"I thought about this precisely what Inez must have thought about this, but it was irrelevant. I thought there had been papers shredded all over the Pacific the night she was flying Jack Lovett's body from Jakarta to Schofield, but it was irrelevant. We were sitting in a swamp forest on the edge of Asia in a city that had barely existed a century before and existed now only as the flotsam of some territorial imperative and a woman who had once thought of living in the White House was flicking termites from her teacup and telling me about landing on a series of coral atolls in a seven-passenger plane with a man in a body bag."
Posted by crshalizi at December 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
From Joan Didion's Democracy. Applications to current events are entirely your affair.
At the time I thought that she had decided to talk to me only because Jack Lovett's name was just beginning to leak out of the various investigations into arms and currency and technology dealings on the part of certain former or perhaps even current overt and covert agents of the United States government. There had even been hints about narcotics dealings, which, although they made good copy and were played large in the early coverage (I recall the phrase "Golden Triangle" in many headlines, and a photograph of two blurred figures leaving a house on Victoria Peak, one identified as a "sometimes Lovett business associate" and the other as a "known Hong Kong Triad opium lord"), remained just that, hints, rumors, that would never be substantiated, but the other allegations were solid enough, and not actually surprising to anyone who had bothered to think about what Jack Lovett was doing in that part of the world.There had been the affiliations with interlocking transport and air courier companies devoid of real assets. There had been the directorship of the bank in Vila that put the peculiarities of condominium government to such creative use. There had been all the special assignments and the special consultancies and the special relationships in a fluid world where the collection of information was indistinguishable from the use of information and where national and private interests (the interests of state and non-state actors, Jack Lovett would have said) did not collide but merged into a single pool of exchanged favors.
In order to understand what Jack Lovett did it was necessary only to understand how natural it was for him to do it, how at once entirely absorbing and supremely easy. There had always been that talent for putting the right people together, the right man at the Department of Defense, say, with the right man at Livermore or Los Alamos or Brookhaven, or, a more specific example with a more immediately calculable payout, the Director of Base Development for CINCPAC/MACV with Dwight Christian.
There had always been something else as well.
There had been that emotional solitude, a detachment that extended to questions of national or political loyalty.
It would be inaccurate to call Jack Lovett disloyal, although I suppose some people did at the time.
It would be accurate only to say that he regarded the country on whose passport he traveled as an abstraction, a state actor, one of several to be factored into any given play.
In other words.
What Jack Lovett did was never black or white, and in the long run may even have been (since the principal gain to him was another abstraction, the pyramiding of further information) devoid of ethical content altogether, but since shades of grey tended not to reproduce in the newspapers the story was not looking good on a breaking basis. That Jack Lovett had reportedly made some elusive deals with the failed third force (or fourth force, or fifth force, this was a story on which the bottom kept dropping out) in Phnom Penh in those days after the embassy closed there did not look good. That the London dealer who was selling American arms abandoned in South Vietnam had received delivery from one of Jack Lovett's cargo services did not look good....
This is from the end of chapter 2 in part 4 --- pp. 207--209 of the Pocket Books edition (New York, 1985).
Posted by crshalizi at December 31, 2005 11:41 | permanent link
It's been a while since I did one of these, hasn't it? But sometimes they just hop onto the keyboard and start meowing in my face.
In this paper, Ryugo et al. are mostly concerned with structures at the synapses in certain nerve fibers, rejoicing in the name of "the endbulbs of Held", which they describe in fairly flowery language: "Endbulbs have a calyxlike appearance that is formed from the main axon as several gnarled branches that arborize repeatedly to enclose the postsynaptic cell in a nest of en passant swellings and terminal boutons." These are abnormal in congenitally deaf animals: they don't branch so much, they're enlarged, they've got a flat rather than an undulating profile, and they've got fewer of the vesicles containing neurotransmitters that make synapses work. Not surprisingly, these endbulbs don't seem to transmit signals very well. This is a problem, especially since the nerve pathways where they tend to be found are the ones which encode precise timing information about sounds, important alike for for predators fond of twilight and leaping in ambush, and for chattering East African Plains Apes ("The critical nature of temporal resolution in facilitating speech recognition is underscored by studies that show speech recognition based on temporal cues while spectral content is systematically degraded").
What they did was to take congenitally deaf cats and, as kittens, give them cochlear implants which restored their capacity to hear. The physical capacity was verified by recording the propagation of neural signals; also by the fact that "we could routinely 'call' implanted cats for a food reward." After several months, they examined the development of the end-bulbs of Held in these cats, compared to matched normal animals, and to congenitally deaf cats which received no implant. (Don't ask how.) The results, photographically, are pretty convincing: the endbulbs look a lot more like those of normal cats than deaf, non-implanted cats, and quantitative comparisons of e.g. size are also fairly persuasive.
It would be interesting to know how old cats can be before simply providing the cochlear implant isn't enough for these synapses to develop properly. They speculate (but don't really show) that the same effect takes place in people, and that this is why congenitally deaf children benefit more from implants the earlier they get them. If that's so, it would just reinforce the importance of making sure all the children who need them get such implants swiftly. It would also make it nice to know what (if anything) could be done in conjunction with such implants, to help gnarl-up children's endbulbs.
Notice, by the way, that, as I've had occasion to remark before, that the whole nature-nurture division is not actually useful to understanding what's going on in processes like the development of hearing in these cats. (Go on, calculate a heritability here and tell me it means something, I dare you.) But this is generally the case with cognition.
Posted by crshalizi at December 30, 2005 23:08 | permanent link
NYU's graduate student teaching assistants are unionized, and have been for several years, but the National Labor Relations Board recently reversed itself and ruled that the university did not have to recognize the union or negotiate with it. The teaching assistants are now on strike, apparently with wide support from the faculty (so that the administration has been snooping through course websites to see who the faculty sympathizers are). To break the strike, NYU's president, John Sexton, is threatening to withhold the whole semester's stipend from any TAs who are not back to work by today, and that any TAs who strike next semester will lose their stipend for the whole year. I understand withholding wages during a strike, but this is simply vicious, and so far as I can work out would be illegal in any normal labor dispute. (Of course Sexton's position is that the TAs are not really employees, which is hogwash.) You can sign a petition against this travesty via Faculty Democracy at New York University. Leaving aside the claims of justice and elementary fairness, how many other chances will you have to agree with Andrew Ross and Alan Sokal?
(Surveying the treatment of our graduate student employees from the lofty perch of half a year on the faculty, it seems to me that CMU, at least in the statistics department, treats them pretty well, and much better than we had it at Madison when I was a TA there, and a member of AFT local #3220. But still, if they wanted to unionize, I'd be completely behind them, and I think it's idiotic and reprehensible for universities to refuse to even recognize and negotiate with graduate student unions. Unions can ask for stupid and/or selfish things, of course — which distinguishes them from any other organization how, exactly? — but the merits of particular proposals isn't the issue here; punishing people who attempt to organize to exert their rights is.)
Via John Burke (in e-mail) and Michael Bérubé; reporting and photos of the strike from Majikthise.
Update, 7 December 2005: I now see that Asad Raza, one of the strikers, has been filing dispatches (1, 2) at Three Quarks Daily.
Manual trackback: Crooked Timber
Posted by crshalizi at December 05, 2005 12:19 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at November 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
What mysterious civilization carved these designs in the high desert — designs which can only be seen from the air?
Did these so-called primitives unravel the mysteries of electricity by themselves?
For how many aeons have these forbidding mountains born witness to eldritch rites?
What disturbing pre-human legends are engraved on these tablets — products of an advanced metallurgy far beyond any native to the region?
Which unspeakable cult conceals its world-shattering secrets and shambling, amorphous blasphemies behind the walls of its armed compound nearby?
Posted by crshalizi at November 30, 2005 13:24 | permanent link
Larry "All of Statistics/All of Nonparametric Statistics" Wasserman has just started a weblog, The Academic Curmudgeon. By my count, this brings the number of faculty blogs in the department to three (and the proportion to about 0.09); none of our students seem to have any. Larry's second post is about peer review.
Here is a summary of common reasons for rejecting papers:Good Reasons For Rejecting a Paper:
- The results are incorrect (unfixable, critical errors).
- The results are not new.
Bad Reasons For Rejecting a Paper:
- The referee doesn't like the paper.
- The referee doesn't like the author's approach.
Tricky:
- The contribution of the paper is too small.
Numbers 3 and 4 are bad because they are based on the taste of the referee which is far too subjective. Number 5 is problematic. True, we don't necessarily want top journals publishing every small idea that occurs to someone. The problem is this: almost all research, including good research, is incremental. The idea that most papers in top journals are breakthough papers is fantasy. What is too incremental to publish is highly subjective.
I think the basic problem is that most referees have the wrong view of the purpose of publishing. Ideally, publishing is about disseminating knowledge. It should not be regarded as admittance to a high and mighty priesthood.
I am going to use Larry's post as an excuse to ruminate about peer review, partly because I spent yesterday whittling down the stack of manuscripts I'd agreed, in weak moments, to review, and partly because I think Larry might be unhappy with my refereeing. Maybe he gets to see a better class of manuscript than I do (I wouldn't be surprised), but it seems to me that his list of good reasons to reject a paper is seriously incomplete.
I am happy to reject papers on such grounds, because they seem to follow from my understanding of the point of peer review. This is, as Larry says, about the dissemination of knowledge, not initiation into a priesthood. But the people peer-reviewers serve are not the authors but the potential readers. Passing peer review ought to endorse a manuscript, not as correct, but as possibly worthy of attention: not obviously wrong, not disconnected from the field, not out to lunch, not a waste of the reader's time. (This is more modest, and more achievable, than actively picking out the good stuff; it's a type I/type II error issue.) One important wrinkle here is that, if you're already an expert in a given field, the extra value of having somebody else filter the stream of manuscripts in that field is small — part of your expertise is being able to make such judgments reliably and cheaply yourself. But if you need to use results or ideas from another field, then you either need to become an expert there, too, or you need experts there to tell you what's worth attention. Very few scientists never need ideas from other fields, which is to say that most of us will benefit from peer review. (Similarly for hiring and tenure, but let's not dwell on such unpleasant subjects.) For complete non-experts, i.e., the lay public who ultimately support us all, peer review is about the only way they have of telling possibly-legitimate scientists from the cranks and the frauds. (More exactly, because peer review only says "not obviously wrong": anyone who can't get over the peer review barrier is so weak as to not be worth bothering with.)
I rather doubt, however, that the current journal/peer-review system is the ideal way of doing this filtering. Journals can be too conservative. Journals can not be conservative enough, when the topic is fashionable. (Not that I have anything in mind.) Journals can get locked into a vicious cycle in which they become so bad that publication there constitutes an anti-endorsement, so that only really bad scientists publish there, and they in turn become recruited as referees. (Still, an anti-endorsement is not without its own value.) There is something perverse about refereeing for commercial publishers, since publishers charge scientists larcenous rates to bring them the results of free labor on the part of authors and referees.
Ultimately, I hope that we move away from the current system towards
something more like Paul
Ginsparg's ideas. He envisions a system of "tiers" of publication; the
lowest tiers, like the current arxiv.org, would
have nearly-open submission and dissemination, and be most valuable to experts.
Above them, operating more slowly, would be more selective tiers of peer
review, commentary, review papers, etc., which will be more valuable to less
expert readers, and won't try to filter the whole manuscript stream,
which is what peer review now does. Getting there from here will probably
involve lining the war-mongering parasites
at Elsevier
up against a wall a good deal of time and effort, but would lead
to something much more efficient and intellectually valuable.
And now, back to revising our manuscript to please its referees.
Update, 29 November 2005: Dave Feldman, propelled by the burning need to procrastinate which drives so many academics to blogging, suggests that the peer review system would be much improved by free socks. He's right.
Update, 7 December 2005: For once, I wish I had comments here. (I don't feel like committing myself to the endless struggle against spam.) "Cog", of The Abstract Factory, writes in (quoted with permission):
I believe your 3 and 4 are subspecies of "the contribution is too small" (5 on Larry's list). Your 1 and 2 are both subspecies of "the paper does not communicate effectively enough for the contribution to be evaluated", which is a new reason. Number 5 is also a new reason. So you've really come up with two distinct extra reasons.I would actually subsume Larry's reason 1, and your 1+2 under:
1'. The results are not clearly shown to be (probably) correct.
Because, of course, the burden of proof is on the authors to convince the reader that their result is not obviously wrong, not on the reviewer to show that the result is obviously wrong. To discharge this obligation requires both technical soundness and effective, precise communication.
Manual Trackback: An Ergodic Walk
Posted by crshalizi at November 26, 2005 11:40 | permanent link
Deborah Mayo's great book on Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge was published in 1996. In it, she lays out a way of thinking about statistics, and about learning from experience more generally, which is at once principled, powerful and useful. It helps make sense of what we already do, and suggests new ways in which we can improve our practices. I read it in 1998, and it roused me from my dogmatic slumbers about statistical inference. It's hard to imagine another path to where I am now if I hadn't read it. All of which is to say that I was very pleased to find the following in my inbox this morning:
Check out the invited speakers and the call for papers.
Posted by crshalizi at November 13, 2005 11:37 | permanent link
General course information (includes gratuitous eye-candy), syllabus, detailed course outline. To ward off the evil eye, I should say that I do not expect to get through all of what's in the outline. (Suggestions about the outline are still most welcome.) Lecture notes will be posted on the course website as I write them. Thanks, again, to everyone who helped me pick a text.
Update, January 2006: See downstream for links to the lecture notes.
Posted by crshalizi at November 08, 2005 12:51 | permanent link
Marcus Porcius Cato was famous for, among other things, ending all of his speeches in the Senate by saying "that is my opinion. It is further my opinion, that Carthage must be destroyed" (ceterum censeo, Carthago delenda est). Eventually, so the story goes, his fellow senators got so worn down that they launched the Third Punic War, which ended with Carthage destroyed, and the ground sowed with salt.
Senator McCain seems to be adopting a similar tactic, in a much higher cause than establishing hegemony over the western Mediterranean basin:
McCain Vows to Add Detainee-Abuse Provision to All Senate Bills: The U.S. Senate added language barring inhumane treatment of enemy combatants to legislation that sets military policy, the second major defense measure the chamber has amended with this provision.The amendment sponsored by Arizona Republican Senator John McCain passed by a voice vote. It was attached to the Senate's fiscal 2006 defense spending bill Oct. 6 by a vote of 90-9. That bill is being negotiated with members of the U.S. House, including Republicans whose support is in question.
McCain said his intent is to prevent abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. He vowed today that his measure would be "on every vehicle that goes through this body" until it's enacted into law. "It's not going away," he said on the Senate floor. "This issue is incredibly harmful to the United States of America and our image throughout the world."
Via Michael Froomkin; I agree with his comment that "I still think he'd be an awful President, but this is good stuff." Unfortunately, the link Froomkin gives to the Bloomberg news story he quotes is broken, so I can't see if anyone else is drawing the classical parallel.
Posted by crshalizi at November 05, 2005 11:30 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at October 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
I used to re-read Something Wicked This Way Comes every Halloween. This year I'm without my copy of both that and A Night in the Lonesome October, so I might as well blog.
The Little Professor offers some Victorian terrors. Actual Victorian-era terrors: the resurrectionists of Ann Arbor.
Barcelona, city of jack-o-lanterns and bull-rings in the air.
Fafblog: the world's only source for haunted Fafblog. (Plus, the Medium Lobster explains the Plame affair in one sentence.)
Mad science: The Annals of Improbable Research re-runs its Halloween Research Review from 2000 (1, 2)
Zombies: Kids! Did you know you can use Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever to make zombies? By Wil McCarthy, who wrote two novels I liked and many others I've not gotten around to. (Via /dev/null, who reproduces a tribute to the Little Prince.) "And I say to any flesh-eating zombies who might be listening to the Factor this evening: Bill O'Reilly is looking out for you." (For more zombies, see Destroy All Bookmarks!.)
Vampires: Carmilla is free online, along with many other good stories by J. Sheridan LeFanu. (The Oxford collection of LeFanu's stories is nice, too.) I've always thought this was a much better-written book than Dracula. It's worth noting, though, that the traditional eastern European vampire was not a pale, skinny, strangely seductive aristocrat, but a fat, red-faced peasant whose carnal designs on the living are limited to their blood, such as drips from his (fangless) mouth, and in many ways corresponded pretty well to what peasants would find if they opened up Uncle Ivan's grave after a few weeks. The whole sexual aspect of vampirism — now, apparently, its main selling point — appears to have been invented by 19th century writers in western Europe (paging Dr. Praz, paging Dr. Mario Praz, to the locked stacks please). — It would be a shame to pass up this opportunity to plug, again, Suzy McKee Charnas's The Vampire Tapestry, unquestionably the most intelligent interpretation of the modern vampire.
Less definable horrors: Probably nobody now producing horror fiction is a better writer than Peter Straub. Here's the beginning of his latest, In the Night Room.
"I can't get that monster out of my mind": If you want to know why we're fascinated by stories of being preyed upon by monsters, Barbara Ehrenreich's observations on the effects of several million years of predation on the hominid psyche is a good place to start. (Here's chapter 1.)
All too definable horrors: Ultimately, as Bradbury's readers know, Halloween is about death; and we turn to magic because grief and loss are intolerable. For a wrenching reminder of just how intolerable, read Joan Didion's Year of Magical Thinking — here is a long, moving excerpt, and here is a review by John Leonard, in the New York Review of Each Others' Books. (How good a writer is Didion? Well, while she was going crazy with grief, she was able to write like this.)
Manual Trackback: The Mystery of the Haunted Vampire.
