theological Engineering Exam ("25 grams of wafers and 20 ml of cheap wine undergo transubstantiation and become the flesh and blood of our Lord. How many Joules of heat are released by the transformation?"). Another, who prefers not to admit that he reads blogs, says that "if you're going to make math puns, at least make them lewd", and links to this little story about "pretty little Polly Nomial" (work safe!).

(From Dave Albers, in e-mail.)

Manual trackbacks: Pharyngula; Geekable.com; hilzoy at Obsidian Wings; Random John; An Ergodic Walk; Thoughts from Kansas; Hey City Zen

Mathematics; The Running-Dogs of Reaction

Posted by crshalizi at March 29, 2005 11:20 | permanent link

March 28, 2005

This Is Your Brain on Statistical Complexity (This Week at the Complex Systems Colloquium)

Attention conservation notice: This is an attempt to increase the attendance at the complex systems colloquia by blogging about them in advance. Of minimal relevance if you're not in Ann Arbor or don't care about complex systems, information theory, quantitative measures of complexity, brain imaging, or summarizing ridiculously largge amounts of data.

For this week's colloquium, we are very happy to have as our speaker Karl Young, from UCSF. In the early 1990s, Karl wrote what are (in my humble and quite unbiased opinion) some of the most important papers on quantitative, informational measures of complexity (e.g., 1, 2, 3). Then, mysteriously, he left the lush and easy life of complexity for the arid desolation of neuroscience, sustained in his wanderings in the wilderness by the ravens of NMR physics and brain imaging. Now, happily, he has returned to us with good news, prophesying the utility of complexity measures in making sense of brain images:

"MRI Diagnostic Tools Via Statistical Complexity Measures"
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data, which are available in a large variety of modalities, has led to challenges regarding how to best utilize and interpret combined information for diagnostic purposes. For example, a MRI study of the brain may involve structural, spectroscopy, perfusion, and functional MRI in the same session, providing anatomical, metabolic, physiological, and functional information. Great progress has been made in registering different MRI modalities via the use of brain atlases, so that regional information is also maintained. However, a major problem with this approach is identification of relevant information for diagnosis from the huge amount of regional and multi-modal information available. In an attempt to generate sensitive methods for diagnostic classification this research explores a complimentary, global approach that utilizes entropy and statistical complexity measures applied to multi-modal data to obtain global measures of brain function. As a demonstration the BrainWeb Simulated Brain Database is used to simulate data based on a common model of neurodegeneration. Entropy and statistical complexity are shown to sensitively track simulated disease state.

A preliminary paper has already appeared in Physical Review Letters, but I know Karl has a lot more done on this topic than showed up in the PRL, and I hope we'll get to hear about it.

4 pm, Thursday, March 31, in room 335 West Hall, Central Campus

Complexity; Minds, Brains, and Neurons; Engimas of Chance

Posted by crshalizi at March 28, 2005 08:26 | permanent link

March 25, 2005

Friday Cat-Blogging (Non-Science-Geek-Edition Edition)

I finally got a digital camera, so I can do normal cat-blogging.

I like Kara's eyes in that one, but this pose is far more typical.

Friday Cat Blogging

Posted by crshalizi at March 25, 2005 09:00 | permanent link

March 23, 2005

The Garden of Forking Paths Weighs Like a Nightmare on the Minds of the Living (This Week at the Complex Systems Colloquium)

Attention conservation notice: This is an attempt to increase the attendance at the complex systems colloquia by blogging about them in advance. Of minimal relevance if you're not in Ann Arbor or don't care about complex systems, historiography, social theory, Africa, imperialism, the formation of the modern world, agency or causality.