Posted by crshalizi at October 31, 2005 21:14 | permanent link
By now, everyone and her brother has read, or at least read about, the papers by Albert-László Barabási and co., purporting to show that response times in e-mail, and in Darwin and Einstein's correspondence, follow a power law distribution, and that this is due to queuing processes.
Unfortunately, this is not true; the apparent power law is merely an artifact of a bad analysis of the data, which which is immensely better described by a log-normal distribution. (Via Aaron Clauset.)
As every school-child knows (at least, these school-children do!), adding together many independent random variables, each of which makes a small contribution to the over-all result, generally gives you a Gaussian or normal distribution (unless the contributing variables are, themselves, kind of pathological). This fact is the central limit theorem.
What happens if the inputs are multiplied together, rather than added? Well, take the logarithm: log(XY) = log(X) + log(Y). The logarithm of the product will be the sum of the logarithms of the inputs. The latter will still be independent, so the logarithm of the output will be normally distributed. Undoing the log gives what's imaginative called the log-normal distribution. Log-normals are very common, for the same reasons that normals are. Unlike normals, they are very easy to mistake for power law distributions, especially if your knowledge of statistics is as limited as most theoretical physicists'. (The distribution of links to weblogs, for instance, is much better fit by a log-normal than a power law, as we've seen.) In their comment, Stoffer et al. show that a log-normal actually gives a textbook-quality fit to Barabási's data. (The only change I'd make to their procedure is that I'd report the likelihood ratio directly, and let people work out their own Bayesian posteriors if so inclined.) Looking at the data reported in the new Nature paper on Darwin's and Einstein's correspondence, if it's not log-normal too — well, I'd say I'd eat my hat, but I don't own one; I'll buy a Notre Dame hat and eat it.
Let me turn the microphone over to Francis Galton (as quoted in Ian Hacking's The Taming of Chance):
I know of scarcely anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful form of cosmic order expressed by `the law of error.' A savage, if could understand it, would worship it as a god. It reigns with severity in complete self-effacement amidst the wildest confusion. The huger the mob and the greater the anarchy the more perfect its sway. Let a large sample of chaotic elements be taken and marshalled in order of their magnitudes, and then, however wildly irregular they appeared, an unexpected and most beautiful form of regularity proves to have been present all along.As Hacking notes, on further consideration Galton was even more impressed by the central limit theorem, and accordingly replaced the sentence about savages with "The law would have been personified by the Greeks and deified, if they had known of it." Whether deified by Hellenes or savages, however, the CLT has a message for those doing data analysis, and the message is:
Thou shalt have no other distribution before me, for I am a jealous limit theorem.
I restrain myself from making any observations on the editorial process at Nature, or on the competence of the referees of Barabási's papers. I do wish it to be noted, however, that this post is not an entry in the "Why Oh Why Can't Physicists Learn Better Probability and Statistics?" series, as Amaral and Barabási are both associated with Gene Stanley's school of statistical physics.
Update, Halloween: Suresh Venkatasubramanian, at Geomblog, turns his microphone over to Michael Mitzenmacher, who has some very good comments. (This led me to read Mitzenmacher's nice paper on generating mechanisms for power-laws.) I am more convinced by Mitzenmacher by the difference in the goodness of fits, simply because it is so overwhelmingly large. It hardly seems to make sense, in this case, to say that the data are even approximately power-law distributed...
Update, 23 November: Barabási's group has posted a reply (physics/0511186). To my eyes, the crucial observation by Stouffer et al. was that the fit of the data to a power law is in fact really, really bad, so it's pointless to talk about what mechanism might produce a power law in such situations. The reply's take on this point is that this is "merely" a statistical issue! In short, I don't find the reply at all convincing on the major points, but if you care, by all means read it. (The reply claims that Stouffer et al.'s comment was rejected by "three referees" at Nature; one wonders if they were the referees who approved Barabási's original paper.)
Update, 25 November: To hammer the point home, let's look at Figure 1b from Stouffer et al.'s comment. (Click for a larger version.)

Update, 29 November: Yet more commentary, from Aaron Clauset.
Update, 29 September 2006: In the event you still care about this, see G. Grinstein and R. Linsker, "Biased Diffusion and Universality in Model Queues", Physical Review Letters (2006): 130201. Grinstein and Linsker analytically solve for the asymptotic distribution of Barabási's queueing model, finding either a power law or a power-law with an exponential cut-off; they also show that the result is very sensitive to introducing a cost for switching between different kinds of tasks.
Manual trackback: In Search of 42; Pharyngula; hakank.blogg; Juan de Mairena [v.2.718]; Three Quarks Daily; Metamerist; Zoltán Sylvester; Language Log; Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science
Posted by crshalizi at October 28, 2005 09:30 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: An appeal to the reader's knowledge of textbooks on stochastic processes; also a plea not to be thrown into the briar-patch.
In the spring, I'm going to be teaching the department's advanced course on stochastic processes (36-754, for those keeping track at home). The catalogue description of the course reads, in full, as follows:
This course introduces advanced topics in Probability Theory such as Brownian motion, Markov processes, stationary processes, stochastic integration, etc.It's intended for students from math or statistics who've had a first course in measure-theoretic probability, such as our 36-752, which goes up through the laws of large numbers for independent variables, a little martingale theory, and the central limit theorem. Most if not all of them will have already had a course on stochastic processes at the level of Grimmett and Stirzaker. My plan is to take advantage of the "etc." in the description, and teach a course on
I am looking for a textbook which covers all of this, or at least most of it; I'd be willing to change the material to match a good text. The students currently in 752 are using Ash and Doleans-Dade, which is good, and the last two chapters (which they won't get to) introduce a little ergodic theory and a little stochastic calculus, respectively, but not in enough depth. No one book I know seems to fit, and making them buy more than one expensive book doesn't seem right. If you have any suggestions, please mail them to me at cshalizi [at] oryx [dot] cmu [dot] edu (removing the name of a genus of antelope, which is there only to confuse spammers). I am going to have to spend a lot of time on my lecture notes; I really don't want that to have to grow into, in effect, writing my own book.
Update, next day: Thanks to Bill Tozier, Anand Sarwate and Wolfgang Beirl for writing with suggestions. Wolfgang, in particular, pointed me to Alexandre Stefanov's useful collection of online probability texts and notes (part of a bigger collection of mathematics resources). One of these, Robert Gray's Probability, Random Processes and Ergodic Properties, is something I was already planning to mine, along with his Entropy and Information Theory.
Update, Halloween: We will be using Olav Kallenberg's Foundations of Modern Probability as a reference, with the primary text being my lecture notes.
Manual trackback: Nothing Funny About Feldspar
Posted by crshalizi at October 27, 2005 16:15 | permanent link
Recent advances in high-energy physics. (Apropos of the second link, I bought my copy of Streater and Wightman's PCT, Spin & Statistics, and All That at university library booksale, where it was shelved under "politics/current events"; I guess they missed the "T" in "PCT".)
"Pittsburgh Unprepared For Full-Scale Zombie Attack", warns The Onion (via Johnny Logic). Here in Shadyside, we can expect to be attacked by fashionably-dressed yuppie zombies (yombies?), who will serve our freshly-sliced brains in a balsamic reduction, dusted with fennel pollen and accompanied by organic heirloom tomatoes. (I rented Night of the Living Dead shortly after moving here, but found it unwatchably bad.)
The Head Heeb looks at 18th century forensics.
The Abstract Factory turns out "the only debate on Intelligent Design that is worthy of its subject".
Bill Tozier finds tongues in trees. (I had no idea that maples actually fluoresce.) Also, an astute observation on cell-phone hazards.
Why does Leon Kass say modern women are "car-owning, pill-popping, body-piercing, career-oriented, degree-granted, sexually confident, frequent-flyer, atheistic sluts" like it's a bad thing?
Tim Burke on UNESCO, Department of Bad Ideas.
Larry Bartels on "What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?" (via Phil Klinkner at PolySigh, who somehow forgot to actually give the link).
Mark Liberman elucidates an important linguistic question: when does "fuzzy" mean "smoothed piecewise linear"?
Michael Bérubé looks forward to the Miers court (as does Brad DeLong), and dares anyone to mess with his reading of Thomas Kuhn. (I like Bérubé's writing, generally, and I hope that I'll get around to posting something about The Employment of English, and how complex systems is like cultural studies. But it does bug me that he seems to care so much more about whether he got Kuhn right than about whether Kuhn got it right, since subsequent work has revealed a lot of problems with Kuhn's scheme as an accurate description of scientific change; see e.g. the papers in Scrutinizing Science.)
I have mixed feelings about stuff like this, since things like this, this and this seem pretty well institutionalized. The fact that the career military (like career academia) is socially quite isolated from the rest of the country, and tends to look down on the people it's pledged to serve, is a long-standing problem. (It's a bit more worrisome in the case of the officer corps than the professoriat.) Under the circumstances, one should be encouraging the decent, sane, capable people who are left in the service to do what they can to redeem its honor, rather than shame them into leaving. Speaking of which: Phil Carter of Intel Dump makes his first post after being deployed to Iraq.
Matthew Yglesias on the intellectuals' war, or rather case for war, and its basic folly. (Includes self-criticism.) Also from MY: why blaming declining benefits for American workers on globalization is bullshit (ObKrugman: Pop Internationalism), and why some form of American social democracy is nearly inevitable. (Brad DeLong points out that however much sense that might make, barbarism is always an alternative.) Relatedly, Nathan Newman points out that the only reason GM's workers are getting reduced health benefits rather than none is that they have a strong union; also that Harriet Miers would benefit from restoring the estate tax.
Posted by crshalizi at October 22, 2005 16:24 | permanent link
Back when Wolfram's monstrous tome came out, in the summer of 2002, I wrote
a long review, which I "left to the gnawing criticism of the mice", thinking
I'd get back to it when the cultural moment was safely past. Since I'm
not getting anywhere tonight showing that the error in my filtering scheme is a
non-negative supermartingale, and need to procrastinate some people
who saw the manuscript liked it, and
Wolfram keeps on keeping on, I
felt I might as well brush off the dust, make a few adjustments,
and put it online. Enjoy, if
you're into that kind of thing.
Manual trackback: Bill Tozier; Quantum Pontiff; Danny Yee; Bruce Sterling ("maybe reviewers shouldn't pick on isolated, wealthy math geniuses who have intensely private, highly bonkers-sounding, self-published cosmological schemes. I mean -- what if he comes out of his ivory basement and deliberately DISTURBS THE UNIVERSE? We could be looking at the pixelated rags and tatters of reality by Friday!"); Geekable; Omniorthogonal; Three Quarks Daily; Jonathan Goodwin/The Valve; Crooked Timber; Chrononautic Log; Nonplatonic; East of the Sun, West of the Moon; Paracelsus Rambles; Blog Khoa Hoc Máy Tính; Dubbings and Diversions
Posted by crshalizi at October 21, 2005 20:09 | permanent link
Attention Conservation Notice: a 2100-word, semi-serious proposal for politically inflammatory social-scientific research, worked out by non-social scientists. Does not adequately explain all the technical concepts involved. Contains media criticism and blogging in-jokes.Note: This idea was developed with a close collaborator who prefers, however, not to be named. Using the first person singular just means that I'm the only one doing the actual writing here, not that I deserve the credit for whatever merits this may have. (The blame for its faults, however, is all mine.)
I haven't written anything about Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath, because nothing I could think to say seemed at all adequate in the face of the horrible human disaster and national shame. Others have said what I'd want to say better than I could have. But about the political fall-out, and the cronyism that preceded the catastrophe, and which continues to be relevant day in and day out — there I think I can suggest something.
It's by now abundantly established, at least to all sentient beings, that Michael Brown had no business running much of anything, never mind FEMA, and had the job not because people thought he was the most qualified possible person, or even a reasonably qualified person with the right political ties, but solely and exclusively because of his political ties. This naturally leads to two logically independent questions: (1) How many other people hold important government positions just because of who they know in the GOP apparatus and/or Bush family retinue? (2) Is this any worse than it was under any fairly recent previous president? It could be, after all, that the level and proportion of incompetence is no higher than it ever was, or even lower, but the Bush crew has had the bad luck of having disasters happen which exposed that incompetence; or perhaps the quality and morale of the civil service has been steadily eroded by many decades of serving under incompetent political hacks, and so can no longer adequately compensate for the folly of their masters. (Think of an unreleased episode of Yes, Minister where Sir Humphrey is merely counting the days until he can begin collecting his pension, and Bernard has split for a private-sector consulting gig.)
I've now read a couple of news stories which attempt to address these questions, and I am dissatisfied. Take, for instance, this one in the New York Times. It purports to be about this subject, but, while it reports some striking instances of cronyism and patronage, contains nothing like facts on which a reader could judge whether this problem is any worse than it's ever been, or even worse than it's been recently. It also contains the following sentence about half-way through: "People who have studied the workings of the federal government for years say this administration is no worse than President Bill Clinton's or any other recent ones in the qualifications of political appointees." This is followed by a number of quotes from such experts, none of which, carefully examined, actually say anything of the kind.
For another example, here's a story from Time, again going through the anecdotes, and quoting one of the same experts (Paul C. Light) to the opposite effect, saying that things are now much more "centralized" and politicized than before. So, from reading the reports filed by — one presumes — well-regarded journalists, not only can the concerned citizens learn absolutely nothing about whether the Bush administration is unusually incompetent and cronyist, they can't even learn what one presumptive expert (Prof. Light) thinks about the topic. Citizens might even wonder what "centralized" means here, and the news isn't going to help. The New Republic's list of the administration's fifteen worst hacks, while at once amusing, depressing and frightening, shouldn't actually convince anyone that "no administration has etched the principles of hackocracy into its governing philosophy as deeply as this one". It may be — it is! — unacceptable to treat the government of a free people this way, but it doesn't mean that this is anything new.
Let us not gnash our teeth in despair over the mainstream media, however: social network analysis can come to our rescue! What's wanted — but what the journalists don't provide — is a study where one builds the network of Presidential cronies, cronies' cronies, cronies' cronies' cronies, etc., and then asks questions such as:
Many people have asserted that networks of influence and social connection are important to how the modern GOP works — Henry Farrell reports that this is an important part of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson's Off Center, which I'm eager to read, and it's more or less explicit in Michael Lind's Up from Conservatism and John Judis's The Paradox of American Democracy — but nobody seems to have really studied this thoroughly. To do it right, you need to carefully define what you mean by "crony". Since, ultimately, the whole species forms a single human web, you want to only consider ties which are actually meaningful indicators of political alliance and, still more, of nepotism and cronyism. Also, you want to set out your criteria carefully and rigidly before collecting data, otherwise there'll be a lot of temptation to manipulate things as you go along, and the result will be closer to Lyndon LaRouche than to Randall Collins (or even Malcolm Gladwell). At the very least, I'd think you want to include the following kinds of ties:
Having fixed our criteria for which kind of relationships will count as links in the network, it'd then be necessary to build the network. A natural starting point would be the strategy sometimes called "snowball sampling": pick an initial target, say G. W. Bush, and identify everyone who counts as one of his cronies (by our criteria). Then go over each of his cronies, and see who their cronies are — Bush will be one of them, but presumably there will be others. Repeat this until either all the cronies are exhausted, or you're exhausted. Note that, if there really is just one network, then it doesn't matter whether you start with Bush, or Karl Rove, or Tom DeLay, or Jack Abramoff, or any of their other unindicted co-conspirators, except for the people who are so marginal to the network that you might reach them from one starting point but not another.
Once you have people in the network, we need to see whether they've been named to government positions (not necessarily confirmed, just named), and whether they met the legally-defined norms of competence for those positions. A simple scheme would be to code them 0 if they just met the qualifications, +1 if they were clearly more than qualified, and -1 if they had no discernible qualifications. This could be hard to do — some key positions don't seem to actually have any minimum qualifications at the moment — but something like this is necessary to answer questions like, "How much more likely are you to be named to a post if you're qualified than not, controlling for social position?" and "How much more likely are you to be named to a post as a function of social position, controlling for qualifications?" (For aficionados: I'm contemplating logistic regression coefficients here.) It's probably completely unrealistic to imagine having a matrix of qualifications scores for all people for all 3000-odd appointed posts, which would let us see whether favorably-situated cronies get named to posts they might be able to do, or just to any old thing, or what.
Now, to really do this right, we'd need to do it all over again, not just for the current administration, but for another one as a control — the Clinton administration, say, or Bush's father; Reagan or earlier is probably too far back. This seems to be the only way to answer questions like whether this administration is more centralized than its predecessors, or more likely to nominate incompetents. The crucial question, for us, is whether your odds of being nominated are more or less dependent on your distance from the center of the network under this administration than under previous ones.
Even without doubling our workload by doing a comparative study, however, simply seeing the network of cronies would let us answer some interesting questions. Who really are the most central members of the network? Are they people with formal positions of authority? Are they people you've ever even heard of? Or are they comparatively little-known fixers with huge address books, but no officially constituted authority? (Bruce Sterling, back during the Clinton troubles, compared our current mode of government to being ruled by some sort of literary movement, where often the most well-connected and subterraneanly influential people are not the most public figures.) Could we discern factions or communities, in the form of cohesive sub-networks? Is the president — the object of such veneration, verging on idolatry (no, that's not a joke) — actually at the head of his machine?
We could also compare the structure of the crony network to that of other well-studied networks of interest. Sageman looked at al-Qaeda, and while the comparison would be provocative, it's probably not really fair: al-Qaeda is very small, comparatively, and also very hard to study, so issues of missing data are much more serious. Perhaps more interesting would be a comparison with the network of people who sit on boards of directors of corporations, where two people are linked if they serve on the same board. This is a fairly sizeable network — some data sets contain over 7000 people — but one with very little formal structure. (Once you take into account the distribution of the number of boards people serve on, it looks almost perfectly random.) Economic sociologists have established that this network is a very important coordinating mechanism for big business, and, less adaptively for the corporations concerned, a mechanism for cronyism, patronage, and giving responsibility to incompetents. (Despite its coordinating role, the board network is not group which tells, e.g., the gas-station owners of America how much to charge for a gallon of regular unleaded, as apparently imagined by certain rabble-rousers who fear the market system because they don't understand it.) It would be interesting to see, then, whether the presidential crony network can be distinguished, in its broad, structural features, from the board interlock network, or whether they are both, in practice, acephalous.
It will not have escaped the reader's notice that I do not present anything like the kind of network I say we should find. In the immortal words of Stephen Pinker, "Good science is pedantic, expensive, and subversive", and this is certainly all three. We're talking, after all, about collecting and manually processing an immense amount of information on at least 3,000 people, and then doing it all over again on another administration. This would be a lot of work, of a kind to which I am totally unsuited; to get results in less than a year would need a team. Moreover, it is completely unfundable, unless the Ancient and Hermetic Order of the Shrill is now giving out grants to further the study of the "mendacity, malevolence, incompetence, corruption, uselessness, simple idiocy, or sheer disconnection from realty of the George W. Bush administration". Nonetheless, I would very much like somebody to do it, because it seems to me that it could actually answer some important questions about how our country now works.
Manual Trackback: In Search of 42; Green Gabbro; Crooked Timber
Networks; The Running Dogs of Reaction; Modest Proposals; The Beloved Republic
Posted by crshalizi at October 21, 2005 18:02 | permanent link
Wolfram Research has now released what is, without question, the most convicing demonstration yet of the power and utility of Stephen Wolfram's New Kind of Science: a cellphone ringtone generator. I will be terribly, terribly disappointed if these don't contain subliminal commands furthering a plan for world domination.
Update, 21 October: By coincidence, I've just run across this paper reviewing the history of using cellular automata to generate music, by Dave Burraston and Ernest Edmonds. (Pulbic-access copies of related papers here, under "cellular automata and music papers".)
Manual trackback: Three Quarks Daily
Posted by crshalizi at October 05, 2005 12:59 | permanent link
Start with your favorite large Erdos-Renyi random graph. Color all of the nodes, in such a manner that the number of nodes of a given color follows a strongly skewed distribution, perhaps a power law. (Exponential growth easily gives power-law size distributions.) Now form the aggregated graph, with one node for each color, and an edge between colors if any two disaggregated nodes of those colors are linked. Query: What is the degree distribution of the aggregated graph? (Inspired by thinking, while walking home, about attempts to model the structure of the Internet at the autonomous system level. Why I was doing that, I have no idea.)
Update, later that night: Aaron Clauset writes to point me to this paper:
This isn't exactly the model I had in mind; it's more realistic, for the Internet, than aggregating a static random graph. (I'm pleased to see that people who know what they're doing also thought to employ the idea that exponential growth leads to a power-law size distribution; presumably a re-invention, since they don't cite Reed and Hughes.) I remain a bit curious about the effects of aggregating a random network, but now will definitely not pursue it.
Update, 7 October: Aaron was too well-bred to point out his own papers on why many (in fact, almost all) networks seem to have power-law link distributions, when you probe them the wrong way. Fortunately, someone reminded me.
Update, 21 October: This looks relevant, if anyone's interested.
Posted by crshalizi at October 04, 2005 21:46 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: Promotes a technical preprint by some friends. I make no attempt to explain the science, owing to lack of time.
As you know, Bob, in the 1950s J. L. Kelly established that there were intimate connections between optimal strategies for repeated gambling and Shannon's information theory. (For instance, the best achievable growth rate for the gambler's wealth is set by the entropy rate of the random sequence of gambling outcomes.) As you know also know, Bob, the mathematical theory of natural selection is closely connected to that of repeated gambling (so that, e.g., John Holland's Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems is in some ways an extended treatise on multi-armed bandits.) This suggests that information theory could be useful in analyzing natural selection, and it would be natural to suppose that information about the environment should manifest itself as increased fitness somehow. There's been sporadic interest in the topic (e.g., J. B. S. Haldane, with his usual prescience had an early paper in this area), but really, in my humble opinion, not enough. By way of rectification, I submit the following for your favorable consideration:
Kussell and Leibler consider Markovian environments (technically, the environmental state is a semi-Markov process), and show that the fitness penalty paid for getting the statistics of environmental changes wrong is proportional to the relative entropy (Kullback divergence) rate between the organism's switch rates and the environments. Bergstrom and Lachmann consider only independent, identically-distributed environments, but go much further in relating the fitness value of signals about the environment to traditional information-theoretic quantities, essentially considering those signals as transmission channels. (They like thinking about the value of signals.) In both cases, my feeling is that, since the Kelly gambling results carry over to general ergodic environments (see the papers of Thomas Cover, especially the ones with Paul Algoet), the evolutionary results should too. I am not, however, volunteering to perform the extensions.
I happen to know that Bergstrom and Lachmann's work is part of a more general program investigating the role of information in evolution, because I've been bugging Michael to publish his results since I heard him talk about them at the first "Science et Gastronomie" workshop two years ago. I won't say any more, for fear of spoiling their surprises, except to say that further exciting revelations are close at hand.
Posted by crshalizi at October 04, 2005 21:34 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at September 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Or, the role of the amygdala in the remembrance of things past:
That is all.
Posted by crshalizi at September 28, 2005 17:56 | permanent link
Due to circumstances which I am at a loss to explain, I find myself on the editorial board of a new, open access, peer-reviewed journal, Structure and Dynamics: eJournal of Anthropological and Related Sciences. I am really happy to report that Volume 1, Issue 1 is now live, though I believe there are still some papers which are being processed for this issue, and the next two issues of volume 1 should follow shortly. While they are all good papers (seriously!), I will, somewhat arbitrarily and unfairly, single out one of them for special mention, on the grounds of popular appeal:
There is much more good stuff in this issue, though, and more to come soon. If you're work falls within the aims and scope of SDEAS, I strongly encourage you to submit.
Posted by crshalizi at September 28, 2005 17:50 | permanent link
Adorable pictures of orphaned baby sloths (and their teddy bears) in Costa Rica (via just about everybody).
(My class continues to eat up all my time. I continue to find certain of Bill's posts uncomfortable reading. What to do, what to do...)
Posted by crshalizi at September 22, 2005 14:24 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at August 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Since it is finally sinking in that I teach my first class on Monday, posting will be light for a while. So, read a book! I've updated the book recommondations in the sidebar, and put up the archived recommendations from May, June and July.
Posted by crshalizi at August 25, 2005 13:45 | permanent link
When you want a smart take on how the more robust findings of cognitive psychology relate to the social organization of interdisciplinary knowledge-production, where do you turn but to the Central Intelligence Agency?
I'm feeling lazy, so I'll quote extensively. (All ellipses are mine.)
Intelligence analysis, like other complex tasks, demands considerable expertise. It requires individuals who can recognize patterns in large data sets, solve complex problems, and make predictions about future behavior or events. To perform these tasks successfully, analysts must dedicate a considerable number of years to researching specific topics, processes, and geographic regions. ...The very method by which one becomes an expert explains why experts are much better at describing, explaining, performing tasks, and problem-solving within their domains than are novices, but, with a few exceptions, are worse at forecasting than actuarial tables based on historical, statistical models.
A given domain has specific heuristics for performing tasks and solving problems. These rules are a large part of what makes up expertise. In addition, experts need to acquire and store tens of thousands of cases within their domains in order to recognize patterns, generate and test hypotheses, and contribute to the collective knowledge within their fields. In other words, becoming an expert requires a significant number of years of viewing the world through the lens of one specific domain. It is the specificity that gives the expert the power to recognize patterns, perform tasks, and solve problems.
Paradoxically, it is this same specificity that is restrictive, narrowly focusing the expert's attention on one domain to the exclusion of others. It should come as little surprise, then, that an expert would have difficulty identifying and weighing variables in an interdisciplinary task such as forecasting an adversary's intentions. ...One obvious solution to the paradox of expertise is to assemble an interdisciplinary team. Why not simply make all problem areas or country-specific data available to a team of experts from a variety of domains? ...
Ignoring potential security issues, there are practical problems with this approach. First, each expert would have to sift through large data sets to find data specific to her expertise....
Second, during the act of scanning large data sets, the expert inevitably would be looking for data that fit within her area of expertise. Imagine a chemist who comes across data that show that a country is investing in technological infrastructure, chemical supplies, and research and development.... The chemist recognizes that these are the ingredients necessary for a nation to produce a specific chemical agent, which could have a military application or could be benign. The chemist then meshes the data with an existing pattern, stores the data as a new pattern, or ignores the data as an anomaly.
The chemist, however, has no frame of reference regarding spending trends in the country of interest. The chemist does not know if this is an increase, a decrease, or a static spending pattern—answers that the economist could supply immediately. There is no reason for the chemist to know if a country's ability to produce this chemical agent is a new phenomenon. Perhaps the country in question has been producing the chemical agent for years and these data are part of some normal pattern of behavior.
One hope is that neither expert treats the data set as an anomaly, that both report it as significant. Another hope is that each expert's analysis of the data... will come together at some point. The problem is at what point? Presumably, someone will get both of these reports somewhere along the intelligence chain. Of course, the individual who gets these reports may not be able to synthesize the information. That person is subject to the same three confounding variables described earlier: processing time, pattern bias, and heuristic bias. Rather than solving the paradox of expertise, the problem has merely been shifted to someone else in the organization.
In order to avoid shifting the problem from one expert to another, an actual collaborative team could be built. Why not explicitly put the economist and the chemist together to work on analyzing data? The utilitarian problems with this strategy are obvious. Not all economic problems are chemical and not all chemical problems are economic. Each expert would waste an inordinate amount of time. Perhaps one case in one hundred would be applicable to both experts; during the rest of the day, the experts would drift back to their individual domains, in part because that is what they are best at and in part just to stay busy.
Closer to the real world, the same example may also have social, political, historical, and cultural aspects.... In order for collaboration to work, each team would have to have experts from many domains working together on the same data set.
Successful teams have very specific organizational and structural requirements.... Effective teams require cohesion, formal and informal communication, cooperation, and shared mental models, or similar knowledge structures. While cohesion, communication, and cooperation might be facilitated by specific work practices, creating shared mental models, or similar knowledge structures, is not a trivial task. Creating shared mental models may be possible with an air crew or a tank crew, where an individual's role is clearly identifiable as part of a larger team effort—like landing a plane or acquiring and firing on a target. Creating shared mental models in an intelligence team is less likely, given the vague nature of the goals, the enormity of the task, and the diversity of individual expertise. Moreover, the larger the number of team members, the more difficult it is to generate cohesion, communication, and cooperation. Heterogeneity can also be a challenge: It has a positive effect on generating diverse viewpoints within a team, but requires more organizational structure than does a homogeneous team.
Without specific processes, organizing principles, and operational structures, interdisciplinary teams will quickly revert to being just a room full of experts who ultimately drift back to their previous work patterns. That is, the experts will not be a team at all; they will be a group of experts individually working in some general problem space. ...Intelligence analysis uses a wide variety of expertise to address a multivariate and complex world. Each expert uses his or her own heuristics to address a small portion of that world. Intelligence professionals have the perception that somehow all of that disparate analysis will come together at some point, either at the analytic team level, through the reporting hierarchy, or through some computational aggregation.
The intelligence analyst is affected by the same confounding variables that affect every other expert: processing time, pattern bias, and heuristic bias. This is the crux of the paradox of expertise. Domain experts are needed for describing, explaining, and problem solving; yet, they are not especially good at forecasting because the patterns they recognize are limited to their specific fields of study. They inevitably look at the world through the lens of their own domain's heuristics.
What is needed to overcome the paradox of expertise is a combined approach that includes formal thematic teams with structured organizational principles; technological systems designed with significant input from domain experts; and a cadre of analytic methodologists. Intelligence agencies continue to experiment with the right composition, structure, and organization of analytic teams; they budget significant resources for technological solutions; but comparatively little is being done to advance methodological science.
Advances in methodology are primarily left to the individual domains. But relying on the separate domains risks falling into the same paradoxical trap that currently exists. What is needed is an intelligence-centric approach to methodology, an approach that will include the methods and procedures of many domains and the development of heuristics and techniques unique to intelligence. In short, intelligence analysis needs its own analytic heuristics designed, developed, and tested by professional analytic methodologists. This will require using methodologists from a variety of other domains and professional associations at first, but, in time, the discipline of analytic methodology will mature into its own sub-discipline with its own measures of validity and reliability.
I have to say it's a bit obscure to me how Johnston thinks the development of intelligence-specific methods will rectify the central problem he diagnoses. (He might just mean that it can't possibly be fixed without such methodology.) That said, the whole thing's well worth reading, especially if you're interested in the earlier discussions of heuristic diversity, or interdisciplinary science. According to this, Johnston, a post-doc at the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, is by training an anthropologist, and has a forthcoming book (based on his dissertation?) titled The Culture of Analytic Tradecraft: An Ethnography of the Intelligence Community, which I'd now like to read...
The archive of declassified Studies in Intelligence articles, 1955--1976, has a lot of interesting stuff in it too, though the transcription into HTML is occasionally shaky, and it's not convenient to link directly to articles.
Update, 25 August: Henry Farrell writes to point to a forthcoming paper in Studies in Intelligence, D. Calvin Andrus's "The Wiking and the Blog: Toward a Complex Adaptive Intelligence Community". I haven't had a chance to read it yet, but it might be worthwhile. And, yes, this post was missing for a few days. I could tell you what happened, but then I'd have to...
(Profuse thanks to K. for pointing out Johnston's paper and discussing it with me.)
Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 20:15 | permanent link
Snow leopards (Uncia uncia) are big cats native to the mountains of Central Asia. They are not in fact particularly closely related to leopards, but they are solitary, beautiful animals (the young are intensely cute), and, unsurprisingly, endangered. Hearteningly, their numbers are actually increasing. Somewhat dishearteningly, part of this is due to an "involuntary park" effect: a lot of their habitat lies along the borders of unfriendly states, where armies exclude people who might otherwise want to use that land for grazing. (Obviously this excludes actual areas of continuing hostilities, like Siachen Glacier, site the "war above the clouds", of one of the most extraordinary, and pointless, conflicts of modern times.) You have to be very poor to find land like this desirable, but there's no shortage of really poor people in Central Asia. However, good work is being done by the Snow Leopard Trust in community-based conservation, trying to devise ways of actually making the presence of the animals beneficial to their human neighbors. (Iowa could use some of this.) The latest effort, in conjunction with the International Finance Corporation (a part of the World Bank group) is to bring this approach to the Sary-Chat Ertash nature reserve in Kyrgyzstan, next door to a substantial gold-mining area. Since the park rangers appear to have exactly one jeep, this seems like a good thing. In the meanwhile, if you find yourself yearning for some Central Asian handicrafts (and who doesn't, from time to time?), the Snow Leopard Trust's online store seems like a beneficent way to get them. (Via the Private Sector Development Blog at the World Bank.)
Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 17:16 | permanent link
Behold: The High Weirdness Project, a wiki descendant of the Rev. Mr. Ivan Stang's classic High Weirdness by Mail. As one of the people responsible, along with Mitch Porter, for producing High Weirdness by World Wide Web (back when the Late Chalcolithic of Internet time was just giving way to the present Iron Age), what can I say except "Praise 'Bob'!"? (Thanks to Modemac for the pointer.)
Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 16:04 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: 2800 words and many large figures advertising our latest scientific paper. More than most people will ever want to know about nonlinear filtering, cellular automata and coherent structures.
A year and a day after we began working on the manuscript, here it is:
Rob and Kristina worked out the fundamental theory and algorithms for this paper and its predecessor; Rob also figured out the order parameter for cyclic cellular automata, and Kristina did the actual statistical analysis. Jean-Baptiste implemented all our ideas (in Objective CAML), and ran all the simulations. Cris came up with the idea of local sensitivity, and pushed for harder examples. I pushed for local statistical complexity, and a lot of misconceptions.
OK, assuming anyone's still reading, let me give you an illustration of the kind of thing we're talking about in the abstract.

That is a picture of the time-evolution of a one-dimensional cellular automaton ("ECA rule 54", in the jargon), starting from a random initial condition. Space goes up and down, and time advances from left to right. What you can see is that, most of the system is soon dominated by patches of a single repeating regular pattern, called a "domain". Technically, each domain is defined by a "regular language" (a certain kind of rule describing the pattern), which can extend indefinitely across the lattice, and persist indefinitely in time under the action of the cellular automata rule. ("The regular language is invariant under the time evolution".) There are also things moving through the domains ("particles"), which are another kind of structure. All this is, in this case, reasonably easy to make out by eye. You'll also notice, if you look long enough, that every once in a while the domains are disrupted seemingly out of nowhere. Since the rule is deterministic, there has to be a reason, and it turns out, if you look quite carefully, that there are multiple phases the domain could be in, that the boundaries between regions of different phase act like particles, and you're seeing the collision of those phase defects.