For this week's colloquium, we are very happy to have Prof. Timothy Burke from Easily Distracted Swarthmore College, who will be telling us about some shiny things that have caught his eye recently

"Colonialism, Counterfactuals, Causality: Emergence and Complexity as Metaphor and Tool in Historical Analysis"
After spending three years working with an interdisciplinary faculty seminar on complexity and emergent systems, I am thoroughly convinced of the value and importance of those topics for historians as well as other scholars. I am also thoroughly confused about how to actually make practical use of my novice's understanding of this subject matter. In this paper, I will review three speculative attempts to apply complex systems and emergence to my own work and interests, ranging from a very specific attempt to rethink the early shaping of British colonial governance in southern Africa to very general attempts to rethink the nature of causality in human history.
While I'm convinced that emergence is at the least provides a powerful explanatory metaphor that usefully unsettles some conventional wisdom in historical scholarship, I'm at more of a loss about how--or whether--to move beyond that in historical research to more concrete empirical or methodological uses of topics like emergence, complex systems, or networks. In particular, I will describe a justifiably unsuccessful proposal for a "counterfactual simulator" that my colleague Bruce Maxwell and I put together last year, a proposal that I think ran aground in part because of its impracticality, possibly even its impossibility.

4 pm, Thursday, March 24, in room 335 West Hall, Central Campus

Manual trackback: Crumb Trail.

Complexity; The Great Transformation; Writing for Antiquity

Posted by crshalizi at March 23, 2005 18:00 | permanent link

How Much of the Behavior of the South African Proletariat Can Sociobiology Explain?

More than zero but less than a third.

Sam Bowles and Dori Posel, "Genetic Relatedness predicts South African migrant workers' remittances to their families", Nature 434 (2005): 380--383 [Journal link]
Abstract: Inclusive fitness models predict many commonly observed behaviours: among humans, studies of within-household violence, the allocation of food and child care find that people favour those to whom they are more closely related. In some cases however, kin-altruism effects appear to be modest. Do individuals favour kin to the extent that kin-altruism models predict? Data on remittances sent by South African migrant workers to their rural households of origin allow an explicit test, to our knowledge the first of its kind for humans. Using estimates of the fitness benefits and costs associated with the remittance, the genetic relatedness of the migrant to the beneficiaries of the transfer, and their age- and sex-specific reproductive values, we estimate the level of remittance that maximizes the migrant worker's inclusive fitness. This is a much better predictor of observed remittances than is average relatedness, even when we take account (by means of a multiple regression) of covarying influences on the level of remittance. But the effect is modest: less than a third of the observed level of remittances can be explained by our kin-altruism model.

Two points seem worth making here. (Actually, three, but I only have energy for two.)

1. Obviously, the precise results are going to depend on exactly how various aspects of the model are specified. (For instance, Bowles and Posel assume that money makes only a logarithmically-growing contribution to fitness.) However, they report that the results are at least reasonably robust to changes in the specification and assumptions, so there really doesn't seem to be any way to get inclusive fitness effects to account for all or even most of the remittances.

2. In calculating the inclusive fitness contributions of relatives of differing ages, they take into account the over-all growth rate of the South African population. In fact, however, "remittances are slightly better predicted using reproductive values assuming zero population growth (which was approximately the case in the ancestral populations of the migrants studied here)", and this "is consistent with the view that contemporary behaviour may be an adaptation to past conditions", rather than to present ones.

The Natural Science of the Human Species

Posted by crshalizi at March 23, 2005 17:47 | permanent link

March 22, 2005

Origin of the Fermi Surface in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (I Don't Know You People, Part III)

It is, of course, altogether too easy to find crazy papers on Arxiv.org, without even going to the string theory section. Today's listings provide the following, brought to my attention by Mok in e-mail.

Diderik Aerts, "Towards a New Democracy: Consensus Through Quantum Parliament", physics/0503078
Abstract: We compare different actual forms of democracy and analyse in which way they are variations of a 'natural consensus decision process'. We analyse how 'consensus decision followed by majority voting' is open to 'false play' by the majority, and investigate how other types of false play appear in alternative types of democratic decision procedures. We introduce the combined notion of 'quantum parliament' and 'quantum decision procedure', and prove it to be the only one, when applied after consensus decision, that is immune to false play.

What really makes me despair for the discipline, however, is when otherwise respectable journals (i.e., ones where I am myself an author and a referee) print papers which are just so insane you have to wonder if everyone involved --- authors, referees, editors, type-setters --- were pawns in a cruel, implacable plot by which the editorial collective of Social Text has sought vengence on the world of physics.