As I've discussed before, understanding the particles and domains of such systems is important in understanding their dynamics, and still more important in grasping their computational properties — particles and their collisions are the components people use to build computational circuits in cellular automata, and appear spontaneously in CA evolved to do non-trivial computations. Accordingly, there's a fair amount of theory now for the regular-language patterns of one-dimensional deterministic cellular automata with known rules. (Important early contributions were made by, inter alia, Wolfram, Grassberger, and Boccara; the most general theory I know of was developed by Hanson and Crutchfield. Ilachinski's textbook on CA has a pretty good review, but it's still a live subject, witness Pivato's recent work on particle kinematics.) But "general theory" here means a general framework, where all the details still have to be filled in by hand, case-by-case, after intensive communion with the pictures like that figure, and with mathematical objects like the regular-language evolution operator induced by the CA. In the end, you can build a little filter which will scan over configurations produced by the system and identify the domains and particles. (Here is a figure showing the domain and the filter, from an old paper I wrote with Wim Hordijk and Jim Crutchfield.)
And then you turn to another system, like this one (ECA rule 110), and you have to do everything over again, because all the work you've done is completely dependent on that particular system. Use your old filter on the new data, and you get nonsense.

Now, unlike my co-authors, I am lazy, which means I don't like putting that much work into figuring out the coherent structures in one system, let alone many. This is the kind of thing I want a computer to do for me, with as little input or insight on my part as possible. (As Larry Wall has said about Perl programming, this sort of laziness implies a negative discount rate: you do work now so your future self won't have to.) More seriously, the primate visual cortex is a remarkable thing, and does a marvelous job of analyzing the kinds of patterns needed to get East African Plains Apes through their natural life-cycles, but it was never supposed to cope with massive collections of high-dimensional multi-variate data, which is what science increasingly is faced with. (Talk to, say, these people if you don't believe me.) Something more automatic and principled is deeply to be desired. We tried to find a generic way of locating the places where interesting, important things were happening, on the grounds that the most interesting and important things in the system are the coherent structures. In fact, we found two ways of doing this, which turn out to be quite distinct. (I was sure, before we actually had any results, that they'd turn out to be two ways of getting at the same aspects of the system, which shows it's a good thing wiser heads were involved.)
The first quantity, which we ended up calling "local sensitivity", tries to quantify interest and importance in the sense of "having a lot of influence on the rest of the system" and "small changes here make a big difference". In classical dynamics, you quantify things like this with the Lyapunov exponents, but for a number of reasons, explored in the paper, we ended up needing something different. Basically, we perturb a small-ish region in the vicinity of a given point, and then see how large an area is affected by the perturbation over a certain interval of time; the bigger that area is, compared to how large it possibly could be, the larger the sensitivity at the point in question. Areas of high sensitivity are ones where small perturbations influence the future evolution of large parts of the system; they tend to drive their neighbors, rather than be driven by them.
The other quantity is the "local statistical complexity", in essence the number of bits of information about the past of a given point needed to optimally predict its future behavior. You might worry that this is not an objectively well-defined quantity, but we'd earlier shown how to put those fears to rest: we showed how to reconstruct the effect state space at each point ("causal state reconstruction"), and then use some information theory and the idea of a minimal sufficient statistic to show this gives an objective forecasting complexity. The details are too technical to go into here (though the connection between physical complexity and statistical inference is pleasing), so if you're really interested I'll refer you to the paper. Complex regions, in this sense, are ones where a great deal of information about the past is required for optimal prediction — where a lot of the past is relevant to the future, and fine distinctions have to be drawn between similar histories.
In practical terms, what we did was take the original CA configurations, and then compute the values of these two fields — local sensitivity and local statistical complexity — at each point in space, at each moment in time, over and over again, and then compare those results to the original field. Here, for example, is what we get looking at the first example (ECA 54) — in order, the original system (repeated here for comparison), the system as filtered for sensitivity, and as filtered for complexity. (The darker points are more sensitive or more complex, respectively.)
Looking at this, all the little defects just pop right out, even though the filters don't know anything about the phase structure of the background domain, or even that there is a background domain. Now, when we apply exactly the same filters to the second example (ECA 110), this is what we get:
In other words, we see the particles cleanly separated from their regular domain backgrounds, and the particle collisions/interactions as well; they're as complex or even more complex than the particles. Since the interactions are what you use to build a universal computer in this CA rule, that's pleasing, but secondary.
Which is all very well, but there are remarkably few one-dimensional pattern-forming systems in nature, and the regular-language story gets weird and unsatisfying in two or more dimensions. Do our filters work in more than one dimension? Well, it depends what you mean by work. The defining math has no problem in higher dimensions, but how do we know that the structures they find are the right, important ones? We needed a two-dimensional dynamical system where people had already figured out what the important structures were. For a number of reasons, we chose cyclic cellular automata (CCA) — partly because they self-organize into cute spiral waves, partly because some clever mathematicians had already thoroughly studied the system, and partly because some of us had already written papers about them and felt comfortable with them.
You really need a movie to appreciate what CCA do, but my skills don't
extend to creating one, so I'll just recommend that you download Mcell and see for yourself.
Here, in lieu of that, are a few snap-shots. You can see the random-noise
initial conditions,



If you're a statistical physicist, you're indoctrinated into a particular way of thinking about coherent structures. You think of them as topological defects in the order parameter field, places where the free energy associated with the order parameter gets very high; and the order parameter is the variable which measures the symmetry broken by the background pattern. This is part of an elaborate, immensely-successful circle of ideas connecting broken symmetry, order parameters, phase transitions, universality, thermodynamic potentials, generalized elasticity and hydrodynamics — what have been called the "basic notions of condensed matter physics". But the application of these ideas involves an immense amount of trial and error, too, and tradition. When you're confronted with a new system, your first question is "which system does it remind me of?", hoping that someone else has already identified the right order parameter and effective free energy for that system. You then try to make them work for yours, find that they don't, and start tinkering with them until, if you are very good, things start to click. Making everything work out of equilibrium is a bear, and even if the next system you encounter looks similar, there's no guarantee that the same order parameters will in fact work there. (While we were writing this, we ran across this paper on a system with a similar phenomenology to our CCA. We tried their order parameter on our case, and the results were horrible.)
Nobody had worked out the order parameter for CCA before, but we wanted to
compare the results of our filters to more physical ideas, so we needed to come
up with one. This was basically the work of Rob Haslinger, who (unlike me) is
actually very good at real physics. After remarkably few tries, he came up
with something which fits the end-state spiral configurations very well (a kind
of discretized XY model, if
you're into this kind of thing). Here is a typical image of one of those
long-run configurations, on the left, and the free energy field corresponding
to the order parameter on the right.

Now here is what we get from the sensitivity and complexity filters. Let me
stress, again, that these are the same filters we applied to the 1D case
— we really, honest, cross our hearts didn't cheat, tweak or adapt at
all.

Clearly, both our filters pick out the right structures — though in somewhat different orders. It turns out that you need a lot of information to predict what's happening at the boundaries between spirals — essentially because you've got out-of-phase regions right next to each other, and so you need to think hard to see what things at the boundaries will do — but they're not very sensitive. Make a small perturbation on a boundary, and it's going to get erased quickly by the waves radiating out from the spiral cores. The story with the cores is just the other way around: you need less information to predict them (though more than background), but disrupting one screws with the whole spiral, making them highly sensitive and autonomous.
I mentioned that the two filters give complementary information; they look at different kinds of system properties, as we say in the abstract, and their values are basically uncorrelated. (You can find correlation coefficients in the paper.) Like I said, I'd expected there would be a strong correlation at least — that places where optimal prediction needs a lot of information would be places where small perturbations have a large effect, and vice versa. My co-authors were not convinced, and, as it happens, right. Remarkably enough, however, if you look at the pictures, they're manifestly identifying the right structures, but in different ways, like I just explained in the spiral case. (We go into the contrast between the two filters in some depth in the paper.)
The fact that the order parameter field looks almost the same as the
complexity field is, in my humble opinion, especially noteworthy. Let's see
them again.

The first is the product of Rob's insight, and the accumulated wisdom of the statistical-physical community; it is also a function of the current lattice configuration alone. The second is an entirely automatic product of our code, and the definition of local statistical complexity, and depends on the past time-evolution of each point's local neighborhood. It is not at all obvious that there should be any relationship between them at all. I admit that they're not exactly the same — they're only strongly correlated, not identical — but the estimates of statistical complexity are subject to finite sample noise, and I'd be willing to bet the difference is due to that. It would be grossly irresponsible at this point to claim that reconstructing the causal states gives us a way of automatically finding good order parameters, but the identity between those figures suggests something like that might be worth looking at.
Also worth looking into, even more, is actual data. Because the sensitivity filter depends on making perturbations, and lots of them, it's probably not suitable for many experimental situations. But the local complexity filter just needs observations, so in principle any experiments producing sufficiently fast movies could work. (Time resolution is important because we need to ensure that a change at one point in one frame can only affect a finite region in the next frame, or else our techniques break down. We'd also need to somehow discretize space and color, but digital cameras do that to you anyway.) For it to be really meaningful, you'd need either an effectively two-dimensional system, or three-dimensional imaging data; we've got some ideas on both fronts, but are open to suggestions. We also have some ideas about weakening the requirement of having a movie, so we could work with just a representative ensemble of snapshots, but they're not ready yet for public consumption.
8 March 2006: The paper is now printed, with very minor corrections; I've updated the citation above, but here it is again: Physical Review E 73 (2006): 036104.
Manual trackback: The Quantum Pontiff; Brad DeLong; The Statistical Mechanic
Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 14:26 | permanent link
It was almost two years ago that I (modestly) proposed to solve our geo-political difficulties by turning the Afghan militias into US auxiliaries, and legalizing drugs. Now I see (via Intel Dump) that the first part of this idea has also occurred to Roberto Bran, who recently gave a presentation sketching out the details on the model of the Gurkhas. When I said this, it was just a sarcastic expression of despair, but Bran is trying to make a constructive policy proposal, has thought carefully about issues like language training, and, again unlike me, has some idea of what he's talking about:
I spent six months as an embedded advisor under Task Force Phoenix with a Quick Reaction force kandak (battalion) and tolei asleyah (weapons company) of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Following that assignment, the 10th Mountain Division returned to Fort Drum and I was sold to Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) in Kabul, where I served as the Interagency Strategic Plans Officer and worked under some of the smartest men I have ever met. I don't pretend this qualifies me for "expertise," but at least I do have some practical experience.
I'm led to believe that this could be a good thing, if well-implemented. But I really doubt it will happen, because there is simply no domestic political constituency for it. (Thanks to Captain Bran for graciously answering some questions in e-mail.)
Afghanistan and Central Asia; Modest Proposals; The Continuing Crisis
Posted by crshalizi at August 19, 2005 12:00 | permanent link
Does Bush's endorsement of teaching the "controversy" over intelligent design actually surprise anyone? Hopefully not, and let's take some comfort from the fact that, according to a reporter who was there, he didn't seem too eager to discuss the topic. (Full transcript here.) As usual, only Fafblog is capable responding to the news in an adequate manner.
Still, for the record: there is no scientific controversy over intelligent design. The best attempts of the intelligent design movement to produce scientific work are, as we've seen, rubbish (e.g., 1, 2). I read them from time to time, but then, I also read people who claim to have found the lost city of Atlantis in Wisconsin, or unearthed the suppressed secrets of anti-gravity, and many other varieties of crackpot. There are two reasons why the best efforts of the intelligent design movement are rubbish. The first, and most important, is that the theory, to the extent there is a theory, is false. Still, I could make out better arguments for ID than they're managing to do; they are either not trying very hard, or just not very good. Which brings us to the other reason why those best efforts are rubbish: the goal is not to produce scientific work. It is instead to give lay-people the appearance of a controversy — to generate uncertainty and doubt — so as to give excuses to politicians like Bush. Organizations like the Discovery Institute do not exist to make discoveries, or advance knowledge; they are, rather, front organizations. In their less guarded moments, people like William Dembski realize this perfectly well, and say things like "intelligent design is just the Logos theology of John's Gospel restated in the idiom of information theory". (See Larry Arnhart's exchange with Behe and Dembski in First Things. Arnhart, incidentally, is proof that intelligent, conservative evolutionists are possible; he even has an interesting book on Darwinian Natural Right, about which more another time, perhaps.)
(Some other time, I'll talk about the history which links places like the Discovery Institute back to the first wave of right-wing think-tanks like Heritage and the American Enterprise Institute, and what those in turn owe to the intellectual Cold War and ultimately to the Communist Party (USA); but in the meanwhile I'll just recommend that you read Creationism's Trojan Horse, and the chapter on "the triangular trade" in Michael Lind's Up from Conservatism. — Paul Krugman has now written about this, without, however, going all the way back to the CP.)
The thing is, this leads to bad science, and, if an unbeliever can say so, bad religion. The stakes are more serious here than with silly "devotionals with mathematical content", but the issues are not that different. Doing what you must know is shoddy science, in the hope that it will provide cover for propagating the gospel, shows a poor opinion of your fellow creatures, of the gospel, and of God. Of your fellow creatures, because you are resorting to trickery, rather than honest persuasion or the example of your own life, to win converts. Of the gospel, because you do not trust its ability to change lives and win souls. Last and worst, of God, because you are perverting what you believe to be the divine gift of intelligence, and refusing to learn about the Creator from the creation. And for what? To protect your opinion about what measure you think it fitting for God to employ.
One of the greatest passages in the Bible is when "the Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind":
Where was thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof; when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?Creationism is a way of responding to this profound challenge by saying "I know! I know! You did it just like I woulda!"
Manual trackback: Crooked Timber; Nanopolitan; Signal + Noise; MoJo; Idiolect
Posted by crshalizi at August 02, 2005 19:29 | permanent link
In an altogether-too-precedented moment, I have just gotten spam flogging monoclonal antibodies.
Posted by crshalizi at August 02, 2005 14:07 | permanent link
Alife X, the 10th international conference on the simulation and synthesis of living systems, has just sent out its call for papers. As a member of the program committee, I urge you to contribute only your best work, whether it addresses what's been achieved in the last two decades, or how much further we still have to go.

You have until November 7th to perfect throwing up your hands and
yelling "It's alive!" your submission.
Posted by crshalizi at August 02, 2005 12:03 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at July 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: Log-rolling promotion of a paper written by two friends.
Some weeks ago, I directed noises of harrumphing approval towards Mark Liberman's contention that it is not enough to explain why humans evolved language, one must also explain why every other species failed to do so. Carl Bergstrom kindly brought to my attention a paper where he and Michael Lachmann do so at least partially: language allows us to lie.
Michael and Carl --- excuse me, Dr. Lachmann and Prof. Bergstrom --- consider a two-player signalling game, where one player, the sender, gets to observe the actual state of the world and send a signal about it to the receiver, whose payoff depends both on the actual state of the world and the action they chose to take. In equilibrium, the expected value of the information in the signal, averaging over all signals, is non-negative. However, for combinatorial signalling systems, but not monolithic ones, "the value of information conditional on a particular signal can be negative at equilibrium". Now, for any particular signal, you could patch this by applying a "monolithic" meaning to it, one not derived from the general combinatorial rules (as, e.g., learning "Of course I'll respect you in the morning" means "I don't respect you now"). But this doesn't really make the difficulty go away:
The problem is not that one can never assign monolithic meanings to phrases. It is simply that one does not encounter most phrases often enough to assign them monolithic meanings and as a result those phrases can be used in ways that confer negative value of information.... Combinatorial communication can efficiently facilitate large numbers of messages because novel messages can be interpreted simply from a familiarity with the message components. Unfortunately, this also means that receivers will assign meanings to messages without first-hand experience of the circumstances of their use — and thus certain messages can be consistently used to the detriment of signal receivers.Let me repeat that all of this holds at equilibrium, when neither the sender nor the receiver can do better by unilaterally switching to a different strategy. (Out of equilibrium, the value of information can be negative over-all, whether the signalling system is combinatorial or monolithic.) Of course this doesn't amount to a full model of the non-evolution of language, but I think it's a real insight. Now, if somebody would just come up with a good explanation for why the benefits of combinatorial communication outweighed this cost in our case, but not for cephalopods or lions or chimpanzees, I'd be happy...
Posted by crshalizi at July 28, 2005 11:55 | permanent link
A lot of work on neural computation just looks at understanding how animals process information coming from a single sense, but of course our ears don't shut off when we look at something, and it's well-established on a behavioral level that you can get more of a response with a noise and a flash than with either alone. Here is a careful paper looking at the neural basis of such multisensory integration in cats.
They start with individual spike-trains, and use those to build post-stimulus time histograms for the spiking rate, but mostly they on the number of spikes evoked in the first 50 ms after the stimulus, which assumes a kind of rate coding. (No attempt at working out a temporal code is made here.) They do, however, do a pretty thorough job of analyzing the rates, including a nice null model of additivity (using the rastergrams), and corrections for spontaneous activity. The abstract does a pretty good job of summarizing the results of this analysis. They use them to suggest a simple and attract model, but dash those hopes a few paragraphs later.
That most multisensory interactions were consistent with simple summation of modality-specific influences suggests that a very basic linear model of the SC might account for many of the current observations. For example, the fact that superadditive interactions were common only in response to combinations of very weak modality-specific stimuli suggests that such superadditivity reflects temporal summation of the [post-synaptic potentials] consequent to near-threshold activity on the auditory and visual input channels. Subadditive interactions were relatively uncommon; however, their correspondence with combinations of the most effective stimuli could likewise be the simple consequence of approaching an intrinsic firing frequency limit of the SC neuron. In principle, a qualitatively similar relationship between computational mode and stimulus efficacy could be produced by an integrate-and-fire model that includes threshold and saturating nonlinearities. [p. 6506]
Alas, as they say, such a nice near-linear model has two fatal flaws. First, it doesn't account for the variability among neurons, and the fact that "few displayed the transition in its entirety from superadditivity to subadditivity". Second, the SC gets input from the cortex as well as from the sense organs, and while blocking cortical input leaves modality-specific responses alone, it eliminates multi-modal enhancement, which is not compatible with the near-linear model.
As you may have guessed, there is no feline cuteness to the paper at all, though I am happy to report that "[a]t the end of an experiment, injection of anesthetics and paralytics was terminated, and animal [sic] was allowed to recover normal respiration and locomotion before being returned to its home cage" (p. 6500).
Posted by crshalizi at July 22, 2005 13:32 | permanent link
Another ancient draft post dusted off while sleepless in China.
One of the best books I've read on how science actually works is Stephen Toulmin's Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts. (It is, of course, long out of print.) The core of it is a set of ideas about how the social mechanisms of working scientific disciplines actually implement the intellectual goals of learning about the world, and rationally changing our minds, through a evolutionary process. (And Toulmin actually understands evolution in a sensible, blind variation plus selection, way, rather than some useless idea about progress or trends.) A lot of the argument is summed up in two of his aphorisms, which he admitted he exaggerated a bit for effect: "Every concept is an intellectual micro-institution" (p. 166), consisting of the people who accept the concept, and the practices by which they use and transmit it; and conversely, "Institutions are macro-concepts" (p. 353).
The natural question is whether one can say which institutions correspond to which concepts, and vice versa. This is a very tricky question, but an excellent beginning has been made by two papers on Camille Roth and Paul Bourgine, which I've been meaning to post about for quite a while.
While I don't want to suggest for a moment that the stuff about Galois lattices is window-dressing, the intuitive idea behind what Roth and Bourgine are doing is simple and compelling, and I think can be accurately presented without an excursion through higher mathematics. (The math is necessary when it comes to actually making the stuff work, though. And really it's pretty cool math in itself. To read more about it, it may be helpful to know that the structure Roth and Bourgine call a Galois lattice is also known as a Galois connection, because it's a relationship between two lattices. The Wikipedia entry on Galois connections is good, and explains where the name comes from, namely Galois theory in abstract algebra, which was, in fact, initiated by Evariste Galois.)
Start with an arbitrary collection of scientists; we don't care whether or not they have anything to do with one another in reality, at least not yet. These will have certain concepts they employ in their research. Probably no two scientists employ exactly the same concepts, but it's a good bet that scientists who are part of the same research community will have a lot of concepts in common. So, let's write down the set of concepts which are shared by all the scientists in our initial collection. This corresponds to starting with the initial set of all concepts, and then tossing out any ideas which aren't shared by all of our scientists. This is, so to speak, the conceptual intension of the group. Now that we have this group of concepts, we can ask "are there any other scientists who employ all these concepts?" That is, we take our initial group, and augment it with all the other scientists who share all the concepts shared by its initial members; this is the social extension of the concepts. Now, notice, we've come to a fixed point. If we took the augmented group and repeated this procedure, we'd get no increase in the group. (You might care to try checking this by hand.) Roth and Bourgine call such an augmented group an "epistemic community".
The same trick can be worked the other way, too. Start with a set of concepts; identify all the scientists who share them; and then add any additional concepts all those scientists have in common. This will get you to a fixed point as well, and so it will also be an epistemic community.
It's easy to convince yourself that if community A includes all the scientists in B and more, it must contain fewer concepts, and vice versa. This lets us define a kind of structure on communities, of the sort technically known as a lattice: socially larger but conceptually more impoverished groups sit higher in the lattice than smaller, more conceptually-distinct groups, until at the very top one finds the collection of all the scientists in the world, and whatever incredibly generic conceptual apparatus they all have in common (if anything). At the bottom are individual scientists, and their complete, presumably unique conceptual repertoires.
Just by itself, this is a neat idea for characterizing epistemic communities, but Roth and Bourgine, in their second paper, go further, and show that it can be used to actually discover such communities, more or less blind. What they did was take all the papers in Medline from 1990 to 1995 that included "zebrafish" among their keywords. They then identified, for operational purposes, the remaining keywords with the concepts employed in the papers. (Naturally, they are aware of all of the pitfalls involved in this.) They then built the Galois lattice of authors and concepts, on the assumption that every author on a paper employed all of the concepts in its keywords. This gives them a lattice of communities, and the striking thing is that their communities make sense. The top is a single community centered on the concept "zebrafish" --- no surprise. Below that are communities centered around words like "gene", "expression", "pattern", "embryo", "develop", "vertebrate", with high over-lap, and another bunch of overlapping communities based on "cloning", "stage", "transcription", "sequence", "protein", "region", "encode". These in turn sub-divide into, say, neuro-developmental communities (P. Z. Myers is probably in there someplace), or even just the spinal cord. Because this is a lattice structure, and not just a tree, there are sub-communities (say, changing patterns of gene expression in the spinal cord during different stages of development) which belong to multiple higher-level communities.
Roth and Bourgine check their results by comparing them to the ideas zebrafish biologists have about themselves, as revealed by tables of contents, review papers, etc., and by a native informant. There's much to be said for this, but it would be nice to have a more objective check. On the one hand, there will be many populations where there aren't handy native informants; on the other, people might mis-understand themselves, or simply have missed some important feature of their own organization, which could in fact be revealed by the lattice. Still, it's impressive how sensible the organization they get is, especially since the way they pick out concepts is, as they emphasize, quite simplistic, both logically and as a matter of language-processing. --- You could of course repeat this analysis on any population with partially-shared concepts and terms: scientists, philosophers, writers for science fiction fanzines, other literary intellectuals, modernist poets, (other) rappers, UFO-fanciers, political pundits, or even bloggers. The results would be interesting, and probably often pretty amusing.
As Roth and Bourgine emphasize in their first paper, simply picking out what the communities are is merely a preliminary to figuring out how they work, and how they got that way --- to understanding dynamics and function. Presumably there are relationships between, say, epistemic community structure and the structure of the scientific collaboration network. (I've already written at length about the "cultural epidemiology" they mention, so I won't repeat myself other than to say "Right on!") But you have to know what the epistemic communities are before you can ask how they're related to other things, and this is the nicest way I've seen to do that.
Update, 22 July: M. Roth writes to point out that he has a new preprint, nlin.AO/0507021, looking at, inter alia, the evolution of the zebrafish epistemic community structure from 1997 to 2004. I've not had a chance to read it yet, but I'm looking forward to doing so.
Manual trackback: Three Quarks Daily; 3rd Desk
Posted by crshalizi at July 19, 2005 13:45 | permanent link
This was mostly written in December, back before I went on hiatus, and polished up last week, when jet-lag had me getting up at four a.m. every day.
One of the commonly-accepted bits of lore in the physics of computation and information is Landauer's principle, named after the late, great Rolf Landauer, who first articulated it in 1961. This states that erasing one bit of information is always an entropy-producing operation, and that the entropy it creates is kln(2), where k is Boltzmann's constant. At a constant (absolute) temperature T, then, erasing n bits produces kTnln(2) joules of heat. Landauer's principle says that erasure is not thermodynamically reversible; a further, associated claim is that erasure is the only irreversible computational operation, and that, in particular, measurement can be done reversibly. This would establish a connection between thermodynamic reversibility, and logical invertibility — the ability to recover the inputs to a computation from its outputs, if you want to do so.
As I said, Landauer's principle is a commonly accepted bit of physical lore. Unfortunately, I have recently read two papers by philosophers — Orly Shenker's "Logic and Entropy", and John Norton's "Eaters of the Lotus" — which have managed to convince me that all of the usual arguments for Landauer's principle, starting with those of Landauer himself, are invalid. Both Shenker and Norton sketch out physical mechanisms which can store and erase bits in thermodynamically-reversible ways, or at least ones which are thermodynamically reversible in suitable limits (you may have to erase very slowly). There may be flaws in their proposals — detecting such slips is not my strong suit — but if so they're subtle ones, and I'm pretty sure they're right about the invalidity of the normal arguments. At best what has been established is that certain physical realizations of bit-erasure are thermodynamically irreversible, and their entropy production is at least kln(2). If Shenker and Norton are right (and I'm afraid they are), we have no good reason to believe Landauer's principle is a general truth. Where this leaves us, I have no idea.
(One thing which strikes me about this is that, while Norton and Shenker document what seems to be a widespread error, their implicit explanations for it rest on mistakes of reasoning, particularly confusions about when different sorts of ensembles are appropriate. They find no need to invoke the social or political interests of the physicists. Indeed, it would be absurd to do so; what extra-scientific interest is served by thinking that the minimum dissipation compatible with erasure of a bit is kln(2) rather than zero? While I have no doubt that one could talk coherently and interestingly about the social mechanisms which made Landauer's principle endemic among physicists — which carried the idea from his mind to, among others, mine — those mechanisms would seem to have little ability to explain the content of the principle.)
Update, 20 July: Dave Bacon has a good follow-up post; unlike me, he actually explains the arguments involved.
Update, 22 July: Cris Moore, writing in the comments to Dave Bacon's post, presents what may be a problem for Shenker's reversible eraser. I'd need to think about that very carefully. I'm still persuaded, however, by Shenker and Norton's criticisms of the arguments for of Landauer's principle.
Update, 23 July: A new preprint by Tony Short et al. at the Pittsburgh philosophy of science archive (just down the street!) claims to rescue a "qualitative" form of Landauer's principle. (Presumably they mean that any logically irreversible operation must be dissipative to some degree, if not necessarily the kln(2) formula.) I haven't had a chance to read it yet, and probably won't for a while.
Posted by crshalizi at July 19, 2005 11:59 | permanent link
An astute observation from David Chess:
By observing the length of time that the Bush administration stonewalled about the Plame affair before any at all credible actions were even hinted at, we should be able to estimate the time that it takes to extract an alien overlord from a human brainstem and implant it into a new host body.(Suggestions that the current Karl Rove is actually a clone of the original, grown specifically to take the blame, seriously overestimate the Greys' ability to clone humans; Cheney's heart problems are clear evidence that they haven't made this a high priority, or that the biology of the two species is just too different to allow quick adaptation of the technology.)
Posted by crshalizi at July 19, 2005 11:32 | permanent link

The atmosphere just outside Beijing is hot, humid, and almost unbelievably hazy. The atmosphere of the complex systems summer school where I'm teaching this week is, thankfully, rather different...
Posted by crshalizi at July 13, 2005 13:47 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at June 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Do you find these hilariously funny, or just lame? (Via Bill Tozier, via Ernie's 3D Pancakes)
Posted by crshalizi at June 16, 2005 09:45 | permanent link
Two more publications are now available (but were done some time ago).
One is a fairly straightforward paper, which you can get from arxiv.org.
This paper grows out of work Matthew did in Ann Arbor, when he visited last summer. (Our summer, not his.)
The other is a little more convoluted.
Now, back to work.
Minds, Brains, and Neurons; Complexity; Physics; Philosophy; Self-Centered
Posted by crshalizi at June 15, 2005 10:00 | permanent link
Posting will be light for the next few days, while I get various forms of work done. In the event you simply must have more of my prose to read, here is my latest (and probably last) article for the SFI Bulletin, which is the 2500 additional words on Scott Page's work on diversity I promised some time ago.
The tone is somewhat affected by the fact that the Bulletin is the functional equivalent of an alumni magazine for SFI --- it's supposed to make people feel good about the place and its work, and (hopefully) give money. Still, I think I did a pretty honest job of it. (On my own, I might have left out the bits about Scalia, and left in the bits about exactly what's wrong with The Wisdom of Crowds, but my editors were right on both counts.) Even at that length, I had to leave out a lot of things. The ones which I most regret, today, were the connections to boosting and other ensemble methods in machine learning and statistics, on the one hand, and to Charles Lindblom's work on decision-making by mutual adjustment and "disjointed incrementalism", a.k.a. "the intelligence of democracy". But I had the disturbing realization, when writing it, of just how easy it would be to turn it into a sixty- or hundred- page venture into social theory. Really, the subject demands a book; fortunately, Scott is writing one.
Now, back to the bowels of LaTeX.
Posted by crshalizi at June 13, 2005 12:13 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: Incredibly geeky exposition of statistical arcana, along with unbecoming negative emotions. Contains equations. Without some knowledge of calculus and probability, only the whinging will be clear.
An exponential
family is a collection of probability distributions over some space of
configurations, where the probability density at a particular
configuration x has the form
is a
(finite) collection of statistics,
, which we calculate on
individual configurations x.
is a corresponding vector of parameters, which essentially say how much weight
we give to each of the statistics. If one of those parameter is large and
positive, then configurations with large values of the matching statistic are,
all else being equal, exponentially unlikely. These parameters —
generally called the natural parameters — index the different
distributions. Clearly, any vector
, where f is invertible, could also be used, but the nice algebraic
form of the density would generally be messed up. (In information geometry, we'd
say that the family is a manifold of distributions, and the natural parameters
are one coordinate system on that manifold. Changing to a different coordinate
system would be the same as reparametrization.) Finally, Z is just a
normalizing factor:
OK, that's an exponential family — so what? Because the probability
density has this nice exponential form, many things are very easy to do. The
statistics
turn out to be sufficient statistics, so to do essentially any kind of
inference, we only need to know their values, not the complete
configuration x. Further, the values of the natural parameters that
maximize the likelihood of the data,
turn out to be the ones where the expected values
of the statistics equal their observed values. I think that calculation is
very cute, so I'll impose on your patience to actually go through it.
Now the derivative of Z has a nice form:
(If you worry about differentiating under the integral sign, I applaud
your caution. Imagine for right now that the space of configurations is
discrete, so that integral is really just a sum.)
So
I could go on about the wonderful properties of exponential families at some length — say, a chapter in a first course on theoretical statistics, or even whole monographs — but I'll forbear. The art in getting exponential families to work consists of picking the right set of statistics — the right functions of the data to calculate.
Some months ago — you'll see why I disguise the details in a moment — I heard a talk a statistician gave on a subject of mutual concern to her tribe, and to physicists interested in complex systems. As I've mentioned a number of times before, these two tribes essentially never talk to each other, so this was pleasing to me. Unfortunately, the talk itself was less than successful, and it nearly resulted in a highly regrettable action on my part.
This was because the statistician was doing something very clever, which should have been quite transparent to the physicists, but was in fact utterly opaque. She was trying to fit the properties of these systems using exponential families, which is why I bring them up. Most of the talk the statistician had intended to give was about how the set of statistics most people had thought were important in these systems actually turned out not to work, but a different, much larger set did, and that these new variables could be broken down into two sorts, which corresponded to two different mechanisms in the system in question, both of which had been postulated by physicists, but whose relative contributions hadn't been clearly distinguished in data before.
If there is any one idea in theoretical statistics which should be
natural for physicists, I'd think it's that of an exponential family. This is
because classical statistical mechanics is all about one particular
exponential family, namely the Boltzmann distribution. The sufficient
statistics
correspond to the extensive thermodynamic
variables, like molecular numbers, volume and energy, while the natural
parameters correspond to the intensive variables, like chemical potentials,
pressure and (inverse) temperature. Saying that you need to find the right
statistics to get good results is the same as our bit of lore that the crucial
first step is to find the right collective degrees of freedom — that you
can't hope to make progress until you've identified the order parameters, etc.
The normalizing factor is just the partition function (which is why I wrote
it Z). And the equality of observed and expected values at the
maximum likelihood parameter turns out to be entropy maximization (as Jaynes
pointed out sometime in the '60s).
In fact, none of this was clear to the other physicists in the audience, who were not (for the most part) dumb. They didn't get what the normalizing factor was, they didn't really get the difference between a statistic and a parameter, and they even had trouble understanding that finding the parameter value for which the observed configuration is more likely than it is with any other parameter value is not the same as finding the parameters where the observed configuration is more likely than any other configuration — that maximizing the likelihood is not the same as making the data the mode. Hell, some of them had trouble understanding that the mean of a distribution and its mode are not necessarily the same. At one point I wanted to yell at one of them, who was being particularly obtuse, "J., can't you even recognize a #$!@% partition function?"; but that wouldn't have been proper even if I'd been the one giving the talk, which I wasn't.
All this comes to mind, of course, because I've been writing a page explaining what I do, and why I'm doing it in a statistics department. I don't think I've ever been so glad of my new affiliation as I was when that talk ended. This was some time ago, now, and so I'm able to think more calmly, and can envision another seminar — the dual, as it were — where a physicist talked about "state" and "coarse-grained collective degrees of freedom", and statisticians were equally baffled, because they didn't realize he was talking about causal screening, low-dimensional statistics, etc.
In fact, I can only too easily envision giving that talk. But that's a somewhat limited ambition: my true goal is to produce work both statisticians and physicists will find incomprehensible.
Posted by crshalizi at June 12, 2005 21:10 | permanent link
Unscrewing the Inscrutable has a wonderful post on the evolution and biology of cats. The illustrations, in particular, are great (especially the Felis ocreata kittens). This shows up my own puny efforts as the jokes they are... (Via Majikthise, Pharyngula and Three Quarks Daily, all at once.)
Posted by crshalizi at June 12, 2005 10:58 | permanent link
How many people who complain about the Just So stories of evolutionary psychology actually go to the trouble of writing them? Thus Sharon Begley in the Wall Street Journal:
In the High and Far-Off Times, oh Best Beloved, the Man lived harmoniously with others. Although his heart ached when his Mate fell in love with another, and he raged and cursed love's cruelty, the thought of vengeance never crossed his mind. Seeing his Doormat tendencies, Women scorned his advances, and he never had children. His line ended, Best Beloved.