Alexandr A. Ezhov and Andrei Yu. Khrennikov, "Agents with left and right dominant hemispheres and quantum statistics", Physical Review E 71 (2005): 016138 [Journal link]
Abstract: We present a multiagent model illustrating the emergence of two different quantum statistics, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac, in a friendly population of individuals with the right-brain dominance and in a competitive population of individuals with the left-brain hemisphere dominance, correspondingly. Doing so, we adduce the arguments that Lefebvre's "algebra of conscience" can be used in a natural way to describe decision-making strategies of agents simulating people with different brain dominance. One can suggest that the emergence of the two principal statistical distributions is able to illustrate different types of society organization and also to be used in order to simulate market phenomena and psychic disorders, when a switching of hemisphere dominance is involved.

The most distinguished (and funky) living scholar of parliament has wisely told us to "Free your mind and your ass will follow". I wish I understood why so many of my fellow physicists appear to confuse freeing your mind with never taking a moment to ask yourself "Wait --- is this just batshit insane, or what?"

Manual trackback: The Statistical Mechanic; Phersu

Physics; Psychoceramica

Posted by crshalizi at March 22, 2005 16:59 | permanent link

March 07, 2005

"Go to the slime mold, thou centralizer, and consider its ways"

David Velleman compares academics to insects and slime, but in a good way.

The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts

Posted by crshalizi at March 07, 2005 11:00 | permanent link

February 28, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, February 2005

Kalpana Misra, From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng's China
Elizabeth Wayland Barber and Paul T. Barber, When They Severed Earth from Sky: How the Human Mind Shapes Myth
A cognitive theory of mythology (quite similar to the work of Sperber and followers, who aren't cited), from the authors of The Mummies of Ürümchi and Vampires, Burial and Death. Great fun and right-headed, if not always completely convincing.
Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Erasmus to Descartes
How the combination of the Reformation and the re-discovery of Hellenistic skepticism, especially Sextus Empiricus, launched modern philosophy. Popkin is obviously sympathetic to a combination of skepticism and Christian fideism, such as he attributes to Montaigne, but not in a really prejudicial way. I read the first edition; the third, which is the one in print, is subtitled From Savonarola to Bayle. Both of them feature in the edition I read, but presumably that material has been expanded. --- It would be interesting to know why skeptical arguments failed to have much impact in antiquity, especially since they're really hard, if not impossible, to actually answer.
Phil Rickman, The Prayer of the Night Shepherd
The latest in his "Merrily Watkins" mystery series, which are perhaps best described as procedural ghost stories: the eponymous character is a Church of England minister, and in fact the official diocesan exorcist ("Deliverance Consultant") for a particularly ghastly region on the English-Welsh border. As in many procedural series, a lot of the book is Watkins struggling with the trials of her life (her faith, her parishoners' lack of same, the C. of E. hierarchy, her boyfriend, her teenage daughter) while trying to solve the mystery; it's just that the mysteries always involve spooks in some way, or at least seem to do so. In many ways, the real theme of these novels is the slow, miserable, hopeless decay of the border country, and the appalling human secrets it harbors. Rickman is able to pull this off. It's not necessary to read the books in order, but Prayer probably isn't the best place to start; the first one is Wine of Angels.
Susanna Clarke, Jonathan Strange and Mr. Norrell
See, for fully-deserved praise, Henry Farrell, or John Holbo, or Jo Walton: "It's as if we've all been building sandcastles in the shadow of a cliff and suddenly Clarke has raised a great castle out of the sea with a strange light shining through the foam-water windows." Further comment on my part is superfluous.

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at February 28, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

February 14, 2005

It's not really blogging if I don't provide any comment

Because everybody wants a box of chocolates and a long stem rose (update: well, not everybody), but some people want links as well:

The Onion's characteristically tasteful and tender Love Coupons.

The medical possibility of dying from a broken heart. Also from /dev/null: "An Australian company is trialling [sic] a testosterone spray to boost the female sex drive. The spray, designed for post-menopausal women, also works on young women wanting to get their bootywhang on; the only side-effect so far is abnormal hair growth."

Luis Rocha thunders against the lewd, depraved and unnatural perversion of puritanism.

Jane Haddam explains what's up with Americans and sex; also, old stories.

And so, one of the oldest stories of all: Inanna Descends into the Underworld (via Sappho's Breathing).