But the Man lived to see the birth of a New Man. When the New Man grew up and his Mate was unfaithful, he killed her. When his next Mate merely glanced at another Man, he killed her, too. His third Mate, he beat up to keep her too submissive to even dream of looking at another. Women became smitten with his power and status, and his line grew plenteous. His sons inherited his mate-killing instincts, and soon only they — not the Doormats — mated and begot children. And ever since then, oh Best Beloved, all Men have a mind designed to kill unfaithful Wives.
Kipling never got around to explaining how men's minds got wired for uxoricide, but fear not: David Buss, professor of psychology at the University of Texas, Austin, has. In "The Murderer Next Door: Why the Mind Is Designed to Kill," he explains that the male mind "has developed adaptations for killing." (An "adaptation" is a trait that conferred an evolutionary edge; those with it left more descendants than those without it.)
(If you think that's not really suitable for telling your Best Beloved, you should check out what some of the Grimms' fairy tales were like, before they edited out the bits that shocked their sensibilities.) Begley then goes on to give Buss's theory the serious consideration it deserves. (A hint as to her conclusion is contained in her story's headline: "Theory Men Are Wired To Kill Straying Mates Is Offensive and Wrong".)
Of course, the shoddiness of (much of) the sex-and-violence part of evolutionary psychology is quite compatible with (many of) the criticisms of the field as a whole being themselves shoddy as well. Chris at Mixing Memory ("The Best Blog in the World That Is Written By Me"), himself no friend of evolutionary psychology, here neatly vivisects one recent attempt at critique (which was hailed by Brian Leiter as definitive).
(Begley's piece via Darrel Plant, via The Tenth Skeptics' Circle, via Deltoid. Aside: The Murderer Next Door is also the title of a out-of-print mystery novel by Rafael "Abu Matthew" Yglesias, which is a much better book than Buss's sounds like; admittedly I say this without having read the latter.)
Posted by crshalizi at June 12, 2005 10:39 | permanent link
Over at LanguageLog, Mark Liberman contemplates the latest theory for the evolution of language ("it's all about cutting up dead elephants"), and raises a worry I've often had about the evolution of human intelligence in general.
In my opinion, the biggest mystery is not why we humans developed language, but why nobody else did. If language is so great, why doesn't everybody have one -- or at least the best approximation they can manage? Judging by their contemporary descendents, the cephalopods of 400 million years ago probably had as many qualitatively different communicative displays as chimpanzees do. Since then, surely, many other species have gotten into situations that motivated symbolic communication for fission-fusion scavenging, or for social group maintenance, or for sexual display, or whatever.
This is exactly right. One needs to explain not just why human beings have language, but also why other species do not — why can't lions talk? They are, after all, a highly social, sexually-reproducing species engaging in group food-procurement on the African savannah. Similarly, remarkably few accounts I've read of human evolution try to explain why other primate, or at least other great ape, lineages didn't themselves develop human-level cognitive abilities. Maybe all the possible selective forces Liberman talks about, and more, actually work, but they are all very weak, and for some reason only hominids were subject to enough of them to make intelligence or language cost-effective...
Update: In e-mail, Bill Tozier reminds me I have neglected the decisive factor in the evolution of the human mind.
Posted by crshalizi at June 11, 2005 10:20 | permanent link
David Byrne has an online journal, where he discusses life, music, spam, photographic iconography, what it's like being introduced as "the guy from Talking Heads", etc. Apparently he doesn't like it being called a blog; fair enough, since there seems to be no way to link to individual entries. (Via John Burke, who also provided the title.)
Posted by crshalizi at June 10, 2005 14:32 | permanent link
Posting has been light partly because of house-hunting (graciously hosted by John and Dani), but also because of finishing and submitting this:
This was really Kris and Marcelo's problem, and their solution; but they let me kibbitz. Still, since it's mostly their work (by a large margin), I feel like I can say that it's very nice, without tooting my own horn too much. Existing methods, like cross-correlation or joint peristimulus time histograms, can handle certain kinds of coordination between neurons, but basically they do it by making really restrictive assumptions about what patterns of activity the neurons might be using, and how they're related. If you look at cross-correlation, for instance, you're sticking to linear relationships between what happens at one time to one neuron and to another neuron after some time-lag, and ignoring non-linear relationships or relationships between extended patterns (rather than just momentary activity). What Kris and Marcelo realized is that you don't have to make this kind of assumption. If we had a way to discover each neuron's characteristic patterns of behavior, we could just look at the moment-to-moment coordination of those patterns. But reconstructing the effective state space, which is something we know how to do, is the same thing as discovering those patterns; and there we are.
Another nice feature of this approach is that, as we say in the abstract, it lets us get at global coordination in a way which goes beyond just averaging pairwise measurements. Since we use mutual information between states, it would be nice to look at the global mutual information — essentially how far the joint distribution of all the neurons' states departs from statistical indepdence. Estimating that global distribution directly is really hard, but it turns out one can use Chow-Liu trees to put a very reasonable lower bound on the global information, while only having to estimate the joint distribution of each pair of neurons. This is like ignoring higher-order interactions in statistical mechanics, except when they can be decomposed into pairwise interactions, and it's actually (see Amari) a kind of maximum-entropy approximation. Nothing like this would work for, say, correlation coefficients. — We learned about Chow-Liu trees from a cool paper by Kirshner, Smyth and Robertson at UAI last year; I'm surprised they're not better known.
There is no reason why informational coherence should measure coordination only between neurons. But that will be another story.
Manual trackback: Idiolect
Minds, Brains, and Neurons; Enigmas of Chance; Networks; Self-Centered
Posted by crshalizi at June 10, 2005 13:54 | permanent link
There are days I am glad I'm a mathematical scientist.
One reason papers like this gladden my heart is my basic intellectual cowardice: the sheer endless proliferating detail of biology overwhelms me, especially when something drives home the fact that we keep finding utterly new stuff everywhere we look. Here we are, looking at our own guts, and coming up with stuff like this: "Three sequences from two subjects ... appear to represent a novel lineage, deeply branching from the Cyanobacteria phylum and chloroplast sequences." See? There are organisms whose closest relatives are the stuff that turns ponds and leaves green living inside us, and until now we had no idea. And when we eventually look inside them, they're going to turn out to be weirdly complicated and uniquely strange, exactly like everything else. And of course the damn things will have histories, again exactly like everything else. Biology just doesn't stop, and at some point the details and special cases make me wish my head would explode.
Fundamentally, however, stuff like this cheers me up because my work does not involve collecting colonic mucosa.
Update, that afternoon: Oh, dear, I knew that last joke
was going to turn out to be a mistake. Really, I was aiming for a tone of
sour grapes adaptive preferences: I think this kind of science
is utterly fascinating, and I wish I could do it, but I just don't have the
ability to keep masses of detail straight in my mind which I'd need to do so.
This rather amuses the half of my immediate family consisting of experimental
biologists. So, pace my good friend Bill Tozier, I really would like you to
know what's up your butt; or at least like someone to know. Bill's post
raises many fine issues, and deserves a full response, but for now he'll just
have to be content with my muttering something about
quasiparticles.
Manual trackback: Crumb Trail; Pharyngula; A Thinking Reed
Posted by crshalizi at June 10, 2005 08:47 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at May 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
I present for your edification three pieces of evidence that the modern world is, in fact, a really bad* science fiction movie.
Needless (?) to say, only the last of these is a basically-hopeful development.
(Thanks to Rob Haslinger and Dave Rainwater.)
Update, further to the theme: Via Gary Farber, startling photos of the Baikonur rocket junkyard.
Update 2, 8 June 2005: Cell announces the coming of Mutant Laser Zombie Flies from New Haven!; trailer; one critic's view ("I am so not going to sleep tonight"). (Thanks to Edward Burns for the pointer.)
*: Actually, to cite precedents
from good science fiction, all three themes appear in Lem's great
Peace
on Earth. And, of course, it is well-established that we
have been "living in a Ken
MacLeod future since sometime not long after 9/11, and I wish he'd CUT IT
OUT" --- to judge by this batch of news, we're someplace in the back-story
of The Cassini
Division (or perhaps The
Sky Road, it's too early to tell).
Scientifiction;
Minds, Brains, and Neurons;
The Eternal Silence of These Infinite Spaces;
The Continuing Crisis;
Afghanistan and Central Asia
Posted by crshalizi at May 27, 2005 23:45 | permanent link
Regret, in decision theory, is the difference between the value of choice you actually made, and that of the best choice you could have made. Usually, decision theory considers agents which try to either maximized the expected value, or maximize the minimum possible value, but there are now some clever methods for learning strategies that minimize the maximum regret an agent will experience, which have some important advantages over those alternatives. (This is something Kris knows much more about than I do, naturally.) Interestingly, there is now also some evidence that this is a better description of what people do than is maximizing expected value --- at least, people with intact orbitofrontal cortices.
Properly constructing the kind of gambling task used in this study can be tricky, and this week's Science contains a comment claiming these experimenters made a mistake; they reply, and seem to me to have the better of the argument.
Posted by crshalizi at May 27, 2005 22:33 | permanent link
Responding to my parenthetical plea for artificial felines, Henry Farrell wrote to point me me (via BoingBoing) to NeCoRo, which (so far as I can make out) is a Japanese company manufacturing a line of toy robot cats. They have a page of QuickTime movies of the toys in action, with a presumably non-robotic little girl. Henry calls them "unnerving", and BoingBoing calls them "creepy", but I think they're charming. The manufacturers don't seem to have given any thought to making them interact with animals or with each other, as opposed to being scratched behind the ears, batting at sticks, etc. --- just as well, or I'd be tempted to get one as a playmate for Kara. (She likes to play with other cats, but needs to establish that she's in charge first, and they tend to find that a bit intimidating.)
Update that afternoon: via a correspondent who prefers to remain nameless, I give you Robokoneko, the robot kitten with cellular automaton brain, from the studio of the inimitable Prof. Dr. Hugo de Garis.
Manual trackback: Crumb Trail
Posted by crshalizi at May 27, 2005 09:04 | permanent link
The latest issue of Adaptive Behavior (vol. 13, no., 2, June 2005) is all about artificial rodents. Beside the humor value, there's really some very good stuff in there, particularly if you're interested in the neural control of action. Abstracts are freely available, but you need a subscription for the full text. (Sadly, none of the papers seem to recognize the need for artificial felines.)
Posted by crshalizi at May 25, 2005 12:40 | permanent link
Correspondence with a number of people who, for obvious reasons, I won't name, suggests that part of the reason physicists so much bad biology, sociology, etc. shows up in physics journals, is that it is "too easy" for physicists to slap together some shoddy simulations and think they're answering important questions, especially if they know very little about the field they're invading. My correspondents further suggest that the people who do this are likely to be the ones who couldn't succeed as ordinary physicists. This case is to be distinguished, they suggest, from physicists who become interested in other fields, take the trouble to learn about them, and, most likely, end up publishing in their fora as well as, or even instead of, physics journals.
Let me suggest, then, the following exercise, which should be fairly straightforward, if quite tedious, for anyone with access to the right databases and a copy of R. Take, say, Physica A over the last few years, and identify all the authors of papers on non-physics subjects. (I suggest counting quantum computation as physics, at least for the purposes of this study, for reasons I hope to explain later.) Divide these authors into the conquistadors, who only publish in physics journals, and the assimilated, who also publish in relevant non-physics journals. For each group, compare their publication record in conventional physics, as measured by say citations per year per paper, with that of straight physicists, who only publish on conventionally-physical topics. The hypothesis is that the conquistadors will have been less successful, within physics, than either the straight physicists or the assimilated. One should probably control for time since receiving the doctorate, and possibly for for the school they got their doctorate from as well.
If you do this study, let me know the results, OK? I'm curious.
Posted by crshalizi at May 23, 2005 18:00 | permanent link
Aaron Clauset — a physicist working on complex networks in a computer science department — has responded to my ramblings on the dispute between physicists and sociologists over networks with a very good post of his own, which goes beyond the immediate subject to considerations of interdisciplinary research generally. Like Aaron's writings in general, it's strongly recommended.
Aaron's post, especially towards the end, touches on the question of why we have disciplines in the first place. Various deflating answers are possible — for instance, some combination of medieval university tradition and primate territoriality. But I think they do, in fact, have a useful function in the advancement of knowledge. Researchers face what are, in principle, insanely difficult decision-problems: what topics do I investigate? what methods do I use? what background knowledge do I need to have? to whom do I communicate my results, and how? which other investigations are most relevant to my work? The existence of a discipline — in the sense of both a body of knowledge and a community of inquirers — reduces the scope of these problems; so does that of more specialized sub-disciplinary fields, and so on all the way down to research communities of, perhaps, a few hundred people world-wide. It is at this point that things are sufficiently manageable that ordinary mortals can hope to make some progress, together, on learning about the world. Disciplines and smaller fields are never completely isolated from one another, but the interfaces are restricted — anything else would be self-defeating. As science expands, both intellectually and socially, the decision problems get harder, and so the pressure to specialize rises.
(The existence of disciplinary specialization is not a logical requirement of scientific investigation. The blessed and immortal gods who, as the poets both ancient and modern affirm, dwell in the untroubled spaces between the worlds, free of suffering and occupied in contemplation, intellects vast, cool, and unsympathetic (this follows, etymologically anyway, from their lack of suffering) — the gods have no need of disciplines. Had we but worlds enough and time, our minds, like theirs, might "grow vaster than empires, and more slow". Instead, we are all-too mortal and all-too dumb. Disciplinary specialization is a response to this, which makes use of our capacities for communication and coordinated attention.)
It is for these reasons that successful interdisciplinary movements turn into disciplines in their own right — if people involved really are doing important and productive work together, they don't have the time or attention to keep up with their home disciplines, but they are keeping up with each other. The outstanding examples from the last century are molecular biology and cognitive science, but at finer levels of resolution you'll find many other examples. Also many failures, interdisciplinary movements which never matured into disciplines (e.g., cybernetics, general systems theory), though one can argue about how many of them deserved to fail, and how many were victims of time and chance.
It is not obvious to me that the field of complex systems is going to follow a trajectory more like that of cognitive science than of general systems theory, nor that it deserves to.
Manual trackback: Crooked Timber
Posted by crshalizi at May 22, 2005 13:58 | permanent link
Who'll give me odds that the US threatens to use military force to get South Korea to halt biomedical research before it threatens to use military force to get North Korea to stop building nuclear weapons?
(Thanks, if that is the word, to Rob Haslinger)
Posted by crshalizi at May 20, 2005 17:45 | permanent link
Attention Conservation Notice: A post of positively Holbonic length (over 2700 words), occasioned by physicists and sociologists squabbling over the turf of studying social networks. Includes a lengthy self-quotation and defenses of the author's friends. Plus, the title is really bad. You must have something better to do than read this.
Eszter Hargittai over at at Crooked Timber is a bit miffed about physicists working on social networks, the specific occasion for the indignation being a preprint on arxiv.org on social networks in the Eurovision song contest; as she points out, Kieran Healy tossed that idea out as a joke more than a year ago. She goes on from there to complain about physicists' habit of invading the field, ignoring all previous work and re-inventing sundry wheels. She posts an informative graph of the citation pattern of the small worlds literature, where physicists show up as one cohesive community (colored black) and sociologists as another (colored white), with only a handful of links between them, and closes by offering some choice recent quotes from John Scott, who I know of as the author of a useful textbook on social network analysis, which includes a nice historical survey.
I was going to let this one pass by, but Henry Farrell, in the comments, asked me to weigh in — which isn't such a compelling reason, when there's real work to be done on deadline (no offense to Henry), but I've been meaning to vent about some of this stuff for a while, and it gives me an excuse to do so. With any luck, I'll manage to offend absolutely everyone!
First off, I agree with a lot of what Hargittai says, and with the quotes she gives from Scott. My fellow physicists, for a number of reasons, have a very bad habit of trying to take up new subject-matter and not learning what's already known about it. Some years ago, in fact, Bill Tozier and I wrote a paper about physicists' tendency to do this in the area of biological evolution, and our guess as to the mechanism. I still think that's right, so I'll indulge in the dreadful vice of public self-quotation.
Mutatis mutandis, I think the same mechanism is at work in our incursions into economics ("econophysics"), network analysis, social psychology, etc.
- A physicist runs across or concocts from whole cloth a mathematical model which is simple, neat, and contains a great many variables of the same sort.
- The physicists has heard of Darwin (1859), and may even have read Dawkins (1985) or some essays by Gould, but wouldn't know Fisher (1958), Haldane (1932) and Wright (1986) from the Three Magi, and doesn't dream that such a subject as mathematical evolutionary biology exists.
- The physicist is aware that lots of other physicists are interested in annexing biology as a province of statistical physics.
- The physicist interprets his multitude of variables as species or (if slightly more sophisticated) as genotypes, and proclaims that he has found "Darwin's Equations" (cf. Bak et al. (1994)), or, more modestly, has made an important step towards eventually finding those equations.
- His paper is submitted for review to other physicists, who are just as ignorant of biology as he, but see that it's about equivalent to the other papers on evolution by physicists. They publish it.
- The paper is read by other physicists, because at least it's not another derivation of specific heats on some convoluted lattice under a Hamiltonian named for some Central European worthy now otherwise totally forgotten. Said physicists think this is cutting-edge evolutionary theory.
- Some of those physicists will know or discover simple, neat models with lots of variables of the same type.