On which note, I must depart; but, before I go, I ask you to remember that

Love is not all: it is not meat nor drink
Nor slumber nor a roof against the rain;
Nor yet a floating spar to men that sink
And rise and sink and rise and sink again;
Love can not fill the thickened lung with breath,
Nor clean the blood, nor set the fractured bone;
Yet many a man is making friends with death
Even as I speak, for lack of love alone.
It well may be that in a difficult hour,
Pinned down by pain and moaning for release,
Or nagged by want past resolution's power,
I might be driven to sell your love for peace,
Or trade the memory of this night for food.
It well may be. I do not think I would.

Posted by crshalizi at February 14, 2005 09:00 | permanent link

February 08, 2005

We Interrupt This Hiatus for a Crass Commercial Announcement

A (positive) number of people have written to ask me not to stop blogging. Rest assured this isn't permanent; I'll start up again. Right now, though, there are seven partially-finished papers sitting on my computer desktop. Regular posting will resume when they're done, or at least when I can pass them off to my co-authors. I'll probably keep updating the reading list in the sidebar, but that's it.

In the meanwhile, I have been going over my bookshelves in a rather jaundiced mood. Taking each volume into my hands, I ask, Does it contain anything I will want to read again? No. Does it contain anything I will get around to reading at all? No. Did I buy it a few weeks before a friend who knows my tastes too well gave me a copy? Yes. Commit it then to the flames of the second-hand book market: for it can contain nothing that's worth the shelf-space. Suffering as I do from the same weakness as Hurree Babu, there are rather a lot of books in the first two categories. (Some might ask why I didn't do this long since, and I wouldn't have a good answer.) Interested parties can look at the listings; I may add some more this weekend.

Posted by crshalizi at February 08, 2005 16:11 | permanent link

January 31, 2005

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, January 2005

René Wellek, Concepts of Criticism
A collection of papers from the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s by one of the most learned and sensible literary theorists then writing. Very good if you're interested in the history of literary theory and literary criticism.
Ray Jackendoff, Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution
See my review: The Object-Oriented Turn in Generative Grammar.
K. J. Bishop, The Etched City
Disturbing, brilliant, marvellously-authoritative novel of corruption, of redemption, of art, of metamorphosis: in short of transformation. Nothing is explained, but I came away feeling that everything was explicable, that it had some hidden, cohesive meaning. I almost suspect there is a concealed alchemical allegory, only the alchemists were never this good.
John Kay, Culture and Prosperity: The Truth About Markets --- Why Some Nations Are Rich but Most Remain Poor
(The original UK title is just The Truth About Markets, which is better.) Not sure if I do recommend this one. It's intended as a popular survey of modern economics, with a bit of an emphasis on micro and on policy. For the most part, the content is quite good, but at times Kay's style really got on my nerves. There seemed to be a lot of places where he could and should have gone into topics more deeply, but contented himself with just dipping into them and then going on to the next section. (Perhaps this is due to writing a weekly newspaper column for several years.) Also, there are some errors. (E.g., in discussing science funding in America vs. Europe, he makes it seem like most basic research in the US is supported by the private sector, and doesn't mention the NSF or the NIH at all.) That said, I really don't know of a better popular treatment of the strengths and limitations of neo-classical economics and its non-crazy competitors.
Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History of the Twentieth Century
Remarkably, this actually lives up to its subtitle. I knew that many of the great scholars in the humanities of the mid-twentieth century were mad, and/or living down fascist pasts (e.g.), but I had no idea how mad, or that so many of them were mad in the same way, having acquired their madness from a common source.
John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action
See Was John Dewey a Member of the Reality-Based Community?. After reading this, I can say that the answer to my question is "yes", and that this is probably Dewey's best-written book. (The in-print edition has an introduction by Stephen Toulmin, but I read an old copy and haven't seen this.)

Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur

Posted by crshalizi at January 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link

January 13, 2005

I Am Not Worthy (II)

I've been nominated for a Koufax Award again, not for "best writing" like last year, but as "most deserving of wider recognition".

This would come on the same day when I'd more or less decided to stop posting for the indefinite future.

Self-Centered

Posted by crshalizi at January 13, 2005 09:32 | permanent link

January 05, 2005

2004: The Year in Pictures

Posted by crshalizi at January 05, 2005 16:01 | permanent link

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