The thing is, the quality of that work is highly, highly variable. Most of what physicists do in all these areas is at best uninteresting and derivative, but most of what all academics do in all areas of research is at best uninteresting and derivative. My impressions, as a reader of the literature, and as a referee for a lot of physics journals, are as follows. We do some good and interesting stuff in theoretical biology, especially in some specialized corners of evolutionary theory (viral quasi-species, hypercycles) and ecology, and on allometric scaling; a lot of what we do on networks is also good, and not just a re-invention of the wheel — I'll get back to that. (Though a part of me wants to ask whether there wouldn't be a certain comfort in a genuine re-invention, in seeing that even from a completely different starting point, you wind up with the same concepts?) In the (very distinct) areas of artificial neural networks and neural coding in real animals, we're actually quite good. On the other hand, our tendency to hallucinate power laws is a disgrace (as I've written here before), and there are times when I think that the best thing which could happen to econophysics would be for someone to come along and rescue its fallen practitioners by making honest quants of them. What explains this variation, I don't know — it's obviously correlated with how well physicists know the non-physics literature, but that might not be the cause; nonetheless I'm pretty sure it's real. In many cases, its effects are annoying-to-dreadful. I don't bother to read Physica A any more, because the overwhelming majority of its papers seem either sound-but-boring vanilla statistical mechanics, or wrong-headed at best. There is a reason why I find myself writing posts titled "I don't know you people", and why my first faculty job is going to be in statistics, not physics (and it's not that I can't get stuff into physics journals, thanks).
(I will not repeat my speculations on the causes which are leading us to do more of this in recent years. I do now have an outline for On the Genealogy of Complexity, and if you're really interested and willing to keep its contents confidential, I'd be happy to send it to you for comments. Nor will I renew my grumbling about theoretical physicists not learning statistics, since that's tiresome and anyway I have another post about that in prep. I will point out an aspect of the division of labor, however: in physics proper, the task of comparing theoretical predictions to real-world data traditionally falls to experimentalists, or interface specialists known as "phenomenologists".)
As for networks, I should declare that while I've never published anything in the area myself (popularization doesn't count), two of my good friends and collaborators are reasonably prominent in that area, and I know quite a few others personally. (I don't speak for my friends, of course, so the blame for what follows is just mine.) So there's probably an element of "don't say my friends are dumb!" in my remarks — as in many academic discussions, of course. But I've already agreed that a huge chunk of what shows up at arxiv.org — and even what gets through peer review — is not especially good, so this isn't intended as a blanket defense of work done by physicists, or near-physicists, on networks. (I say "or near-physicists" because I imagine someone like Duncan Watts is probably counted as a physicist in the graph Hargittai posted, since his doctorate is from Cornell's department of theoretical and applied mechanics, i.e., applied math, though he's now a professor of sociology at Columbia. Actually, come to think of it, what color do Duncan's papers have in that graph?)
Having now thoroughly cleared my throat, let me say what those genuine contributions are.
One thing I don't think the physicists can really claim as a contribution is computational data analysis on really large networks; while things like studying the collaboration networks of physics or biomedicine are impressive through sheer scale (as well as through results), something like Woody Powell et al.'s study of the American biotechnology industry is certainly in the same league. Another place where novelty can't be claimed is the idea of networks with power-law degree distributions forming through preferential attachment; Barabasi and Albert re-invented this in one of their 1999 paper on network growth, but the fundamental mechanism — multiplicative growth producing highly skewed distributions — was apparently first discovered by Herbert Simon in the 1950s ("On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions", Biometrika 42 (1955): 425--440), and applied to citation networks by Derek de Solla Price in the 1970s ("A General Theory of Bibliometric and Other Cumulative Advantage Processes", Journal of the American Society for Information Science 27 (1976): 292--306). The first people to point this out were themselves physicists. (To compare a small thing to a great one, if all western thought is a series of footnotes to Plato, then complex systems is a series of footnotes to Models of Man and The Sciences of the Artificial.)
(As another parenthetical remark: Price, by all accounts one of the great sociologists of science, was, as I've said before, originally a physicist. Like many of us, he seems to have always remained one at heart; he described his classic book Little Science, Big Science as an exercise in statistical mechanics: "[M]y first lecture is concerned with the volume of science, the second with the velocity distribution of its molecules, the third with the way in which the molecules interact with one another, and the fourth in deriving the political and social properties of this gas" (p. vii). Perhaps part of the difference between sociologists' reception of Price and that of later physicists, is that there were next to no sociologists studying these issues before Price!)
So where does all this leave us? Obviously, I wish physicists would bother to master the existing literature in new areas, before we start building models there. It's highly unlikely that all of the previous scholars who worked on the subject were idiotic or totally misguided — and even if they were, it's important to be able to say so with a clean conscience. As a physicist working in non-traditional areas myself, I find it both acutely embarrassing and professionally harmful when others of my tribe make dreadful howlers, or re-enact elementary discoveries. (There is a reputational externality here.) At the same time, I think it would be a shame if the offenses many physicists commit against properly scholarly procedure and etiquette lead others — in this case, sociologists — to dismiss our efforts completely, partly because that would be unfair to individuals, and partly because very interesting results, which seem to me to be relevant to sociology, have come from individuals who I've heard express the most withering (and completely unjustified) contempt for that field and its practitioners. (I can't, obviously, name names.)
After some thought, I am unable to come up with a flaw in the following simple plan (which means there are probably many): if you are a physicist and found you have written a paper on topic X, send it to a journal of X-ology. If X is, by tradition, a part of physics, by all means send it to Physical Review E. If, on the other hand, X is a topic in social science, then send it to a social science journal. Only if X isn't physics, but also isn't really, or isn't just (say) an analysis of social structure, because it's also an analysis of metabolic pathways, and says something new about nonequilibrium phase transitions, and says how to get a free pony, only then does it make sense again to send it to PRE — or Nature, especially if you have a good picture of the pony. (Even then, if we had successful complex systems journals, I'd say send it there.) As precedent, I would point to the way we helped invent molecular biology, publishing not in our own journals but in things like the Journal of Biological Chemistry. If you are worried about finding a social science journal which will not reject your contributions just because of your background and approach, let me take this opportunity to plug the new Structure and Dynamics: e-Journal of Anthropological and Related Sciences. As a recently co-opted member of the editorial board, I can promise that your manuscript will receive extensive criticism from referees from both mathematical-physical and social-scientific backgrounds — though whether the net effect is to make the review process unusually well-informed or completely blockheaded is obviously not for me to say.
Update: See The Structure and Strangeness of Interdisciplinary Research for a follow-up; there will probably be more.
Manual trackback: Dubbings and Diversions; MoneyScience; Structure + Strangeness; Idiolect; hakank.blogg; Easily Distracted; Crooked Timber; Knowledge Problem; Preposterous Universe; Something Similar; Michael Nielsen; Nanopolitan
Posted by crshalizi at May 20, 2005 00:03 | permanent link
Here is Kara, her air of feline self-satisfaction in rare form, while looking ridiculous from her nest on the couch.

Kara is a cat, so she gets to assume this expression whenever she feels like it. I, for my part, have returned the proofs for my book chapter, and handed off two manuscripts to my co-authors this week, so I'm sure I look as smug, and probably as silly. Rather than nesting in the living room, however, I think I'm going to go outside and enjoy the spring... because next week I'm traveling back to autumn.
Posted by crshalizi at May 06, 2005 16:26 | permanent link
For May Day, how about a distressingly well-documented book on how the Great American Risk Shift shows up in the labor market?
Their documentation for the descriptive claims about what has happened to the labor market and to career paths is compelling, and statistically impeccable; also completely in accordance with, y'know, actually looking around you. The writing is OK, too. (You can get a sense of it from the free PDF of the first chapter.) Firm-internal career ladders are gone or severely truncated. Many jobs have been intentionally de-skilled and simplified so that workers need less training, can be more easily fired, and their services more readily contracted out to specialized firms, which themselves have no internal career ladders. Surprisingly, increasing demand for technical skills seems to explain only a negiglbe portion of wage stagnation; engineers' wages have actually fallen, and even those for workers with computer science degrees have risen very little in real terms. Personally, I find this result especially distressing:
Workers with college degrees did not see significant growth in their wages during the 1980s and 1990s but were generally able to hold their own ground. Workers with less education, however, saw large declines in real wages. The increase in the high school wage penalty between 1979 and 1995 varies from one labor force group to another [typically in the range of 30 to 60 perecent].
Accompanying these changes, shafting the people at the bottom, things have actually gotten better for people at the top, such as their "new nomads". For these people, the management-guru fairy-tales about flattening hierarchies, self-direction, personal flexibility and creative work are, if not true, then at least recognizable. I have friends who qualify for membership in this class, and I suppose I do myself. (It would be interesting to know how many people in this category are the children of salarymen --- most, I imagine.) It's an appealing niche in many ways; it's a shame that the same organizations which make it possible for a small number of us to enjoy it currently rely on many others being stuck in the low road.
And for the really rich, of course, the last thirty-odd years have been great. There are so few of these people that they are essentially invisible in the statistics here.
Inevitably, perhaps, Bernhardt & co. are a bit less convincing when it comes to explaining why these changes have come about; it's simply much harder to rule out alternative explanations, and much of the data one would really like simply isn't there. (It's not enough to say that capitalists and managers will give workers the rawest deal they can get away with, because that's always true. The question is why firms and managers have become more effective at screwing over workers recently, and you can't explain a variable with a constant.) Given the kinds of causes the authors (plausibly) argue are at work, however, it's hard to see what they suggest really making much of a difference; my suspicion is that regional action would be ineffective, but that national-level risk pooling (say, universal health insurance) might actually do a lot to mitigate the effects of the new labor market. To be fair, however, I haven't gotten to the last chapter of the book yet, where they advance constructive proposals.
My feeling is that the transformation of the labor market is one of the most important things to have happened in the US during my lifetime (and it does pretty much coincide with my lifetime); its consequences are manifold, and often profoundly morally ugly. It is a great luxury to be able to think about this transformation, as opposed to struggling to preserve one's life and a modicum of dignity in its midst. Shamefully, my thoughts keep running in circles: we need political change to reduce inequality and the shift of risk to those in no position to bear it, but our politics is driven by those who've profited most from the risk shift (and their hired minions). The only way out I can see is some new form of organized labor, adapted to the new job market. What that might look like, I have no idea, but I am sure it will be resisted mightily.
Happy May Day.
The Progressive Forces; The Dismal Science; The Beloved Republic
Posted by crshalizi at May 01, 2005 21:45 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at April 30, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Why oh why do publishers require you to submit your manuscript in LaTeX, using their particular, and particularly ugly, style file, only to pour everything into Microsoft Word? Why oh why, if they are going to do this, do they not have a reliable way of translating the math into Word, where by "reliable" I mean "does not introduce an error about one time in four"? (Yes, yes, I know, we should all have nothing worse to complain of, or more onerous to do than sit in a cafe, surrounded by pretty flowers in bloom, and revise proof sheets.)
Posted by crshalizi at April 30, 2005 18:37 | permanent link
The lab my little brother studies in now has a homepage, and what kind of big brother would I be if I didn't call attention to this fact? And what kind of geek would I be if I didn't also call attention to his very nice paper on signal transduction in neural development?
Posted by crshalizi at April 30, 2005 11:59 | permanent link
This is not good, in several ways:
In addition to the deaths of well over a hundred tigers (unpleasant ones; I will spare you the details), this is bad because they Thanawongnuwech et al. can more or less show that many of the tigers which got the disease must have gotten it from other tigers: "Epidemiologic data obtained from this study demonstrated that all tigers that became ill after October 23, 2004, were probably infected by horizontal transmission since the animals had not been fed raw chicken carcasses since October 16." Infection from other birds can also be pretty much ruled out. It's worth reading in detail if you want to scare yourself about mammal-to-mammal transmission of avian flu, or you're curious about how, exactly, one determines what ails a tiger. (Via Majikthise.)
Posted by crshalizi at April 29, 2005 16:40 | permanent link
Speaking of light posting, let me recommend Hal Herring's six-part saga (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) of sex, econonomic collapse, meth addiction and Christian financial counseling in rural Montana. It's an extraordinary story, but I think anyone who's lived in the west or southwest recently should find the elements only too familiar. If it had happened here in northern New Mexico, the drug would've been heroin rather than meth, but then this region has always taken pride in its distinctive culture. (Via The Uneasy Chair.)
Update, 27 April 2005: My posting this a few days before Herring began covering the trial was pure coincidence. (Again via The Uneasy Chair.)
Manual trackback: Mark A. R. Kleiman; Unions-Firms-Markets.
Posted by crshalizi at April 23, 2005 09:20 | permanent link
I'm in Santa Fe for a small meeting on networks, and trying to do some work as well. (Finishing a paper is always an uphill slog, but I think we'll be able to see a very long way from the top this time.) Posting will be light for the next little while. If you want more serious stuff, you can try the notebooks.
Posted by crshalizi at April 23, 2005 08:46 | permanent link
Our new neighbors are rebuilding the house next door, pretty much from the ground up. Kara is intrigued by their construction supplies, and especially by the concept of prefabricated columns.

Posted by crshalizi at April 22, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: This is an unusually self-absorbed post, even for me.
Spring arrived very suddenly in Ann Arbor last week, in the form of actual warm weather. As Julie's mysterious co-blogger Mock Turtle said over dinner, within hours the mode of dress around campus went from Michelin-man down padding to Sin City. Other signs have followed: magnolia and forsythia and cherry in bloom, crocuses unfurling, the cat shedding all over the place and stalking birds in the early morning hours, the trees coming into bud, green creeping back in everywhere, boaters back on the river. It's all very wonderful and life-affirming, and like the previous two springs I've had here, makes you feel glad to live someplace nice. (I happen to think that where I live is an especially nice part of Ann Arbor, too.)
This is going to be my last spring in Ann Arbor. My post-doc here, as I've mentioned, finishes at the end of May, at which point I join the statistics department at Carnegie Mellon as a visiting assistant professor. (If you want to draw conclusions about the power of blogs, achieving success through social capital, etc., well, it's a free country.) It's a three-year, non-tenure-track position, with teaching duties of one course a semester. I realize it's conventional to say you're excited about new jobs, especially when your new employers can overhear, but I am excited: the people in the department are great and do very cool stuff, I'm looking forward to teaching again, it'll be good to live in a city rather than a small town again, and Pittsburgh actually seems like a decent one. I'm even kind of looking forward to house-hunting, which should be helped a lot by things like this amazing hack of Craig's List and Google Maps. (That last was kindly supplied by John Taylor.) As a former devoted reader of Invisible Adjunct, I realize just how lucky I am.
So: I'm looking forward to the new job, and at some point I will no doubt post some feeble confabulation about how this isn't really a deflection in my career path, but rather part of a Cunning Plan to put the stat. back in stat. phys. But today I'm going to enjoy spring here.
Posted by crshalizi at April 16, 2005 14:50 | permanent link
This was mostly written just before I went on hiatus.
Wolfgang has got me thinking about Newcomb's Paradox (here, under "2004-12-23"). It goes something like this. A Superior Being (perhaps the Medium Lobster?) appears before you, and gives convincing signs and tokens of its effective prescience. Then, being capricious, it offers you the following dilemma. It places before you two boxes. Box A is transparent, so you can see it contains $1,000. Box B is opaque, and may or may not contain <voice="dr. evil">$1,000,000</voice>. You can take either box B, or both boxes. If it predicts that you will take only box B, then it's got the money; if it predicts that you will take both boxes, then box B is empty. Which do you chose? I emphasize that the Superior Being has convinced you it is able to predict your behavior, and that attempts to fool it are unavailing. We can also stipulate that you're not allowed to randomize: it will detect you doing so, and smite you appropriately.
There does not seem to be a stable resolution, within the stated terms. If you chose both boxes, then (since the Superior Being can follow your train of reasoning), you'd do better to pick only box B, but if you do chose just box B, you should really chose both boxes: if there's any chance the Superior Being predicts wrong, you'll be better off, on average, by doing so. Better people than I have gone over this a zillion different ways, exploring all the decision-theoretic wrinkles, and still wound up like the demons in Paradise Lost:
Others apart sat on a Hill retir'd,
In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will, and Fate,
Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost.
Wolfgang suggests, in e-mail, that the best way out may simply be to reject one of the premises of the paradox --- that the kind of prediction the Superior Being is purporting to make is simply not possible. But this is also very strange. Human beings are, after all, finite material bodies, and it strains belief --- at least a physicist's belief --- to think that a limitation on the in-principle ability to predict the motion of a finite material body can be discovered by an exercise of pure reason, without any experimental data. Worse, there doesn't seem any reason, in principle, why a Laplacean Vast and Considerable Intellect couldn't integrate the equations of motion for your body to predict what it would do. (Pace Penrose, and even Mitch Porter, quantum processes are unimportant in the brain, so this just demands utterly implausible computational resources and measurement resolution: a piece of cake for a Vast and Considerable Intellect.) For that matter, your friends (and still more your spouse) could probably make a pretty shrewd guess about what you'd do, even if you can't.
My thought, at this point, is that the paradox shows us a limitation, alright, but not on the predictability of material bodies. Rather, I suspect, the limitation is in our ideas about rational decision-making.
The laws of physics are what they are, and I see no reason to suppose that human beings are necessarily harder to predict than, say, the atmospheres of gas giant planets; perhaps less. Psychological terms and concepts, in both their folk and scientific versions, provide a coarse-grained description of human (and animal) behavior with considerable predictive power, at least on its own level, and great concision. (Rather than belabor the point, I will refer you to my post about David Wallace's version of this story.) Psychology is a kind of approximation to the reality of human organisms, just as hydrodynamics and climatology are approximations to the reality of the Jovian atmosphere. (That we use those approximations to help mark off the objects under discussion is beside the point.) At the psychological level, we can say things like "Cosma is over-cautious and greedy, but his timidity always beats his avarice; he'll take both boxes".
Psychology is, in turn, approximated by our ideas --- or better, ideals --- of rational choice. These constitute an abstract system, which can be formalized in various ways, e.g., as in von Neumann and Morgenstern. I think what Newcomb's paradox tells us is that the situation imagined is one where the abstract system of decision theory breaks down and gives indeterminate results, perhaps because your being a rational agent, in the necessary sense, is inconsistent with your being predictable. Since we're dealing with an abstract system, it's not surprising that a mere thought experiment can show us a place where it breaks down.
Or maybe you should just take both boxes; what do I know?
Update, 18 April 2005: Thanks to Wolfgang for pointing out that I initially mislabeled the boxes!
Posted by crshalizi at April 15, 2005 20:11 | permanent link
Kara has a slight flaw in her character: she is a thief. She has, over the years, brought home several socks (including one matching pair, on successive days), other cats' toys, dogs' toys, and, most ambitiously, a small music box which she will stare at, mesmerized, when it's wound up and playing. It's been several months since her last acquisition, which I attribute to our unusually prolonged and depressing winter. Last week, as if to herald the arrival of spring, she got a glove.

I think she was disappointed when it wouldn't do anything.
Posted by crshalizi at April 15, 2005 17:15 | permanent link
When considering slime molds, about which I hope to have more to say soon, we should not forget their natural predators [cache]. (Via Matthew Berryman, in e-mail.)
Posted by crshalizi at April 14, 2005 07:58 | permanent link
In honor of National Poetry Month, Robert Pinsky has a piece in Slate nicely titled "I, Too, Dislike It". Here is my favorite poem by Pinsky.
(From The Figured Wheel: New and Collected Poems, 1966--1996, pp. 105--106. First published in Plougshares, 1983)The Figured Wheel
The figured wheel rolls through shopping malls and prisons
Over farms, small and immense, and the rotten little downtowns.
Covered with symbols, it mills everything alive and grinds
The remains of the dead in the cemeteries, in unmarked graves and oceans.Sluiced by salt water and fresh, by pure and contaminated rivers,
By snow and sand, it separates and recombines all droplets and grains,
Even the infinite sub-atomic particles crushed under the illustrated,
Varying treads of its wide circumferential track.Spraying flecks of tar and molten rock it rumbles
Through the Antarctic station of American sailors and technicians,
And shakes the floors and windows of whorehouses for diggers and smelters
From Bethany, Pennsylvania to a practically nameless, semi-penal New TownIn the mineral-rich tundra of the Soviet northernmost settlements.
Artists illuminate it with pictures and incised mottoes
Taken from the Ten Thousand Stories and the Register of True Dramas.
They hang it with colored ribbons and with bells of many pitches.With paints and chisels and moving lights they record
On its rotating surface the elegant and terrifying doings
Of the inhabitants of the Hundred Pantheons of major Gods
Disposed in iconographic stations at hub, spoke and concentric bands,And also the grotesque demi-Gods, Hopi gargoyles and Ibo dryads.
They cover it with wind-chimes and electronic instruments
That vibrate as it rolls to make an all-but-unthinkable music,
So that the wheel hums and rings as it turns through the births of starsAnd through the dead-world of bomb, fireblast and fallout
Where only a few doomed races of insects fumble in the smoking grasses.
It is Jesus oblivious to hurt turning to give words to the unrighteous,
And is also Gogol's feeding pig that without knowing it eats a baby chickAnd goes on feeding. It is the empty armor of My Cid, clattering
Into the arrows of the credulous unbelievers, a metal suit
Like the lost astronaut revolving with his useless umbilicus
Through the cold streams, neither energy nor matter, that agitateThe cold, cyclical dark, turning and returning.
Even in the scorched and frozen world of the dead after the holocaust
The wheel as it turns goes on accreting ornaments.
Scientists and artists festoon it from the grave with brilliantToys and messages, jokes and zodiacs, tragedies conceived
From among the dreams of the unemployed and the pampered,
The listless and the tortured. It is hung with devices
By dead masters who have survived by reducing themselves magicallyTo tiny organisms, to wisps of matter, crumbs of soil,
Bits of dry skin, microscopic flakes, which is why they are called "great",
In their humility that goes on celebrating the turning
Of the wheel as it rolls unrelentingly overA cow plodding through car-traffic on a street in Iasi,
And over the haunts of Robert Pinsky's mother and father
And wife and children and his sweet self
Which he hereby unwillingly and inexpertly gives up, because it isThere, figured and pre-figured in the nothing-transfiguring wheel.
Posted by crshalizi at April 08, 2005 13:48 | permanent link
Attention Conservation Notice: This is an attempt to increase the attendance at the complex systems colloquia by blogging about them in advance. Of minimal relevance if you're not in Ann Arbor or don't care about complex systems, modeling the spread of ideas and practices through social networks, herding and information cascades, fads and fashions, relating micro-actions to macro-behavior, or how to successfully launch one of those silly blog memes.
For this week's colloquium, we are very happy to have as our speaker Michelle Girvan from SFI. Michelle has done extremely impressive and well-known work on complex networks, perhaps most notably her algorithms for discovering community structure in networks. This week, however, she is going to answer for us a question asked by generations of parents, "If everybody else jumped off a bridge, would you jump too?", as well as its less time-honored companion, "What if they all told you it was 'gravitational therapy' and really good for your calves?"
Thursday, 7 April, at 4 pm in 335 West Hall, Central Campus.
UPDATE: Sadly, Dr. Girvan has had to cancel her visit to Ann Arbor. The talk is off, at least for this semester.
Posted by crshalizi at April 04, 2005 08:45 | permanent link
An unusually compact and pensive Kara contemplates her next project.
Posted by crshalizi at April 01, 2005 07:00 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at March 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: Brazen promotion of research done at the center where I work; worse yet, one of the authors is my boss.
I meant to write about this quite some time ago, but held off because I had too much to say, and still do. But seeing Muck and Mystery blog a third-hand account of this really cool work --- someone's notes on a presentation by James "Wisdom of Crowds" Surowiecki --- prompts me to plug the actual research here.
There will be 2,500 words more on this later.
Manual trackbacks: Muck and Mystery; Three Quarks Daily
Posted by crshalizi at March 31, 2005 09:45 | permanent link
For April Fool's Day, Mark Liberman (a.k.a. Mr. LanguageLog) has arranged for me to give a colloquium talk to his colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Research in Cognitive Science. I'll be speaking this Friday at noon.
This is largely based on my paper with Cris Moore on the nature of macroscopic states in statistical mechanics, plus some irresponsible speculations about coarse-graining neural dynamics to yield symbolic cognitive states, which should on no account be held against him. Hopefully these speculations are not so irresponsible that I will have to deny knowing myself, but we'll see what people with actual knowledge of the relevant subjects think on Friday.
(I didn't post about my last three talks, but what would this blog be without my shameless, yet ineffectual, attempts at self-promotion? )
Posted by crshalizi at March 30, 2005 22:10 | permanent link
Enough of eternal salvation and similarly unpleasant subjects! I present, by way of cleansing the mind's palate, Michael Farrrell's "saints & or: notes in the form of sonnets (millay effects)", from the last issue of the Boston Review. This poem is perhaps best described as imagining the result of a collaboration between twentieth-century America's greatest masters of the sonnet form, e. e. cummings and Edna St. Vincent Millay. It works better than it ought to. A stanza from the middle:
the season knows you as its own &,
the bay as it produces weed for you to;
put in a, pocket &, bring out a
hat never photographed & never; was your water drunk
the moons no, good except as hook,
to pull you back over the sands of dance,
you are not too tall to be a bird.
a sign i hope the wind ignores the
drops foreground what this is really about rain;
loss of focus &, ignorance of steps directions magpie
swoops they know something too from a different view &, ---
maybe on another day you or another a summers
day tanned, --- & feeling light youll answer who.
Posted by crshalizi at March 29, 2005 11:55 | permanent link
From Suburban Guerilla (by way of Brad DeLong), a remarkable little story from the Charlotte, N.C. Observer, proving that, as ever, the secret of great comic delivery is timing:
A church has withdrawn its support for a food pantry serving the needy because the pantry works with Roman Catholics.
Central Church of God explained its decision in a letter March 1 from minister of evangelism Shannon Burton to Loaves & Fishes in Charlotte.
"As a Christian church, we feel it is our responsibility to follow closely the (principles) and commands of Scripture," the letter said.
"To do this best, we feel we should abstain from any ministry that partners with or promotes Catholicism, or for that matter, any other denomination promoting a works-based salvation."
Loaves & Fishes isn't the only ministry with which the large church has cut ties, and Catholics have not been the only reason they've given.
The Rev. Tony Marciano, executive director of Charlotte Rescue Mission, said Burton told him the church could no longer support the agency after it allowed three Muslim students from UNC Charlotte to help serve a meal.
DeLong's response is perfect, so I'll quote that, too.
When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory. And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats. And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left. Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in: Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me."
Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, "Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee?"
And the King shall answer and say unto them, "Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."
Posted by crshalizi at March 29, 2005 11:46 | permanent link
Who among us has not, from time to time, felt the need for "Christian devotionals with mathematical content"? Yet who has ever found them? Look no further: Prof. Sharon K. Robbert, chair of the mathematics department of Trinity Christian College has prepared a whole series such devotionals, to accompany courses in single-variable calculus, multivariable calculus, discrete structures, linear algebra, differential equations and statistics. Linear algebra is my favorite, but I also admire the wit which links the idea of sampling a population to the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Sadly, none of Prof. Robbert's devotionals reference either the natural Wisdom 11:20 ("Thou has ordered all things in measure and number and weight"), or the apt 1 Timothy 6:20-21:
O Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called: which some professing have erred concerning the faith. Grace be with thee. Amen.
Joking aside, there is something rather sad about these devotionals, simply in their own terms, because they are so shockingly bad as readings of the Bible, being based on little more than puns. (I guess it could be worse.) At first I thought this must be a joke, like the creationist science fair web page that made the rounds a while ago; but this doesn't seem to be the case. Because I try to maintain a high opinion of my fellow creatures, I still hope that Prof. Robbert is not being entirely honest on that last-linked page, and these things were the result of, say, trying to comply with an ill-conceived order from the college administration that all classes must have a Scriptural component. But I'm afraid it doesn't seem likely. It seems to me that if you were serious about the Bible being the inspired word of the God to whom you will answer at the Last Judgment, you would not treat it in this profoundly shoddy, slapdash way. Yet people like Robbert are evidently both sincere in their faith, and devoid of intellectual conscience in matters pertaining to it. I am left with a psychological puzzle, and a strong desire to read The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind.
Update, 30 March 2005: Two correspondents write to point to related, and well-traveled, Internet jokes. Danny Yee says he prefers Theological Engineering Exam ("25 grams of wafers and 20 ml of cheap wine undergo transubstantiation and become the flesh and blood of our Lord. How many Joules of heat are released by the transformation?"). Another, who prefers not to admit that he reads blogs, says that "if you're going to make math puns, at least make them lewd", and links to this little story about "pretty little Polly Nomial" (work safe!).
(From Dave Albers, in e-mail.)
Manual trackbacks: Pharyngula; Geekable.com; hilzoy at Obsidian Wings; Random John; An Ergodic Walk; Thoughts from Kansas; Hey City Zen
Posted by crshalizi at March 29, 2005 11:20 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: This is an attempt to increase the attendance at the complex systems colloquia by blogging about them in advance. Of minimal relevance if you're not in Ann Arbor or don't care about complex systems, information theory, quantitative measures of complexity, brain imaging, or summarizing ridiculously largge amounts of data.
For this week's colloquium, we are very happy to have as our speaker Karl Young, from UCSF. In the early 1990s, Karl wrote what are (in my humble and quite unbiased opinion) some of the most important papers on quantitative, informational measures of complexity (e.g., 1, 2, 3). Then, mysteriously, he left the lush and easy life of complexity for the arid desolation of neuroscience, sustained in his wanderings in the wilderness by the ravens of NMR physics and brain imaging. Now, happily, he has returned to us with good news, prophesying the utility of complexity measures in making sense of brain images:
A preliminary paper has already appeared in Physical Review Letters, but I know Karl has a lot more done on this topic than showed up in the PRL, and I hope we'll get to hear about it.
4 pm, Thursday, March 31, in room 335 West Hall, Central Campus
Posted by crshalizi at March 28, 2005 08:26 | permanent link
I finally got a digital camera, so I can do normal cat-blogging.

I like Kara's eyes in that one, but this pose is far more typical.

Posted by crshalizi at March 25, 2005 09:00 | permanent link
Attention conservation notice: This is an attempt to increase the attendance at the complex systems colloquia by blogging about them in advance. Of minimal relevance if you're not in Ann Arbor or don't care about complex systems, historiography, social theory, Africa, imperialism, the formation of the modern world, agency or causality.
For this week's colloquium, we are very happy to have Prof. Timothy Burke
from Easily
Distracted Swarthmore
College, who will be telling us about some shiny things that have
caught his eye recently
4 pm, Thursday, March 24, in room 335 West Hall, Central Campus
Manual trackback: Crumb Trail.
Posted by crshalizi at March 23, 2005 18:00 | permanent link
More than zero but less than a third.
Two points seem worth making here. (Actually, three, but I only have energy for two.)
1. Obviously, the precise results are going to depend on exactly how various aspects of the model are specified. (For instance, Bowles and Posel assume that money makes only a logarithmically-growing contribution to fitness.) However, they report that the results are at least reasonably robust to changes in the specification and assumptions, so there really doesn't seem to be any way to get inclusive fitness effects to account for all or even most of the remittances.
2. In calculating the inclusive fitness contributions of relatives of differing ages, they take into account the over-all growth rate of the South African population. In fact, however, "remittances are slightly better predicted using reproductive values assuming zero population growth (which was approximately the case in the ancestral populations of the migrants studied here)", and this "is consistent with the view that contemporary behaviour may be an adaptation to past conditions", rather than to present ones.
Posted by crshalizi at March 23, 2005 17:47 | permanent link
It is, of course, altogether too easy to find crazy papers on Arxiv.org, without even going to the string theory section. Today's listings provide the following, brought to my attention by Mok in e-mail.
What really makes me despair for the discipline, however, is when otherwise respectable journals (i.e., ones where I am myself an author and a referee) print papers which are just so insane you have to wonder if everyone involved --- authors, referees, editors, type-setters --- were pawns in a cruel, implacable plot by which the editorial collective of Social Text has sought vengence on the world of physics.
The most distinguished (and funky) living scholar of parliament has wisely told us to "Free your mind and your ass will follow". I wish I understood why so many of my fellow physicists appear to confuse freeing your mind with never taking a moment to ask yourself "Wait --- is this just batshit insane, or what?"
Manual trackback: The Statistical Mechanic; Phersu
Posted by crshalizi at March 22, 2005 16:59 | permanent link
David Velleman compares academics to insects and slime, but in a good way.
Posted by crshalizi at March 07, 2005 11:00 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at February 28, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
Because everybody wants a box of chocolates and a long stem rose (update: well, not everybody), but some people want links as well:
The Onion's characteristically tasteful and tender Love Coupons.
The medical possibility of dying from a broken heart. Also from /dev/null: "An Australian company is trialling [sic] a testosterone spray to boost the female sex drive. The spray, designed for post-menopausal women, also works on young women wanting to get their bootywhang on; the only side-effect so far is abnormal hair growth."
Luis Rocha thunders against the lewd, depraved and unnatural perversion of puritanism.
Jane Haddam explains what's up with Americans and sex; also, old stories.
And so, one of the oldest stories of all: Inanna Descends into the Underworld (via Sappho's Breathing).
On which note, I must depart; but, before I go, I ask you to remember that
Love is not all: it is not meat nor drink
Nor slumber nor a roof against the rain;
Nor yet a floating spar to men that sink
And rise and sink and rise and sink again;
Love can not fill the thickened lung with breath,
Nor clean the blood, nor set the fractured bone;
Yet many a man is making friends with death
Even as I speak, for lack of love alone.
It well may be that in a difficult hour,
Pinned down by pain and moaning for release,
Or nagged by want past resolution's power,
I might be driven to sell your love for peace,
Or trade the memory of this night for food.
It well may be. I do not think I would.
Posted by crshalizi at February 14, 2005 09:00 | permanent link
A (positive) number of people have written to ask me not to stop blogging. Rest assured this isn't permanent; I'll start up again. Right now, though, there are seven partially-finished papers sitting on my computer desktop. Regular posting will resume when they're done, or at least when I can pass them off to my co-authors. I'll probably keep updating the reading list in the sidebar, but that's it.
In the meanwhile, I have been going over my bookshelves in a rather jaundiced mood. Taking each volume into my hands, I ask, Does it contain anything I will want to read again? No. Does it contain anything I will get around to reading at all? No. Did I buy it a few weeks before a friend who knows my tastes too well gave me a copy? Yes. Commit it then to the flames of the second-hand book market: for it can contain nothing that's worth the shelf-space. Suffering as I do from the same weakness as Hurree Babu, there are rather a lot of books in the first two categories. (Some might ask why I didn't do this long since, and I wouldn't have a good answer.) Interested parties can look at the listings; I may add some more this weekend.
Posted by crshalizi at February 08, 2005 16:11 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at January 31, 2005 23:59 | permanent link
I've been nominated for a Koufax Award again, not for "best writing" like last year, but as "most deserving of wider recognition".
This would come on the same day when I'd more or less decided to stop posting for the indefinite future.
Posted by crshalizi at January 13, 2005 09:32 | permanent link
Posted by crshalizi at January 05, 2005 16:01 | permanent link